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Seaport investment is lumpy, entails a long gestation period and has been referred to as a 
sunk cost. While seaport infrastructures have long been recognized to be a contributor of 
seaport performance, research on seaport competitiveness, a popular theme among 
mainstream maritime studies, has not directed sufficient efforts to understand the role of 
resource management in building seaport competitiveness. Instead, the dominant focus has 
been on seaport location, productivity and efficiency, price, connectivity, and organization. 
The manner in which global seaports manage their capital-intensive resources to develop 
contingent dynamic capacities and capabilities to confront the changing dynamics in the 
maritime market has not been systematically examined. 
Using a qualitative multiple case study approach, this study traces the developmental paths of 
three geo-politically distinctive global seaports - Dubai, Kaohsiung, and Rotterdam - to 
examine how they achieved competitive advantages since the advent of containerization. 
Drawing on the tenets of resource-based view, organization learning, dynamic capability and 
contingency theories, this research reviewed and interpreted the planned actions of the three 
seaports from the perspective of resource structuring, bundling and leveraging to develop 
constructs of strategic resource management. 
From the strategic actions taken by the three case seaports, the study identifies eight resource 
management constructs couched within four basic capability building blocks that were 
instrumental in helping them to achieve, and maintain, their global competitiveness: a capital-
intensive regime of developing logistics support infrastructure, a parallel program of utilizing 
resources in a complementary manner, a dynamically agile capability of coupling, de-
coupling, and recoupling to renew resource utilization efficiency in response to external 
changes (regional market dynamics, industry trends), and a capability of re-orienting the use 
of tangible assets as an exit strategy to develop intangible resources to adapt to unfolding 
events. The judicious blend of the eight resource management constructs underpins the 
developmental paths of the three case seaports as they navigated the environmental 
contingencies posed by the dynamics of the regional competition they faced against the 
backdrop of the size of their hinterland and foreland. 
Offering a fresh perspective on understanding how global seaports compete by developing 
contingent dynamic capabilities, this study presents six working propositions, opening an 
avenue for building a theory of global seaport competitiveness based on seaport resource 
management. 
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1.1 Motivation of Study 
This study examines how global seaports structure, bundle, and leverage their physical 
resources and develop dynamic capabilities (also referred to as intangible resources) to cope 
with changes in the maritime industry to achieve sustainable competitive advantages. It is 
motivated by the lack of documented findings on the contributory role of seaport physical 
assets, infrastructures and superstructures in seaport performance (Da Cruz et al., 2013b), in 
particular how global seaports manage these physical resources to achieve and/or maintain 
their competitive strength. 
Seaport investment has been characterised as lumpy (Donaghy, 2012) and indivisible (Ho and 
Ho, 2006). It also generates sizeable external costs, attributable to both the direct effects of 
the seaport infrastructure created as well as the indirect transport activities resulting from the 
operations of the seaport (Musso et al., 2006). Similar to other large-scale infrastructure 
developments, seaport projects also entail long gestation periods from planning to 
construction to operations (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943, Nurkse, 1966, Ahmed and Donovan, 
1992, Plympton and Brunker, 1992). This means that the payback period for seaport 
investment is exceedingly lengthy, which also implies that seaport development is a high-risk 
investment (Musso et al., 2006). Further, seaport developments are both location and 
operation specific. Once developed, seaport infrastructures and associated superstructures 
would be hard to be deployed for other uses within the same location or to be transported to 
other seaports for use. Seaport development costs, as such, have been referred to as “sunk” 
(Musso et al., 2006, Helm, 2009), which implies that seaport investments would be “lost 
whenever the investor decides to withdraw from the market”(Musso et al., 2006, p.175). 
Seaport developments, in short, are non-retractable investment decisions. 
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Wiegmans et al. (2002) viewed seaport investment as the creation of throughput capacity. 
They argued that seaport investments are largely related to capital goods, such as the 
construction of piers, wharfs, yards and breakwaters; the building of terminal superstructure, 
like cranes and means of transport; as well as assets used for storage or production of port 
services that expand throughput capacity (Wiegmans et al., 2002).  
Itoh (2002) argued that port operations efficiency is contingent upon the design and 
maintenance of its physical infrastructures, ranging from berths to channels, cargo handling 
equipment to stacking areas and warehouses as well as accessibility to water-side and other 
land-side facilities. This argument is confirmed by Limao and Venables (2001), who found 
that seaport infrastructure quality strongly affects seaport efficiency and is also an important 
determinant of transport costs, with 40% of predicted transport costs attributable to poor 
infrastructure (Limao and Venables, 2001).  
From the investment perspective, developments involving sunk costs would, expectedly, 
invite utility maximization, not to mention that global seaports have been relentlessly 
pressured to upscale their infrastructures by continual increase in vessel sizes (Da Cruz et al., 
2013b) and reconfigure their spatial and functional logistical linkages with the persistent 
surge in inter-modality (Notteboom and Rodrigue, 2005). Given that cargo-handling is a 
seaport's core business (Haralambides, 2002), it would be unimaginable to assume that 
seaports do not leverage their capital-intensive infrastructural resources to increase their 
throughputs, referred to by Wiegmans et al. (2002) as a seaport’s main product.  
To a large extent, the apparent importance of seaport physical infrastructure in contributing to 
the performance of seaport has long been recognized, evidenced from the list of factors 
identified by UNCTAD (1992), Rugman and Verbeke (1993), and Fleming and Baird (1999) 
as contributing to the competitive position of seaports. In these early studies, the status of 
physical infrastructure has been invariably pointed in the form of hinterland networks, 
availability and efficiency of transportation, and port information systems (UNCTAD, 1992), 
related and supporting industries (Rugman and Verbeke, 1993), and seaports accessibility 
(land and sea) and productivity (Fleming and Baird, 1999).  
Despite such early widespread recognition on the role physical resources play in seaport 
performance, relatively few studies on seaport competition have analyzed the contribution of 
seaport physical resources to enabling seaports to achieve sustainable competitive advantages 
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(Da Cruz et al., 2013b). Instead, research on seaport competition and competitiveness has 
tended to concentrate on efficiency evaluation and cost-benefit analysis, investigating sources 
of seaport competitiveness (e.g. Peters, 2001; Lirn et al., 2004; Tongzon and Heng, 2005; De 
Langen, 2007) and evaluating seaport competitiveness based on a variety of performance 
measures and benchmarking methods (e.g. terminals, and supply chains). The significance of 
seaport’s physical resources as a contributor to overall seaport performance has rarely been 
explored (Da Cruz et al., 2013b). Even when seaport’s physical resources were used as an 
indicator in studying seaport performance levels (Itoh, 2002, Cullinane et al., 2004, 
Quaresma Dias et al., 2009), Da Cruz et al. (2013b) pointed out that “this indicator was 
neither analysed individually nor was its contribution to the overall performance studied” (p. 
589).  
The lack of focus on resource-based analysis among seaport competitiveness studies may be 
partly attributable to the appeal of approaches adhering to Porter’s (1980) principles of 
competitive advantage: achieving cost reduction through scale economies, differentiation (in 
particular through the range of services offered), and competitor analysis (Panayides, 2003). 
In organizational studies, Grant (1991) had contended that regardless of the level of emphasis 
management has placed on issues related to strategic positioning through cost advantages and 
service or product differentiation, the fundamental factor underpinning these choices is 
deployment of resources available to the firm. In the seaport industry, Sletmo and Holste 
(1993) also conceded that maritime organizations would not be able to achieve 
competitiveness by solely relying on Porter’s (1980) three generic strategies, but have to 
invoke use of intangible resources (e.g., staff with tacit knowledge and specific seaport 
related skills) in line with tenets of the resource-based view (Rumelt, 1984, Wernerfelt, 1984, 
Barney, 1991). Likewise, Robinson (2005) also reasoned that a strategy is an organization’s 
response to external conditions using its distinctive bundle of resources and capabilities.  
In organizational studies, the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm (Barney, 1991) and 
dynamic capability (DC) theory (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000) have been widely used to 
explain how firms exploit resources to develop capabilities and competencies, leading 
ultimately to competitive advantage (Javidan, 1998).  The theories of RBV and DC are no 
strangers to the logistics and supply chain literature either.  For instance, Olavarrieta and 
Ellinger (1997) explored the applicability of RBV in strategic logistics research. Lai et al. 
(2008) and Wong and Karia (2010) also drew on the tenets of RBV to explain the competitive 
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advantage of logistics service providers. Competitiveness of airports and airlines had also 
been examined from a resource-based perspective by Van de Rijt and Santema (2005), 
Bitelmal (2010) and Jifri (2016).  
Within the maritime industry, by contrast, only a few studies have applied resources and 
capabilities theories to examine issues related to seaport competitiveness (Panayides and 
Gray, 1999, Haezendonck et al., 2001, Gordon et al., 2005, Azevedo and Ferreira, 2008, Da 
Cruz et al., 2013b, Cho and Kim, 2015, Wong et al., 2017).  In general, these studies have 
found that unique combination of tangible and intangible seaport resources are among the key 
factors contributing to seaport competitiveness and performance (Da Cruz et al., 2013b). 
These studies, however, are primarily single case cross-sectional analysis, such as 
Haezendonck et al.’s (2001) study of Antwerp, Gordon et al.’s (2005) study of Singapore, 
and Azevedo and Ferreira’s (2008) investigation of Sines, which renders their findings 
fragmentary. No attempts have been made to examine the developmental paths of global 
seaports using a longitudinal analysis. Little emphasis has been given to exploring the 
resource management strategies employed by port authorities to achieve competitiveness in 
respond to external circumstances. In short, the manner in which global seaports have 
structured, bundled and leveraged their resources to gain competitiveness within the context 
of evolving environmental contingencies remains largely unexplored. This study was 
designed to fill that void. 
1.2 Research Focus  
This study will extend the resource-based line of enquiry by combining four major 
management theories – RBV, Organization Learning, Contingency and Dynamic Capabilities 
theories – to examine the resource development and management paths of three global 
seaports – Port of Dubai (PoD), Port of Kaohsiung (PoK) and Port of Rotterdam (PoR) - to 
answer the following primary research question:  
How do global container seaports manage their resource base to achieve competitiveness? 
The focus on resource management is intended to be inclusive, covering the entire gamut of 
activities referred to in the organizational studies literature (see e.g., Rumelt, 1984; 
Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991; Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Zollo and Winter, 1999; 
Karim and Mitchell, 2000; Barney and Arikan, 2001; Priem and Butler, 2001; Teece, 2007), 
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which include: planning, developing, building, bundling, using, adjusting, configuring, 
organizing, deploying and leveraging of resources. In developing their conceptual model of 
resource management process, Sirmon et al. (2007) group all these activities into three 
partially sequential processes: structuring, bundling and leveraging. 
The research will delve into the developmental paths that had been navigated by the three 
case global seaports, and the strategies they deployed in building their competitive 
capabilities and in sustaining their competitive positions among the top container seaports in 
the world over the last five decades, i.e., since the advent of containerization. It will use a 
grounded-theory approach to qualitatively assess how global seaports attained and maintained 
competitiveness through strategic resource management to develop dynamic capability, and 
achieve fits within the contingencies of the environment in which they operated. Specifically, 
the analysis will use a two-dimensional framework formed by “strength of regional 
competition” as one dimension and “size of hinterland and foreland” as the second dimension 
to explore how and why the three case seaports differed in terms of their resource-based 
strategies. Its ultimate aim is to lay the foundation for building a theory in seaport 
competitiveness. 
Within the broad confine of the above research question, this study will assess seaport 
competitiveness from two perspectives. The first perspective is based on the resource 
management process model of Sirmon et al. (2007), concentrating on the structuring, 
bundling and leveraging of resources. The second perspective is on the dynamic capabilities 
displayed by the case seaports to fit with the operating environment and regional market 
dynamics to achieve sustainable competitive advantages. These two perspectives resulted in 
extending the above research question into the following two sub-questions:  
1. Do global seaports engage in a parallel program of complementary activities when 
they plan and develop their superstructure and infrastructure? If so, what are the 
characteristics of these parallel programs of complementary activities? 
2. How do global seaports adapt their developed superstructure and infrastructure to 
continually align their functions to meet evolving market conditions and industry 
trends overtime? 
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1.3 Research Significance and Contribution  
The most significant aspect of this research is its use of four organizational theories - RBV, 
Organization Learning, Contingency and Dynamic Capabilities theories – to examine the 
resource management process of three geo-political distinctive global seaports. 
In RBV, resource strategies are internally derived (Barney, 1991). In Dynamic Capability 
theory, capability development is externally driven (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). 
Contingency theory focuses on the fit between resource strategy and environmental 
contingencies and that between capabilities and environmental contingencies (Drazin and 
Van de Ven, 1985, Donaldson, 2001). Organization Learning theory views a firm’s potential 
capacity to adapt and adjust its resources or processes to create value (through fit) as a 
function of new knowledge acquisition and application (Lei et al., 1996). The combined use 
of the four theories thus allows the resource management process adopted by the case 
seaports to be studied in a more encompassing manner via a longitudinal perspective based 
on the developmental path they had traversed. In this light, the evolvement of resource-based 
strategies could be discerned and understood as a path-dependent and contingent process. 
This, in essence, captures the complexity underpinning the dynamic capability building 
process. 
The comparative analysis of the resource management strategies of three global seaports that 
are geo-politically different from each other also enables the findings to be interpreted in a 
coherent manner within the framework of “regional competition” and “size of hinterland and 
foreland”. To lay the foundation for theory building within the context of global seaport 
competitiveness, such a coherent comparison is imperative. This is another significant aspect 
of the study. 
While the contributions of the study findings will be discussed later in Chapter 6, it is 
important to point out that the outcome of the study would have two valuable contributions to 
knowledge. First, findings of the study can be employed by seaports around the globe to 
review their current practices, and guide them through long-term strategic resource 
development planning. This process may be either:  
 “Creative Destruction” (Schumpeter, 2012): For some seaports, revolutionizing their 
resource structure from within, by incessantly destroying the old structure and 
creating a new one might be an appropriate option.  
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Or,  
 “Creative Accumulation” (Breschi et al., 2000): For other seaports, competitive 
strengths could be developed by deepening or reconfiguring existing resources and 
operational processes.  
Either way, the practical implications of the study for new seaports would be a guideline on 
how they can excel, and for existing seaports, on how they could remain competitive.  
Second, findings from this study offer a platform for building a theory on a model of 
competitive global seaport with a focus on resource building and capability development. 
This model could be a framework for new seaport development, or ports that are active in a 
smaller scale but planning an urban mega-project with the goal of transforming to global 
seaport.  
1.4 Thesis Organization  
This thesis is organized into six chapters. Chapter 2 will review the background literature 
relating to the research topic. It will first examine the literature on seaport evolution to 
indicate that global seaports have been investing in physical infrastructures to keep pace with 
changes in the maritime sector. It will then present the key factors determining seaport 
competitiveness since containerization, following by an analysis of the literature on seaport 
competition and competitiveness to show that little emphasis has been given to examining the 
resource-based strategies employed by seaport authorities as a means to gain competitiveness. 
The review will conclude by demonstrating why, and how, four classical management 
theories - Resource-Based View, Organization Learning, Dynamic Capability and 
Contingency theories – are appropriate to study how global seaports manage their resources 
to gain competitive advantage.  
Chapter 3 will present the methodology used in this study. It will describe the process of case 
seaport selection, data collection and the data analysis framework based on contingent factors 
of “strength of regional competition”, and “size of hinterland and foreland”. This framework 
is designed to trace the resource development strategies of case seaports over the last five 
decades. 
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Chapter 4 will present the within-case findings, describing the case seaports background 
operation characteristics, including their global and regional competitive positions, 
governance structure, and key development ventures over a period of five decades.  
Chapter 5 will discuss the results of the cross-case analysis, focusing on similar and 
contrasting means of strategic resource management between the case seaports. The 
distinctive resource management strategies employed by the three case seaports will be 
identified and interpreted in the form of constructs to develop working propositions for 
theory-building. 
Chapter 6 will conclude the study, summarizing the major contributions of the salient 
findings and discussing their implications for theory and practice. Limitations of the study 
will be highlighted and directions for further studies outlined.  
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This chapter reviews the background literature pertaining to the research question of how 
global seaports achieve their competitiveness by building, bundling and managing their 
resources, both tangible and intangible. It is divided into four sections. It begins by reviewing 
the literature on seaport evolution to show that, as a historical and path-dependent process, 
global seaports have been investing in superstructures and seaport infrastructures to keep 
pace with three sets of changes: growth of shipping alliances, increasing vessel size and rise 
of inter-modality.  
The second section presents the fundamental factors determining seaport competitiveness in 
the last five decades since containerization. It finds that while these factors have evolved in 
tune with changes in the maritime environment, they remain resource-based in 
characteristics.  
The third section examines extant literature on seaport competition and competitiveness. It 
will demonstrate that, despite the resource-based nature of the competitive-bolstering factors, 
previous studies of seaport competition have predominantly concentrated on efficiency 
evaluation and cost-benefit analysis. Little emphasis has been given to examining the 
resource-based strategies employed by seaport authorities as a means to gain competitiveness. 
The fourth section highlights why, and how, three classical management theories - Resource-
Based View, Dynamic Capability and Contingency theories – are appropriate to study how 
global seaports gain competitive strength through an incessant process of resource planning, 
building, bundling, and re-configuring. 
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2.1 Global Seaports Evolvement 
Over the last five decades, the role of seaports has progressively evolved from being a 
provider of the required interface for transferring goods between sea and other transport 
modes to logistics platforms (Rodrigue, 2013b). This section presents the factors that have 
contributed to the transformation with a view to show that, in keeping with the changes, 
global seaports have been investing in superstructures and seaport infrastructures either to 
gain or to maintain their competitive position. It will concentrate on the path of evolution as 
well as mechanisms and key factors of competition in seaports. 
2.1.1 Changing Environment in Seaports and Products 
The dramatic transformation in the nature of seaport competition is associated with the global 
trends in port development, and the way seaports adapt to the changing maritime systems 
(Lee et al., 2008, Hung et al., 2010, Parola et al., 2017). Lee et al. (2008) and Parola et al. 
(2017) contended that six main trends in the maritime environment have been particularly 
significant in shaping the way seaports operate: shipping alliances, larger vessel size, inter-
modality, governance changes, coopetition among seaports, and green and sustainability 
challenges (see Table 2.1). 
To achieve the twin objectives of minimizing running costs and maximizing market share at 
the same time, many large shipping companies began taking aggressive moves in initiating 
take-over bids of smaller companies (e.g. Maersk Line took over EacBen Container Line 
Ltd,), and formed mergers (P&O Containers Ltd. merged with Royal Nedlloyd Lines) as well 
as loose alliances with one another (e.g. Global alliance of APL, Mitsui-OSK, Orient 
Overseas Container Line, Nedlloyd Lines, Malaysian International Shipping Corp. and the 
Grand alliance of Hapag Lloyd, Neptune Orient Lines, NYK and P&O Containers) during the 
mid-1990s. Since seaports are fixed in space and reliant on shipping lines, the enhancement 
and sustainability of their competitiveness depend on meeting greater demands from shipping 
lines. The consolidation of shipping lines through mergers and alliances that bolstered the 
position of seaport users had a major impact on seaport operations. First, as a result of 
alliances formed by shipping companies, cargos became concentrated on particular routes and 
were served directly by a number of large seaports. Second, the alliances created a stronger 
bargaining power for shipping lines in dealing with seaports (El Kalla et al., 2017). The 
service concentration increased competition among the seaports as they attempted to maintain 
11 
their ongoing traffic or to attract new flows (McCalla, 1999).  In order to build and maintain 
customer loyalty, some seaports began to find means to deal with competition, such as 
awarding dedicated terminals or services to global shipping alliances (Vanelslander, 2008).  
By early 2000s, shipping lines rapidly increased their consolidation as a method of supporting 
each other and preventing bankruptcy (El Kalla et al., 2017).  Toward the end of 2017, three 
main alliances - 2M, Ocean Alliance, and The Alliance - already controlled about 77% of the 
global container traffic using 60% of the world fleet of fully container vessels  (El Kalla et 
al., 2017).  
Table 2.1: Factors affecting seaport environment 
Category  
Phenomenon  Result  
Shipping alliances 
(Inter-firm networks) 
Large shipping companies have propelled 
mergers, alliances, and take-overs for 
consolidation of their shipping lines' 
leading role, in order to minimize running 
costs while maximizing market shares.  
Shipping lines became providers 
of global networks. One mega-
carrier or alliance can move 
cargos freely around the global 
market. 
Larger Vessel size 
(Economies of scale 
in shipping)  
Larger container ships are built to achieve 
economies of scale. 
Fewer seaports are able to serve 
the transoceanic mega-vessels, 
due to depth limits.  
Inter-modality  
Inland intermodal hubs enable containers 
to be shipped longer distances across 
continents to establish greater and more 
connections with other seaports.  
Expansion of hinterland and 
foreland of seaports.  
Governance 
changes  
Port authorities have experienced an 
institutional turn from the public to the 
landlord model.  
Agile and effective decision 
making in seaports were 
promoted.  
Coopetition among 
seaports  
Seaports in geographical proximity 
increased interdependency using a mix of 
competitive and cooperative strategies, 
called “coopetition”.   
Imbalanced competition in 
neighboring ports were 
moderated while their powers 
against intensified international 
competition strengthened.  
Green and 
Sustainability 
challenges 
Seaports have been increasingly 
challenged to pursue green practices and 
to comply with environment sustainability.  
Ports began to conceive green 
strategies and planning to be in 
harmony with their local 
environment and the entire 
logistics chain.  
Source: Adapted from (Lee et al., 2008) and (Parola et al., 2017)  
The second trend that has greatly impacted seaport development was the evolution of 
container carriers (see Table 2.2). Although the deployment of larger vessels by shipping 
lines reduces the frequency of ship calls at seaports, larger vessels require more handling 
capacity when they call at seaports and also longer times for loading and unloading 
containers. Therefore, the dramatic increase in volume of containers aboard the latest 
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generation of carriers became a real challenge for major gateway seaports in terms of their 
terminal operation and storage facilities, as well as landside road and rail connections. For 
example, based on an average call size of 8,000 TEUs of inland flows generated by calls of 
mega-vessels in major ports in Europe (e.g. Rotterdam, Antwerp), Notteboom (2015) 
estimated that 30% of that volume would involve transshipment cargo and 70% gateway 
cargo (5,600 TEU), which needs to be distributed uninterruptedly to hinterlands. Therefore, 
the inland distribution platforms should be able to support the volume or up-scaled. 
Moreover, the new generation of transoceanic mega-vessels can only be served by seaports 
that have terminals with certain lengths and drafts on offer (Table 2.2). The trend of mega-
vessels imposed unprecedented operational challenges for seaports such as deeper channel, 
terminal water depth, longer quays, and larger terminal areas (Parola et al., 2017). With the 
change in site requirements, seaports either had to defend their competitiveness by coping 
with the essential physical conditions to keep pace with market transformations (Parola et al., 
2017), or face the possibility of being dropped as regular ports of call by major shipping 
lines, and taking limited roles in container handling (McCalla, 1999).  
Table 2.2: Evolution of Container Vessels 
Vessel Generation 
(Year) 
Capacity  
(TEU) 
Terminal Requirements 
Length (Metres) Draft (Metres) 
A (1970) 1,000 - 2,500 215 10 
B (1980) 3,000 - 4,500 250 - 290 11.6 - 12.5 
C (1988) 4,000 - 8,000 285 - 300 11.6 - 12.8 
D (2014) 12,500 366 12.8 - 14 
E (2016) 15,000 - 18,000 397 - 400 >14.5 
Source: Adapted from Rodrigue (2013a) 
The third major trend that has changed the face of seaport environment is inter-modality. 
Inter-modality has emerged as a major trend hand-in-hand with containerization, and 
deployment of mega-vessels that have generated a high concentration of cargo in a limited 
number of seaports. Sending or receiving cargos via containers over longer inland transport 
distances by road, rail and barge became an incentive for seaports to expand their hinterland 
reach (Notteboom, 2008). As Notteboom and Rodrigue (2005) argued, the success of a 
seaport is dependent on its capability of fitting into a regional network that shapes supply 
chains. They suggested that seaports should fully benefit from the synergies created by all 
players in the shipping network. While inter-modality expanded seaport competition from 
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forelands to hinterlands, the sea-sea operations were extended to sea-land and port-related 
logistics activities in inland intermodal hubs, enabling containers to be shipped longer 
distances across continents to establish more connections with other seaports (Notteboom and 
Rodrigue, 2005). 
The fourth trend that transformed the seaport operation profoundly over that last two decades, 
in both advanced economies and developing countries, is institutional change. Parola et al. 
(2017) noted that seaports benefited from the governance shift from the public to the landlord 
model in a number of ways that reinforced their competitiveness.  First, broader strategic 
decision objectives and innovative functions and activities (e.g., ICT development, 
communication and marketing, and customer relationship management) were promoted by 
the reformed port authorities (Parola et al., 2013).  Second, the institutional change created a 
more open market in seaports, created more effective players and supported private 
investments (Parola et al., 2017).  Third, entry of private firms and their practices in seaport 
operation incentivized the reformed port authorities to adopt agile, coherent and transparent 
managerial practices that enhanced their decision making processes (Brooks and Cullinane, 
2006, Debrie et al., 2013).   
The fifth trend is created by the increasing interdependency among seaports in geographic 
proximity that led to a mix of competitive and cooperative strategies, called “coopetition”.  
This trend has enhanced competitiveness of neighboring seaports by moderating imbalanced 
competition among them while strengthening powers against intensified international 
competition (Ducruet et al., 2009, Wang et al., 2012). Parola et al. (2017) highlighted a 
number of coopetition benefits among seaports, including: 1) joint utilization of port land and 
available infrastructure, 2) pooling of infrastructural and financial resources, 3) creation of a 
unified lobby to obtain state funds, 4) forming of communication, ICT services and 
marketing alliances, and 5) joining developing in common projects related to environmental 
protection, safety and security issues.  
Finally, the most recent trend is the rise of green and sustainability concerns that represent a 
wave of change in seaports (Lam and Notteboom, 2014, Acciaro et al., 2014).  Port users and 
local communities are becoming increasingly conscious over sustainability practices in 
seaports, which have a direct impact on the port capacity in terms of dealing with pollution 
(i.e., air, water, acoustic and visual) and traffic congestion (Bergqvist and Egels-Zandén, 
2012). Therefore, seaport policy makers and authorities are expected to provide solutions to 
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environmental concerns, while maintaining their quality standards, and boosting seaport 
competitiveness (Parola et al., 2017).  
2.1.2 Global Seaports: Path of Evolution 
According to Guerrero and Rodrigue (2014), major seaport development has been interlinked 
with five waves of containerization (see Table 2.3). The first wave commenced at the 
absolute centers of the global economy (North America, Western Europe and Japan, called 
"the economic triad"), and lasted about 10 years before shifting to new locations within their 
respective spheres of influence (Guerrero and Rodrigue, 2014). 
Table 2.3: Long Waves of Containerization (1970-2010) 
 
First Wave 
(A) 
Second Wave 
(B) 
Third Wave 
(C) 
Fourth Wave 
(D) 
Fifth Wave 
(E) 
Period  1965-1975 
1970-1980 (B1) 
1975-1985 (B2) 
1980-1990 
1995- (D1) 
2000- (D2) 
2005 
Overview  
Pioneer ports setting 
containerized 
operations in the 
economic triad 
 
(North America, 
Western Europe, 
Japan and Australia) 
Expansion of the 
triad and its 
trade partners 
 
(Caribbean, 
Latin America, 
Mediterranean, 
East Asian 
Tigers) 
Large 
diffusion in 
new markets 
 
(Latin 
America, 
Middle East,  
South Asia, 
Southeast 
Asia) 
"The China Wave" 
 
The container 
became the standard 
support of the global 
economy  
Peak growth 
and the 
setting of 
niches 
Driver  
Early trade 
substitution  
Adoption of 
containerization 
Setting of 
global supply 
chains  
 
Setting of 
transhipment 
hubs 
Expansion of global 
supply chains. 
China and 
transhipment hubs  
Spill-over 
effect and 
new 
transhipment 
hubs 
Represent
ative 
Ports  
Antwerp,  
New York, 
Los Angeles, 
Oakland, 
Nagoya 
B1. Rotterdam, 
Tokyo, 
Hong Kong, 
 
B2. Kaohsiung, 
Jeddah, 
Kingston 
Singapore, 
Colombo, 
Busan, Dubai, 
Algeciras 
D1. Shanghai, 
Shenzhen, 
Gioa Tauro,  
 
D2. Ningbo, 
Tanjung, Pelepas 
Tangier, 
Caucedo, 
Yingkou,  
Prince 
Rupert 
Source: (Guerrero and Rodrigue, 2014, p.17) 
In the first wave, regular transatlantic and transpacific services were established and pioneer 
ports adopted containerized services. The second wave was the early expansion of container 
services within the economic triad and its trading partners (Guerrero and Rodrigue, 2014). 
The third wave was driven by the rise of the global supply chains as well as the emergence of 
transshipment hubs, predominantly in East and Southeast Asia (Guerrero and Rodrigue, 
2014). The fourth wave is also known as the China wave, with the global shipping networks 
taken over by the entry of Chinese ports. The container became the standard support of the 
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global economy, with transshipment hubs blossoming around the world. The fifth wave saw 
the growth of seaports with a niche role (e.g., a new transshipment hub serving a maritime 
network, a new gateway coping with congestion) (Guerrero and Rodrigue, 2014). 
At the core of these five waves was the steady progression of logistics as a cross-sectional 
function (Hesse, 2008), which has transformed seaports beyond the basic model, performing 
as regional hubs equipped with value-added logistics services (Notteboom and Winkelmans, 
2002), such as warehousing, consolidation, distribution and customs clearance. Hayuth 
(2008) characterized these changes as three major stages of evolution, as follows:  
1. The first phase was during the 1970s when Containerization was introduced. The 
continuous growth of container traffic has led to a steady rise in seaport development 
around the world for handling containerized cargo (see Figure 2.1), from 57 ports in 
1970 to 317 ports in 2010 (Guerrero and Rodrigue, 2014). This first phase marks the 
rise of the first and second waves. 
2. The second phase, referred to as Inter-modality, occurred throughout the 1980s. The 
rise of inter-modality offered opportunities for seaports to strengthen their position in 
the global transport chain (Van Klink and Van den Berg, 1998) and resulted in 
expansion of the hinterlands and forelands of the ports (Lee et al., 2008). This phase 
coincided with coming of the third wave of containerization, which witnessed a surge 
in containerized traffic in the largest number of ports, spurred by the growth of 
transshipment hubs in East and Southeast Asia regions (Guerrero and Rodrigue, 
2014). 
  
Figure 2.1: Number of Ports and Container throughput (1970-2010) 
Source: (Guerrero and Rodrigue, 2014, p.4) 
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3. The final phase commenced in the early 1990s with the rise of globalism. Maritime 
transport became one of the key drivers of globalization, with over 80% of the global 
trade being carried by sea (Asariotis et al., 2012). With an increasing level of global 
consumption, the capacity of transport infrastructure was further developed to handle 
higher levels of material flows. Hence, seaports were transformed through physical 
expansion schemes that created additional handling capacity, and upturning their 
functionality. This phase was linked to the fourth and fifth waves of containerization. 
Each of these periods brought substantial changes to the Port-Urban interrelationships and 
were characterized predominantly by technological innovations, synchronization and co-
ordination of logistics systems (Hayuth, 2008). Through technological advancements, vessel 
structures and cargo handling methods as well as physical layout of ports were revolutionized 
(Hayuth, 2008). Notteboom and Rodrigue (2005) divided the evolution in container port 
system into six main phases - Scattered Ports, Penetration and Hinterland Capture, 
Interconnection and Concentration, Centralization, Decentralization and Regionalization - as 
illustrated in Figure 2.2. 
 
Figure 2.2: Evolution model of a container port system 
Source: Adopted from the original model by Notteboom and Rodrigue (2005) modified by Wang and 
Ducruet (2012) 
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The process of converting seaports from a final stop to a link in the transport chain was the 
further synchronization and coordination in logistics systems (Hayuth, 2008). Following the 
developing trend and inevitable need of running regular transportation services within the 
routes of production and consumption, some seaports grew to be stronger participants (i.e. 
Rotterdam, Hong Kong, Singapore and Dubai). Challenges such as concentration of maritime 
flows with access roads, infrastructure that can cope with large vessels and increasing traffic 
volumes are some instances that were managed in these seaports' areas (Fremont and Soppe, 
2008). The outcome of this progression was concentration of principal operators, mainly 
shipping lines and their strategic plans of stopping their mother vessels and feeders in these 
ports to increase the number of possible destinations for commodities at both regional and 
global levels (Fremont and Soppe, 2008). Other operators in the chain followed the trend set 
by the shipping lines. Gradually, the combination of services shaped a network that 
determined the situation of each port. In other words, the status of each seaport was 
determined by opportunities provided for linking the networks for various transport operators 
(Fremont and Soppe, 2008). 
In the last two decades, the increasing advantage of agglomeration of services (Air, Land, 
Sea) as well as improved accessibility has revitalized the port-urban interface. Fleming and 
Hayuth (1994) introduced the concept of “Gateway hub”, to show that in gateway hubs port 
forelands became prime access points to large market areas of their hinterlands and attracted 
a host of maritime operators due to their high volume of traffic (Hall et al., 2011). As a result, 
port gateway functions had to be linked to logistics activities, such as warehousing, inventory 
control and distribution, to maximize the benefits of regional trade. “Logistics Gateways” 
were formed (Van Klink, 1995). A more progressive term, “Global Gateway City”, was later 
given by Berechman (2007) to describe a coastal metropolis with port access to the local 
hinterland and to the rest of the world, capturing a substantial share of the total regional and 
global trade volumes. 
From the perspective of the resource-based view (Barney, 1991), physical assets, such as 
land, transport infrastructure, port infrastructure (berths, docks, basins, storage areas, internal 
connections), and port superstructure (cranes, pipes, terminals, sheds), are classified as 
tangible resources (Trujillo and Nombela, 1999); while human capital, structural capital 
(networks and information systems), and relations capital (list of clients, partners, suppliers) 
(Chlomoudis et al., 2009), specialized skills, such as know-how and organizational culture 
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(Hall, 1992), are considered as intangible resources. In this context, the evolution in container 
port system over the last five decades suggests that, in attempting to keep pace with changes 
in the larger maritime environment, global seaports have been constantly engaging in a 
process of building physical assets and investing in infrastructure that support their logistics 
operations. The next section will discuss how these resource-based changes among seaports 
are linked to their attempts to remain competitive. 
2.2 Global Seaports Competitiveness 
2.2.1 Overview  
Inter-port competition can be interpreted as competition among whole ranges of seaports on a 
coastline, or among seaports in different countries, or among individual seaports in the same 
country (Goss, 1990b). The focus of this study is on the competitive position of a seaport in 
relation to seaports in other countries, which has the most profound influence on its national 
fortunes in the long run. 
Historically, the competitive strength of seaports was gauged by their terminal (berth) 
performance (Heaver, 1995, Notteboom and Yap, 2012), a higher level of berth occupancy 
would lead to higher revenue, which eventually translates into profit. However, with changes 
in the larger maritime environment described in Section 2.1, seaports responded by 
transforming themselves into supply chain hubs. Revenue-generating activities were no 
longer limited to terminal operations and water-related functions. Supplementary functions 
linked to supply chain operations, such as cargo preparation, warehousing, and customs, were 
introduced in the port areas (De Langen et al., 2007, Notteboom and Yap, 2012).  
The phenomenon has been variously described as a chain of interlinking functions (Suykens 
and Van de Voorde (1998) or a cluster of economic activities (De Langen, 2004a). A port 
became a link in the overall logistics chain (Suykens and Van de Voorde, 1998) with a large 
number of organizations providing services and creating a range of port products collectively. 
De Langen et al. (2007) presented three main categories of seaport products – cargo transfer 
product, logistics product and port manufacturing product (Table 2.4) - with diverse 
characteristics to explain the transformation of seaport competitiveness. 
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Since seaport products are extended to value-added logistics services and manufacturing, the 
indicators of port performance are no longer limited to throughput volumes and the number 
of ships calling at a port. It is the profitability and performance of new port products that 
reflect the performance in seaports, such as investment level of private firms, and the number 
of new establishments in a port area. This is exemplified by the emergence of dramatically 
different performance indicators in the Port of Rotterdam during the last few decades, from 
throughput volume, as the primary functionality of seaports, to the number of new firms 
established in the port (De Langen et al., 2007).  
Table 2.4: Characteristics of Seaport Products 
Port Product Service Users Providers 
Cargo Transfer 
Product 
Vessel Loading, 
Unloading 
Shipping Lines 
Terminal Operators, Towage, 
Pilotage and Bunkering firms 
Logistics 
Product 
Storage, 
Value adding services 
(Packing, Re-packing, 
Labeling, 
Quality inspection) 
Import / Export 
Companies 
Logistics Service Providers, 
Freight Forwarders, 
Transport Companies 
Port 
Manufacturing 
Product 
Provision of space 
and conditions for 
investments in 
manufacturing facilities 
Manufacturing 
companies 
(Multinationals) 
Port Authority (landlord) 
Utility Providers for 
Manufacturing 
(Water, Energy, Heat, 
Telecommunications) 
Source: Adapted from De Langen et al. (2007) 
In addition to the range of products stated, a relatively new concept in supply chain 
management, called “Port-centric Logistics”, has also emerged, which redefines the crucial 
role of seaports by the provision of distribution and other value-adding logistics services at a 
port (Mangan et al., 2008, Monios and Wilmsmeier, 2012). This concept has been a major 
driving force for ports to engage in activities beyond simply providing berths for ships and 
other core services, and increasing profit margins made on some non-core port activities 
(Mangan et al., 2008). With a potential for significant revenue generation, the port-centric 
Logistics concept has lately become a prime consideration for reforming and evolving 
seaports (Pettit and Beresford, 2009). 
Another concept that has also been a recent addition to seaport studies is “seaport clusters”. 
Haezendonck (2001) defined seaport clusters as a set of interdependent firms located in the 
same port region, and engaged in port-related activities, with a common strategy of creating 
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competitive advantages over external competition. De Langen (2004b) referred to the Port of 
Rotterdam as an example of a seaport cluster, identifying six sets of leader firms in the port 
area: freight forwarders, non-assets owning logistics service providers, shipping lines' agents, 
associations, commodity traders and shipbrokers. The concept of seaport cluster indicates the 
presence of customers and suppliers within the same geographical locale, contributing to 
lowering transportation costs and reducing cargo handling times, thus enhancing seaport 
competitiveness. 
2.2.2 Factors Affecting Seaport Competitiveness  
One of the earliest frameworks in seaport competitiveness was given by Verhoeff (1981), 
who identified geographical location, level of infrastructure and industrialization, government 
policies and standard of operational performance are key factors affecting seaport 
competition. Since then, many other studies have been undertaken, concentrating in specific 
geographical zones and focusing on seaport selection criteria from the perspective of different 
users of seaport services, such as shipping lines, freight forwarders, shippers and consignees 
(Da Cruz et al., 2013a). These studies, as such, are considered rather limited in capturing a 
broad view on seaport competitiveness that would include a global assessment and 
consideration of factors commonly required by all seaport users. 
One of the first comprehensive studies on seaport competitiveness was UNCTAD (1992), 
which listed the specific influences in the third generation of seaports, as geographical 
location, hinterland networks, availability and efficiency of transportation, port tariffs, port 
stability and port information systems. Rugman and Verbeke (1993) extended the list by 
offering a competitive port positioning structure based on Porter’s (1998) Diamond model, 
with six factors: 1) factor conditions (e.g. production, labor and infrastructure); 2) demand 
conditions; 3) related and supporting industries; 4) firm structure and rivalry; 5) chance, and 
6) government intervention. Following that, further studies were conducted by Fleming and 
Baird (1999); Meersman et al. (2002) and Tongzon and Heng (2005). The range of factors 
identified by these studies supporting seaport competitiveness include: Port (terminal) 
efficiency level, port-handling charges, reliability and reputation, port selection preferences 
of carriers and shippers, depth of navigation channel, adaptability to changing market 
environment, cargo-generating effect, landside accessibility, and product and service 
differentiation. A more recent study on seaport competitiveness (Carbone and Gouvernal, 
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2007) however, suggested that factors influencing port competition have evolved into the 
following: 
1. Relationships with other actors in the supply chain;  
2. Availability of port-infrastructure;  
3. Proximity to major sourcing and final markets;  
4. Road/Rail network configuration;  
5. Transit time; 
6. Number of direct connections to overseas destinations;  
7. Extent of feeder service; 
8. Good labor climate, and  
9. Inland waterways connections 
From the numerous studies carried out during the last two decades, (e.g. Fleming and Baird, 
1999; Peters, 2001; Trujillo and Nombela, 1999; Lirn et al., 2004; Song and Yeo, 2004; 
Tongzon and Heng, 2005; De Langen, 2007; Yuen et al., 2012; Kim, 2014; Yeo et al., 2014; 
and Martinez Moya and Feo Valero, 2017), the leading determinants of gaining 
competitiveness in seaports can be categorically summarized into six main groups: seaport 
location; productivity and efficiency; price of services connectivity of seaport and hinterland 
access; port organization, and infrastructural facilities. 
Seaport Location 
Geographical location is important in positioning seaports in global supply chains, as seaports 
are nodes between different transport systems. A strategic location creates a competitive 
advantage for seaports for a number of reasons: proximity to production, distribution or 
consumption centers; natural deep harbors to accommodate large vessels, and being situated 
on the main maritime routes (UNCTAD, 1992). Studies by Fleming and Baird (1999); Song 
and Yeo (2004); Guy and Urli (2006); Ng (2006) and De Langen (2007) have highlighted 
“location” as a prime factor of seaport competitiveness. The importance of geographical 
location as a competitive element has been further amplified in a number of other studies, 
including Notteboom (1997), who examined the dynamics of load center development in 
Europe; Ha (2003) who compared service quality factors at major container ports; Ducruet et 
al. (2009) who investigated the impact of local and regional economic growth on seaport 
activities; Zondag et al. (2010) who modeled seaport competition, and Yuen et al. (2012) who 
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identified port location the most important factor determining seaport competitiveness from 
freight forwarders and shippers perspective. Although strategic location is a leading factor in 
gaining competitive advantage in seaports, it is worth mentioning that many seaports (e.g. 
Port of Jebel Ali - Dubai in United Arab Emirates, Port of Tianjin in China) have managed to 
obtain a large market share by promoting other competitive factors than merely benefiting 
from a favorable geographical location. 
Seaport Productivity and Efficiency  
Efficiency in seaports is explained by the speed of handling containers and turn-around time 
of vessels. A significant number of studies on seaport competition have concentrated on 
performance and efficiency evaluation, by either assessing or comparing performance in 
seaports, or benchmarking seaport operations. Marlow and Paixão Casaca (2003) suggested 
two-tier (qualitative and quantitative) indicators for seaport performance based on three sub-
processes: interface process; transport operator process, and land infrastructure process. 
Estache et al. (2004) evaluated productivity changes in Mexican seaports during a process of 
liberalization and decentralization, and suggested that reform improved competitiveness of 
seaports. In the context of Italian seaports, Barros (2006) evaluated the performance of ports 
through operational and financial variables. Another study by Barros and Peypoch (2007) 
suggested that benchmarking of multi-country seaports could demonstrate how seaport 
performance is also reflective of culture, traditions and managerial practices in different 
countries. 
With regards to efficiency in container terminals, De Koster et al. (2009) suggested that 
larger container terminals are more efficient and transshipment terminals are significantly 
more efficient in comparison with import/export or gateway terminals. Productivity and 
efficiency have also been highlighted as key elements of competiveness in seaports (Fleming 
and Baird, 1999, Peters, 2001, Tongzon and Heng, 2005, Ng, 2006, Ugboma et al., 2006, De 
Langen, 2007, Saeed, 2009, Tongzon, 2009, Onut et al., 2011, Tang et al., 2011, Yeo et al., 
2014, Kim, 2014, Martínez Moya and Feo Valero, 2017).  The outstanding performance of a 
number of seaports in the top 10 global rankings, such as Hong Kong and Singapore (Merk 
and Li, 2013), underscores the role of port efficiency as a significant indicator in gaining 
competitive advantage.  
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Resources and Infrastructural Facilities 
Improving the handling capacity of seaports (e.g. equipment, storage facilities and the 
number of berths), and creating inter-modal links, as the main requirements of port users, are 
not possible without advanced infrastructural facilities. In the early 1990s Christopher (1992) 
signaled that competition is no longer provided by individual firms but between supply 
chains. Similarly, seaport competitiveness has since been determined by the quality of the 
entire port, both in terms of infrastructure and services. De Martino and Morvillo (2008) 
argued that resources play an important role in promoting the development of inter-
organizational relationships among supply chain players, ICT systems, modal-
interconnections and acquisition of new areas as critical assets for seaports to gain 
attractiveness. Within contemporary maritime literature, however, recognition of resources as 
a key factor of seaport competitiveness has been limited to a few studies (Lirn et al., 2004, 
Carbone and Gouvernal, 2007, Ha, 2003, Onut et al., 2011, Martínez Moya and Feo Valero, 
2017). 
Pricing of Seaport Services 
Seaport users generally favor locations with relatively lower service charges, which have a 
direct effect on operational costs (Tongzon and Heng, 2005). Hence, the price of services has 
been regarded as a predominant element of seaport competitiveness. This has been supported 
by Fleming and Baird (1999) who examined the influence of state aids on seaport costs; 
Trujillo and Nombela (1999) who assessed regulation in seaport pricing (in terms of port 
tariffs, cargo handling charges and concessions fees), and Meersman et al. (2003) who 
reviewed seaport pricing mechanisms. Lirn et al. (2004) also noted that terminal costs (e.g. 
handling and storage costs of containers, terminal ownership and/or an exclusive contracts 
policy) feature as a criterion when shipping lines select a transshipment port. Likewise, Ng 
(2006) found monetary costs among the key components when shippers assessed port 
attractiveness. De Langen (2007), Chang et al. (2008), Saeed (2009), Yuen et al. (2012), 
Wang et al. (2014), and Yeo et al. (2014) all indicated that shippers, freight forwarders and 
shipping lines consider the price of port services as a factor when selecting a seaport, 
confirming the importance of price as an advantage generator.  
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Seaport Connectivity 
The rise of inter-modality in the 1980s, and globalism in the early 1990s created 
opportunities for seaports to strengthen their position in the global transport chain (Van Klink 
and Van den Berg, 1998), which resulted in expansion of the hinterland and foreland of the 
ports (Lee et al., 2008). Under a new business environment following trade globalization 
(Juhel, 2001), seaports became prominent nodes of global value chains (Robinson, 2002) and 
availability of intermodal terminals and facilities, such as on-dock railways, pipelines, and 
airport proximity, became pre-conditions of modern seaports. Rather than evaluating seaports 
merely as places with particular functions, the focus on ports shifted to the dynamics of 
connectivity and inter-port relationships in supply chains, which is reflected in research 
conducted since the early 2000s. Some examples of these studies are the seaport as an 
element of value-driven chain systems (Robinson, 2002), seaport performance from a supply 
chain management perspective (Bichou and Gray, 2004), transformation of seaports to global 
supply chain management centers (Wang and Cheng, 2010), and seaport connectivity in 
supply chain systems (Lam and Yap, 2011). Consequently, the capability to offer a speedy 
and reliable access from forelands to hinterlands, and vice versa, became an element of 
seaport attractiveness (Fleming and Baird, 1999, Tongzon and Heng, 2005, Guy and Urli, 
2006, Low et al., 2009, Iannone, 2012, Van Asperen and Dekker, 2013, Kim, 2014, Yeo et 
al., 2014, Martínez Moya and Feo Valero, 2017). 
Organization of Seaports 
Seaport management plays a vital role in creating competitiveness by improving and 
regulating customs and administration, management of risk, and security and safety 
measures. The role of authorities in seaport management and policies pursued by them in 
relation to port competition has been evaluated at various levels of authorities, segregation of 
ownership and management. Examples of such studies include Verhoeff (1981); Heaver 
(1995); Van der Lugt and De Langen (2007) and De Langen and Heij (2014). These studies 
indicated seaport administration, management and deployment of strategies have a major 
impact on seaport performance. Other studies have focused on the roles port authorities play 
in creating advantages for seaports through pricing decisions on seaport services 
(Haralambides, 2002), lease agreements and concessions (Kaselimi et al., 2011, De Langen et 
al., 2012). Kaselimi et al. (2011) found that deciding to dedicate an existing terminal capacity 
to a specific customer by port authorities affects competition between remaining multi-user 
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terminals. De Langen et al. (2012) argued that the process of competitive bidding for granting 
concessions in a container terminal is a potentially attractive form of sustainable and 
competitive development for the port. Fleming and Baird (1999); Ha (2003) and Lirn et al. 
(2004) also highlighted that seaport organization, i.e. port tradition, management and 
administration, sales activity and marketing, security and safety as well as labor environment, 
is an element that differentiates seaport competitiveness. 
Table 2.5 summarizes the six main groups of determinants of seaport competitiveness. 
The foregoing discussion shows that a precondition in developing factors affecting seaport 
competitiveness is the presence of critical assets, commonly categorized into infrastructures, 
superstructures, human capital and information and communication technology (ICT) 
systems (Meersman et al., 2002). These tangible seaport resources are necessary for the 
conduct of value-added logistics activities (De Martino and Morvillo, 2008) and have become 
an integral part of port operations. Once these infrastructural investments are in place, the 
resources allocated, as well as the general policies designed to support their development, 
may not be readily overturned. 
These findings reinforce the notion that port evolvement involves a long process of resource 
planning, selection, building, organization and utilization in response to changes in the larger 
maritime industry and the market environment. The changes occur through a sequence of 
growth and resource development. Once the physical infrastructures were in place, they are 
extremely hard to be reversed at later stages. In this context, port development is a path-
dependent process, where future events are not independent of past events, the sequence in 
which these events occurred, or of the manner in which they occur (Notteboom, 2009). Path 
dependency, as such, explains why port systems globally have not developed in the same 
pattern or followed the same sequence, not to mention that seaports are generally subject to 
open economics founded on market-based principles and for the same reason they vary to a 
great extent around the world (Notteboom, 2009). 
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Table 2.5: Key Determinants of Seaport Competitiveness 
Key Determinants 
of Seaport 
Competitiveness 
Reason Reference 
Seaport Location 
A strategic location creates competitive 
advantage in seaports due to a number of 
reasons. First, proximity to production, 
distribution, or consumption centers; second 
natural deep harbors to accommodate large 
vessels, and third being situated on main 
maritime routes.  
- UNCTAD (1992) 
- Fleming and Baird (1999) 
- Song and Yeo (2004) 
- Guy and Urli (2006) 
- Ng (2006) 
- De Langen (2007)  
- Yuen et al. (2012) 
Seaport 
Connectivity and 
Hinterland Access  
Considering seaports as prominent nodes in 
integrated logistics systems their capability 
in offering a speedy and reliable access from 
port to hinterlands create a competitive 
advantage.  
- Fleming and Baird (1999) 
- Tongzon and Heng (2005)  
- Guy and Urli (2006) 
- Low et al. (2009) 
- Iannone (2012) 
- Van Asperen and Dekker (2013) 
- Kim (2014) 
- Yeo et al. (2014) 
- Martínez Moya and Feo Valero 
(2017) 
Seaport 
Productivity 
and 
Efficiency 
Efficiency in seaports is explained by the 
speed of handling containers, and turnaround 
time of vessels. The greater the level of 
efficiency, the more attractive the seaport is 
to the users and enhances its 
competitiveness. 
- Fleming and Baird (1999)  
- Peters (2001) 
- Tongzon and Heng (2005) 
- Ng (2006)  
- Ugboma et al. (2006) 
- De Langen (2007) 
- Saeed (2009) 
- Tongzon (2009) 
- Tang et al. (2011) 
- Onut et al. (2011) 
- Kim (2014) 
- Yeo et al. (2014) 
- Martínez Moya and Feo Valero 
(2017) 
Price of Seaport 
Services 
Shipping lines generally prefer seaports with 
relatively lower service charges, as the price 
of seaport services directly impacts on their 
operational costs. Hence the price of service 
is a determinant in seaport competitiveness.  
- Fleming and Baird (1999) 
- Trujillo and Nombela (1999) 
- Lirn et al. (2004) 
- Tongzon and Heng (2005) 
- Ng (2006) 
- De Langen (2007) 
- Saeed (2009) 
- Yuen et al. (2012) 
- Wang et al. (2014) 
- Yeo et al. (2014) 
Resources and 
Infrastructural 
facilities 
Improving the handling capacity in seaports 
(equipment, storage facilities, number of 
berths, etc.), and creating inter-modal links, 
as the main requirements of port users, are 
not possible without advanced infrastructural 
facilities. 
- Lirn et al. (2004) 
- De Martino and Morvillo (2008) 
- Low et al. (2009) 
- Onut et al. (2011) 
- Martínez Moya and Feo Valero 
(2017) 
Organization of 
Seaports  
Seaport management plays a vital role in 
creating competitiveness by improving and 
regulating customs and administration, 
managing risk, and security and safety 
measures.  
- Fleming and Baird (1999) 
- Ha (2003) 
- Lirn et al. (2004) 
- Kaselimi et al. (2011) 
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2.3. Themes in Seaport Research 
2.3.1 Overview  
According to Notteboom et al. (2013b), the extensive range of seaport research conducted 
over the last 30 years essentially fall into seven major themes: terminal studies; seaports in 
supply chains; seaport governance; seaport planning and development; port policy and 
regulation; seaport competition, and spatial analysis of the seaports (see Table 2.6). Among 
the seven broad themes, seaport competition is one of the most popular categories. During 
the late 1990s, studies in this stream were considerably expanded. By the late 2000s, over 
20% of the total seaport research were in the subfield of seaport competition (Pallis et al., 
2010). The bulk of the studies under this theme have been dominated by economics, 
geography and operational research disciplines. Some theoretical concepts, such as 
production theory, game theory and utility theory, have been widely applied and in a 
consistent manner since the 1980s (Woo et al., 2011). 
Based on the definition given by Cullinane and Talley (2006) seaports are economic units 
providing a service or nodes among various transportation modes, or are facilities through 
which cargos pass, or are a part of logistics and supply chains. The given definition implies 
that efficiency, performance and profitability in seaports are significant issues as they are 
considered economic units where cargos pass through the supply chains. It also means that 
the geographical location of seaports is important in their placement in the global supply 
chains, as they are nodes among different transport systems. Moreover, the definition 
indicates that seaports are facilitators in handling global trade volumes, and their condition 
has a direct impact on their logistics systems. Therefore, the issues related to seaports can be 
perceived from different perspectives and led by various disciplines.  
An analysis carried out by Woo et al. (2011) reveals that since the 1980s, three disciplines 
have dominated seaport research: economics (31.5%), geography (15.7%) and operation 
research (16.3%). Studies supported by other disciplines were mostly related to management 
studies with an aggregated proportion of 13.2%. However Woo et al. (2011) observed that the 
disciplines involved in port studies became more diverse in the 2000s with the emerging 
trend of the logistics-based, marketing-based and strategic management-based research.  
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Table 2.6: Contributions to Main Themes of Seaport Research 
Themes  Description Contributions 
Terminal Studies 
Terminals are taken as the unit of 
analysis, and their productivity and 
efficiency, size and capacity, 
strategies of terminal operators, and 
optimizations examined.  
(Chang, 1978, Talley, 1988, Dowd and Leschine, 
1990, Chen, 1998, Lee et al., 2003, Choi et al., 
2003, Dragović et al., 2006, Lin and Tseng, 2007, 
Notteboom and Rodrigue, 2012, Panova and 
Korovyakovsky, 2013, Yip et al., 2014, Ambrosino 
and Siri, 2015, Ferrari et al., 2015, Pallis et al., 
2015, Yu et al., 2016, Ferrari et al., 2017, Ferretti et 
al., 2018) 
Seaports in 
Supply Chains 
The role of seaports in global supply 
chain operations, strategic decisions 
of shipping lines and terminal 
operators, liner service networks and 
hinterland access are evaluated under 
this theme. 
(Slack, 1985, Zohil and Prijon, 1999, Heaver et al., 
2000, Robinson, 2002, Carbone and Martino, 2003, 
Midoro et al., 2005, Parola and Musso, 2007, Song 
and Panayides, 2008, Rodrigue and Notteboom, 
2009, Van der Horst and Van der Lugt, 2011, 
Ducruet and Zaidi, 2012, Ascencio et al., 2014, 
Zhang et al., 2014, Song and Parola, 2015, Seo et 
al., 2016, Loh et al., 2017) 
Seaport 
Governance 
The role of port authorities in a port 
community and variety of governance 
models, as well as their restructure 
and reform are assessed.  
(Goss, 1990b, Goss, 1990c, Goss, 1990a, Ircha and 
Thomas, 1993, Saundry and Turnbull, 1997, 
Cullinane and Song, 1998, Heaver et al., 2001, 
Martin and Thomas, 2001, Baird, 2002, Wang and 
Slack, 2004, Beresford et al., 2004, Brooks and 
Pallis, 2008, Verhoeven, 2010, Donselaar and 
Kolkman, 2010, Debrie et al., 2013, Notteboom et 
al., 2013a, Ferrari et al., 2015, Vanelslander, 2016, 
Vale et al., 2017, Ferretti et al., 2018, Di Vaio and 
Varriale, 2018)  
Seaport Planning 
and development 
Concessions in port terminal industry 
are examined. 
(Grosdidier De Matons, 1986, Warf and Cox, 1989, 
Gripaios and Gripaios, 1995, Vandermeulen, 1996, 
Turner, 2000, Fung, 2001, Taneja et al., 2010, Ng 
and Tam, 2012, Yap and Lam, 2013, Bask et al., 
2014, Wang et al., 2015, Martins et al., 2017) 
Port Policy & 
Regulation 
Strategic plans of port authorities in 
relation to seaport pricing and 
financing, environment, safety and 
security, and competition are 
investigated.  
(Suykens, 1986, Tongzon, 1993, Talley, 1994, 
Finney and Young, 1995, Pallis, 1997, Kent and 
Hochstein, 1998, Farrell, 2001, Notteboom, 2002, 
Baird, 2004, Banomyong, 2005, De Langen and 
Pallis, 2007, Yeo et al., 2013, Shinohara, 2017, 
Shinohara and Saika, 2018) 
Seaport 
Competition 
Port competitiveness through 
performance of ports and terminals 
and the embeddedness of seaports in 
supply chains are explored. 
Improvement of competitiveness 
through port policies and cooperation 
between ports are also investigated.  
(Miyajima and Kwak, 1989, Fleming, 1989, Roll 
and Hayuth, 1993, Tongzon, 1995, Fleming and 
Baird, 1999, Malchow and Kanafani, 2001, Song, 
2003, Bichou and Gray, 2004, Cullinane et al., 
2005, Ugboma et al., 2007, Zondag et al., 2010, 
Brooks et al., 2011, Ishii et al., 2013, Bae et al., 
2013, Czerny et al., 2014, Notteboom and De 
Langen, 2015, Lee and Lam, 2015, Wan et al., 
2016, Song et al., 2016, Van Hassel et al., 2016, 
Cheon et al., 2017, Garcia-Alonso et al., 2017) 
Spatial analysis 
of the seaports 
The evolution and dynamics of 
spatial systems, including port system 
development, port system and 
hinterland networks are studied.  
(Baird, 1996, Fleming, 1997, Notteboom and 
Rodrigue, 2005, McCalla et al., 2005, Ducruet et al., 
2010, Do et al., 2011, Hall and Jacobs, 2012, 
Monios and Wilmsmeier, 2012, Yang et al., 2016, 
Shinohara and Saika, 2018, Nguyen and 
Notteboom, 2018, Monios et al., 2018) 
Source: Own elaboration based on themes of seaport research according to Notteboom et al. (2013b) 
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Table 2.7 presents the range of studies carried out with the theme of seaport competition and 
competitiveness, revealing the focus of the studies, theoretical framework (i.e. theories 
employed), methods (i.e. research methodology) and techniques of analysis. 
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Table 2.7: Seaport Competition and Competitiveness Research - Methodological analysis 
Discipline Theories Methods 
Analysis 
Techniques 
Focus / Argument Reference 
Economics 
Production 
Theory 
Economic 
Modelling 
Data 
Envelopment 
Analysis 
(DEA) 
• Comparison of the seaports' performances.  
• Suggesting DEA as an easily adaptable approach for efficiency ratings in 
operation of seaports. Further study adopted DEA to measure multi-stage 
efficiency of seaports with the four steps of productivity, profitability, 
marketability and overall efficiency. 
Roll and Hayuth 
(1993) 
 
Park and De 
(2004) 
• Evaluating the efficiency of seaport authorities in Spain.  
• Suggesting that ports with high complexity offered higher efficiency levels, in 
contrast with ports with medium complexity. Seaports with low complexity 
showed a negative evolution in global efficiency levels. 
Martinez-Budria 
et al. (1999) 
• Technical efficiency and technological change of Portuguese seaports.  
• Suggesting that seaport authorities did not achieve total productivity 
improvements in the considered period. While most of them achieved 
improvements in technical efficiency, not all advanced in technological changes. 
 
• Further study provides a comparative analysis on the seaport systems of two 
European countries, Greece and Portugal. 
Barros (2003)  
 
 
Barros and 
Athanassiou 
(2004) 
• Seaport performance indicators based on the multimodal process.  
• Proposing a two-tier measurement (quantitative - qualitative) indicator, based on 
three sub-processes: interface process, transport operators process, and land 
infrastructure process. 
Marlow and 
Paixão Casaca 
(2003) 
• Evaluating the liberalization and decentralization process in Mexican seaports by 
measuring productivity changes in cargo handling operation. 
• Results suggesting that the reform improved the competitiveness of Mexican 
seaports (facilitating the new adoption of technologies is an example given). 
Estache et al. 
(2004) 
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Discipline Theories Methods 
Analysis 
Techniques 
Focus / Argument Reference 
Economics 
Production 
Theory 
Economic 
Modelling 
Data Envelopment 
Analysis 
(DEA) 
• Evaluating the performance of Italian seaports through operational and financial 
variables. 
• Suggesting that generally Italian seaports display relatively high efficiency. 
Barros (2006) 
• Evaluating the deregulation process in Spanish seaports by measuring productivity 
changes in cargo handling operation. 
• Results show that seaports with a relatively large traffic volume exhibit an average 
efficiency index larger than average of the rest. Also technical change seems to be 
the element that has caused an increase in productivity.  
Díaz-
Hernández et 
al. (2008) 
• Benchmarking the efficiency in container terminals.  
• Suggesting the larger terminals are more efficient, and transshipment terminals are 
significantly more efficient than import / export terminals.. 
De Koster et 
al. (2009) 
• Evaluating the port efficiency and suggesting port efficiency is not impacted by 
competition when measured at a local level. Though the study concludes that 
seaports efficiency in a range of 400-800km decreases with competition.  
De Oliveira 
and Cariou 
(2015) 
Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) 
Stochastic Frontier 
Analysis (SFA) 
• Evaluation of efficiency of container port industry.  
• Findings suggest that a high level of technical efficiency is associated with greater 
private sector participation. 
Cullinane et 
al. (2006) 
Descriptive 
• Port reorganization; new structures of the contemporary seaport industry and 
characteristics of the port product. 
• Suggesting that modern seaports must provide a greater variety of services to the 
seaport users than in the past. Critical parameters for the essential restructuring are 
counted as: introduction of Intra-port competition, development of strategic and 
regional network, and reconsideration of the role of the port authority. 
Chlomoudis 
et al. (2003) 
Luenburger 
Productivity 
Indicator 
• Benchmarking Italian and Portuguese seaports and rationalization of their 
operational activities. 
• Suggesting that the benchmarking of multi-country seaports gives a different 
picture than the one obtained by benchmarking the seaports of a single country, 
reflecting different cultural traditions and managerial practices. 
Barros and 
Peypoch 
(2007) 
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Discipline Theories Methods 
Analysis 
Techniques 
Focus / Argument Reference 
Economics 
Economics 
of Vertical 
Integration 
Survey Descriptive 
• Reviewing the organizational strategies of shipping lines in relation to terminal 
management, intermodal services and logistics services. 
• Suggesting a close integration with shipping in the management of dedicated 
terminals and intermodal services. However, the management of logistics services 
remains quite distinct from shipping activities. 
 Heaver 
(2002) 
Geography 
Economies  
of Scale 
Hirshmann 
Hirfindahl  
Coefficient / 
Lorenz 
Curve 
Descriptive 
• Focusing on concentration and de-concentration, and load center development in 
the European continental container port system during 1980-1994. 
• Demonstrating that the assumption that containerization leads to further seaport 
concentration is no longer valid. 
Notteboom 
(1997) 
New 
Economic 
Geography 
(NEG) 
Case Study 
 
Descriptive 
• The New Economic Geography (NEG) is seen as a possible bridge which can 
explain how seaport activities impact on and are influenced by local and economic 
growth.  
• Suggesting NEG can explain the fading of seaport location spatial fix, as well as 
the regional variations that leads to port-economic relations. Also highlights the 
need to understand which seaports may attract which commodity chains and why.  
Ducruet et 
al. (2009) 
• The process of adaptive capacity building by port authorities in Antwerp and 
Hamburg is discussed.  
• Suggesting that future of the ports can not be detached from the public broader 
public policy and stakeholder management concerns as well as the influences of 
retention mechanisms, power, politics and collective action by the port 
community. 
Notteboom 
(2016a) 
Utility 
Theory 
Logit Model 
• Focusing on the containerized traffic and how seaports' developers are 
responding to the increasing trade volumes.  
• Suggesting a model of seaport competition by following a logistics chain 
approach, which is designed to calculate the impacts of a wide range of policy 
measures. The functioning model is demonstrated for the seaports of Rotterdam, 
Antwerp, Bremen and Hamburg. 
Zondag et 
al. (2010) 
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Discipline Theories Methods 
Analysis 
Techniques 
Focus / Argument Reference 
Operational 
Research 
Game  
Theory 
Case Study 
Stochastic 
Frontier 
Analysis 
(SFA) 
• Understanding how competitor seaports respond to development at a focus port. 
• The framework (based on the investment and competition occurring in Shanghai and 
Pusan) suggested that the focus seaport would be able to capture or defend market 
share by building additional capacity. 
Anderson et 
al. (2008) 
Linear 
Modelling 
• Focus on a landlord port management system with long-term concessions agreements 
shaping the formal relationships between the Port Authority (PA) and the private 
Terminal Operators (TOs) (who use the land for terminal activities). 
• Suggesting a framework for competition between multi-user terminals, and by 
comparing the results (expected payoffs for potential TOs and PAs) of different cases, 
demonstrating how the shift toward a fully dedicated terminal impacts on intra-port 
and inter-port competition among the remaining multi-user terminals. 
Kaselimi et 
al. (2011) 
Nash 
Equilibrium 
• Focus on competition between Busan and Kobe.  
• A non-cooperative game theoretic model was constructed where each seaport selects 
port charges strategically in the timing of port capacity investment. 
Ishii et al. 
(2013) 
• Focus on strong competition between ports of Hong Kong and Shenzhen  
• By examining the port decision making process, suggestions are made for future 
strategic actions (including future competition plan) for the two seaports. 
Do et al. 
(2015) 
Others 
Theory of 
Contestable 
Markets 
Case Study 
Logit 
Model 
• Investigation into factors influencing seaport selection.  
• Based on a case study in US, the research suggests that distance (in either oceanic or 
inland) makes a seaport less attractive. Sailing frequency and the average size of 
vessels do not play a significant role in selection of the ports. 
Malchow 
and 
Kanafani 
(2001) 
Conceptual 
Multi-
Criteria 
Decision 
making 
(MCDM) 
• Dynamics of the European container handling business, as a result of vertical and 
horizontal integration strategies of container terminal operators.  
• Concluding that competition in seaports in gradually shifting from port authorities to 
private terminal operators who are building regional terminal networks. 
Notteboom 
(2002) 
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Discipline Theories Methods 
Analysis 
Techniques 
Focus / Argument Reference 
Others 
Theory of 
Contestable 
Markets 
Discrete 
Choice 
Logit Model 
• Focusing on the port choice behavior of shippers, in China. 
• Results indicating that the distance of the shipper from port, distance to destination 
(in case of exports), distance from origin (in case of imports), port congestion, and a 
shipping line's fleet size are the selection criteria.  
Also reporting that Chinese shippers prefer Chinese shipping lines. 
Tiwari et al. 
(2003) 
Case Study 
Exploratory 
Factor Analyses 
• Factors affecting shipping companies’ port choice in Intra-Asia service routes. 
• Analysis identified five port choice categories: advancement/convenience of port; 
physical/operational ability of port; operational condition of shipping lines; 
marketability, and port charge.  
A comparison between the main trunk and feeder service providers indicated that the 
former face more intense competition than the latter. Moreover, the main haul shipping 
lines are more sensitive to seaport cost factors. 
Chang et al. 
(2008) 
Theory of 
Constraints 
Case Study 
Evaporating 
Clouds  
Method 
• Focusing on spatial development as one of the main ways of gaining competitive 
advantage in seaports, and proposing a decision framework to determine whether a port 
development should be at the original site or a new site. (Taiwan case studies) 
• Suggesting core constraints affecting the spatial development in seaports as 
geographical and economics. Four steps for making decisions in any port spatial 
development are recommended: port planning, site consideration, analysis and 
decision-making. 
Chan and 
Yip (2011) 
Servqual Case Study 
Analytical 
Hierarchy 
Process (AHP) 
• Evaluation of quality of services in container terminals in Iran.  
• Four container terminals were ranked based on physical, reliability, responsiveness, 
assurance and sympathy attributes. 
Jafari and 
Batvandi 
(2013) 
  Case Study  
Exploratory 
Factor Analysis 
(EFA), 
Structural 
Equation 
Modeling 
(SEM)  
 • Identification of the determinants of non-price competition in the port sector in 
Turkey and evaluate their effect on various aspects of non-price competition. 
• Suggesting five non-price competition strategy implemented by Turkish ports such as 
customer care, service customization and bundling, service expansion, service 
diversification and auxiliary service.  
Esmer et al. 
(2016) 
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2.3.2 Research into Seaport Competition 
The general inference emerging from this body of the research is that production theory has 
been extensively used to evaluate performance and efficiency in seaports, because seaports 
are economic units that utilize resources (input) to create services (output) (Roll and Hayuth, 
1993). This is reflected from the large number of studies that measure inputs versus outputs, 
or use cost-benefit analysis and benchmarking to evaluate seaport competitiveness as 
indication of performance efficiency. Other theories such as Utility (Zondag et al., 2010), 
Economies of Scale (Notteboom, 1997), and New Economic Geography (Ducruet et al., 
2009) have also been employed to investigate how seaports' activities are influenced by the 
global increase in trade volumes, and growth in their local economies. Seaport competition in 
both inter-port and intra-port levels is also examined through game theory to suggest 
strategies to cope with competition, such as building additional capacity in seaports 
(Anderson et al., 2008), shifting to dedicated terminals (Kaselimi et al., 2011), and strategic 
pricing of port charges (Ishii et al., 2013). 
Some other theories, which have not been commonly used in seaport competition studies, 
include the theory of contestable markets and the theory of constraints. An example of the 
application of the former is Notteboom’s (2002) study of integration strategies of container 
terminal operators, which found that the nature of seaport competition has moved from port 
authorities to private terminal operators (Notteboom, 2002). A case in point of the latter is 
(Chan and Yip, 2011) study of how seaports dealt with increasing demand and competed with 
adjacent ports and found support for diversified development over concentrated development 
in seaports.  
Despite the diverse range of approaches and methodologies adopted in studies of seaport 
competition, Notteboom et al. (2013b) argued that the general theme of seaport 
competitiveness research can be categorized into five distinct streams, as follows: 
Research Stream 1: Performance of Seaports and Terminals 
The first Research Stream focuses on evaluating seaport competitiveness based on a 
comparative analysis of the performance of seaports and terminals. The methodology most 
widely used in this stream is Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), an analytical tool measuring 
efficiency of multiple decision-making units (DMUs) where the production process presents 
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a structure of multiple inputs to multiple outputs (Zhu, 2003). Under DEA, “efficiency” is 
represented in a variety of measures, depending on the specific set of DMUs and associated 
performance measures used. For instance, if the performance measures are inputs and outputs 
of a production process, then DEA efficiency is “production efficiency”; or if performance 
measures are quality indicators, then DEA efficiency would be a quality measure composite 
(Zhu, 2003). Referred to as “balanced benchmarking” by Sherman and Zhu (2012), DEA 
appears to be one the most popular approaches for efficiency ranking in seaports, evaluation 
of performance in seaports, and benchmarking. Comparison of seaport performance (Roll and 
Hayuth, 1993), evaluating the technical efficiency of container ports (Cullinane et al., 2006), 
benchmarking container terminals (De Koster et al., 2009), and evaluating efficiency of 
container ports (De Oliveira and Cariou, 2015) are examples of studies conducted in this 
stream. 
Research Stream 2: Embeddedness of Seaports in Supply Chains  
In Research Stream 2, studies moved beyond assessment of seaports in isolation to viewing 
seaport competitiveness from a supply chain management perspective. This stream has 
become popular since the late 1990s and is based on a new business environment following 
trade globalization (Juhel, 2001), and observing seaports as nodes of global value chains 
(Robinson, 2002). Consequently, studies in this stream tend to focus on the dynamics of 
seaport connectivity and inter-port relationships in supply chains, rather than evaluating 
seaports merely as places with particular functions. Examples of studies in this category 
include viewing seaports as elements of value-driven chain systems (Robinson, 2002); 
seaport performance from a supply chain management perspective (Bichou and Gray, 2004); 
the impact of hinterland access conditions on competition between seaports (Zhang, 2008); 
transformation of seaports into global supply chain management centers (Wang and Cheng, 
2010); and seaport connectivity in supply chain systems (Lam and Yap, 2011).  
Research Stream 3: Seaport Policies  
In Research Stream 3, the role of the public authorities in seaport management and policy 
formulation in relation to seaport competition is evaluated. This stream examines how 
various levels of seaport authorities, in terms of segregation of ownership and management, 
led to the development of policies in a diverse manner and improved port competitiveness. 
This stream includes: role of authorities in seaport management and administration (Verhoeff, 
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1981); implications of seaport competition for port policy and management (Heaver, 1995); 
relationship between seaport governance structure and performance (De Langen and Heij, 
2014); and decisions on pricing of the port services (Haralambides, 2002), lease agreements 
and concessions (De Langen et al., 2012), as well as adopting security policy (Yeo et al., 
2013).  
Research Stream 4: Cooperation between Seaports  
Research Stream 4 explores coopetition, a combination of competition and co-operation, 
among seaports. This approach emerged with the internationalization of seaport users 
(shipping lines and terminal operators) and services required that would fit into the users’ 
global strategies. Traditionally, seaports have a deeply-rooted culture of competition with 
adjacent ports. However, in order to satisfy the user requirements, seaports were obliged to 
reconsider their spatial scope and, engage in cooperative practices with other seaports. 
Cooperation between seaports is developed in the form of joint investments, joint acquisitions 
and holdings, and participation in networks with ports other than neighboring ports. Parola et 
al. (2017) noted cooperation among neighboring ports as a prime way of enhancing their 
competitiveness, by means of: 
“rationalisation of port spaces and available transport infrastructures, building of 
new infrastructures, pooling financial resources, creation of a “lobby” for getting 
State funds, port promotion through joint-marketing and communication activities, 
realisation of market studies and common projects on environmental protection, ICT 
services, research and development (R&D) and safety/security issues” (p.130).  
Regional container coopetition and co-operation (Song, 2002); (Song, 2003); (Shinohara and 
Saika, 2018), and cross-border port cooperation (De Langen et al., 2009) are examples of 
case studies of coopetition between seaports. 
Research Stream 5: Seaport Selection  
Research Stream 5 comprises studies that developed models of seaport selection validated by 
seaport users, which are predominantly shipping lines. From the user perspective, seaport 
selection criteria mostly contained factors like physical and geographical location 
(availability of hinterland and immediacy of consumers) (Lirn et al., 2003, Lirn et al., 2004, 
Chang et al., 2008), terminal cost (Slack, 1985, Lirn et al., 2003, Lirn et al., 2004, Chang et 
al., 2008), physical infrastructure (Lirn et al., 2003, Chang et al., 2008), as well as port 
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management and administration (Lirn et al., 2003, Lirn et al., 2004). However, when it comes 
to selecting a port or terminal, shipping lines have different preferences. The general factors 
influencing seaport selection (Malchow and Kanafani, 2001) and selection of seaports and 
terminals by deep-sea container operators (Wiegmans et al., 2008) and transshipment 
containers (Lirn et al., 2004) are among the major studies in this research stream.  
Section 2.1 shows that global seaports have been relentlessly investing in physical resources 
to accommodate the changing needs of the shipping industry and evolving requirements of 
maritime operations since containerization. Section 2.2 has also revealed that the fundamental 
factors determining seaport competitiveness in the last five decades have largely been 
resource-based in characteristics, despite the industry-wide changes over the period. Yet, the 
five major streams of research on seaport competition do not seem to have examined seaport 
competitiveness from the resource-based view. Though Streams 2 to 4 do appear to have a 
resource dimension, their focus have not been directed to exploring the role of resource-based 
strategies in achieving seaport competitiveness. 
In their summation, Notteboom et al. (2013b) highlighted three outstanding issues relating to 
research on seaport competition and seaport competitiveness. The first is to diversify the 
research focus on port competition beyond container cargoes to include such segments as 
cruise, warehousing and advanced producer services. The second is to have more detailed 
analysis on reasons of port switching to include supply chain redesign, hinterland mode 
transfer, and carrier strategies. The third is to direct more attention to “hidden” sources of 
port competitiveness to examine other relevant factors, such as differences in bunker costs 
and efficiency, rather than taking the easy route of adopting a ‘generalized port costs’ 
approach.  
Robinson (2005) reasoned that strategy is an organization’s response to external conditions 
by its unique blend of resources and capabilities. Implicit in the three research issues outlined 
by Notteboom et al. (2013b) are strategies and policies adopted by seaport authorities relating 
to deployment and management of seaport resources in response to external environmental 
conditions. Making provision to accommodate cruise, warehousing and advanced producer 
services would be a resource-based strategy to expand the use of seaport infrastructure. 
Likewise, redesigning seaport facilities and offering ancillary services (e.g., advanced 
logistics solutions) to insert seaport into the global supply chains of major products or 
multinational enterprises would also be a resource-based strategy to strengthen the 
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attractiveness of the seaport. Lastly, using differences in bunker costs to create a competitive 
advantage, such as the case of Singapore versus other seaports in the region (Lam et al., 
2011) could also be considered a resource-based approach, as it exhibits an exceptional 
resource organization capability to create a hidden source of competitiveness for Singapore. 
Within the maritime industry, a few studies have applied resources and capabilities theories 
to examine seaport strategies (Panayides and Gray, 1999; Wang et al., 2017), explore seaport 
competitiveness (Haezendonck, 2001; Gordon et al., 2005; Azevedo and Ferreira, 2008) and 
evaluate seaport performance (Da Cruz et al., 2013). In general, these studies suggest that 
unique combination of seaport resources, both tangible and intangible, are among the key 
factors contributing to bolstering the competitive strength of seaports (Da Cruz et al., 2013). 
These studies view resources as factors necessary to performing both seaport and value-added 
logistical activities and play an important role as they can promote development of inter-
organizational relationships among various players in the supply chain network (De Martino 
and Morvillo, 2008). A fuller discussion of these studies will be presented in Section 2.4.2. 
2.4 Seaport Competitiveness: A Resource-Based Perspective 
2.4.1 Resources, Capabilities, Environmental Contingencies and 
Firm Performance 
In mainstream management literature, RBV of the firm (Barney, 1991) and DC (Eisenhardt 
and Martin, 2000) are two of the popular theories that explain how firms exploit resources to 
develop capabilities, competencies and, ultimately, competitive advantage (Javidan, 1998).  
RBV as a basis for explaining how firms gain competitive advantage is founded on the 
application of a bundle of strategic resources at the firm’s disposal (Rumelt, 1984, 
Wernerfelt, 1984). This foundation is built on the premise of Ricardo’s (1817) resource-
picking mechanism of economic rent creation (Makadok, 2001, Sirmon et al., 2007). The 
Richardian logic (Ricardo, 1817) contends that differences between firms’ performance are 
attributable to their ownership of resources of dissimilar productivity (Makadok, 2001), as 
illustrated by his illustrious farmland example which shows that owners of scare resources 
with higher production levels generate abnormal profits.  
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Drawing on the Richardian logic (1817), Barney (1991) argued that strategic resources 
should be valuable, rare, imperfectly mobile, and non-substitutable (VRIN). The premise is 
that VRIN resources are a source of competitive advantage and provide the basis for value 
creation (Sirmon et al., 2007). However, ownership of, or access to, VRIN resources does not 
guarantee the generation of competitive advantages (Barney and Arikan, 2001, Priem and 
Butler, 2001, Sirmon et al., 2007). Several researchers (e.g., Priem and Butler, 2001; Sirmon 
et al. 2007) have further lamented that information is scanty on how resources are employed 
to create a competitive advantage to the extent that some RBV research assumes that the 
actions needed to exploit resources are self-evident when they are not (Barney and Arikan, 
2001, Sirmon et al., 2007). In this regard, Barney and Hesterly (2010) emphasized the 
importance of organization, i.e., a firm’s policies and procedures that support the organization 
of the resources for exploitation, arguing that without organization, even firms with valuable, 
rare and costly-to-imitate resources can endure competitive disadvantage. Indeed, it is not 
uncommon for valuable resources to have competitive disadvantages co-existing with 
competitive advantages (Powell, 2001, Bowman and Ambrosini, 2007). Presence of 
competitive disadvantages does not necessarily imply the non-existence of VRIN resources 
(Powell, 2001). Competitive disadvantages are weaknesses and inadequacies that could 
dampen the benefits of VRIN resources (Arend, 2004), unless competitors also experience 
similar weaknesses and inadequacies (West and DeCastro, 2001).  
Further, even if the co-existence of competitive disadvantages does not erode the competitive 
advantages of VRIN resources, there is no guarantee that possession of VRIN resources 
would result in superior performance (Andersén, 2011). For VRIN resources to generate 
superior performance, Andersén (2011) argued that they have to fulfill five additional 
criteria: 
1. Fit with resources: This criterion warrants that the acquired strategic resource fits into 
the overall existing resource configuration of the firm. It argues that resources interact 
with one another in a complex manner: a potentially strategic resource might reduce 
the value of other existing resources within the firm. 
2. Management capability: This criterion requires that the firm possesses the managerial 
ability to make use of the acquired strategic resource. Its rationale is that the way a 
strategic resource is utilized could affect performance more so than possessing the 
resource could. 
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3. Marketing capability: This criterion highlights the importance of having the necessary 
(product) market experience and skills to position the products. In other words, 
inferior marketing capabilities may nullify the strategic value of a high-value product, 
if the firm fails to deploy the product in a suitable product market. 
4. Firm appropriation of rent: This criterion warns that certain stakeholders 
appropriating the rent, i.e., profits that exceeds the average return of the industry, may 
not be reflected in the financial performance of the company. This could lead to a 
distortion in terms of assessing the relationship between strategic resources and firm 
performance. 
5. Non-competitive disadvantages: This criterion cautions that strategic resources have 
both competitive advantages as well as non-competitive disadvantages, a feature that 
has been noted by other scholars discussed above (e.g., Powell, 2001; West and 
DeCastro, 2001; Arend, 2004; Bowman and Ambrosini, 2007). The important point, 
therefore, is to be able to develop resources that generate competitive advantages 
without them also resulting in competitive disadvantages. 
While Andersén’s (2011) five criteria clearly point to the need to have in place a unique 
blend of resource management capabilities, i.e., capabilities that could utilize resources in a 
strategic manner to create fit among them, to market the firm’s products and/or services, to 
appropriate rent and to minimize the counteracting effects of competitive disadvantages, 
Andersén (2011) stopped short of describing how firms could use their VRIN resources to 
produce superior performance. The processes by which firms organize, combine, deploy and 
leverage those resources to produce superior performance or gain competitive advantage 
remain poorly understood. This, unfortunately, has been the case with most research on RBV 
(Priem and Butler, 2001, Sirmon et al., 2007). The "black box", as Sirmon et al. (2007) called 
it, housing the processes by which VRIN resources are developed, organized, combined, 
deployed and managed to create value, produce competitive advantage, and superior 
performance, has not been adequately studied. 
Grant (1996) argued that a sustainable competitive advantage can be generated by resources 
and the managerial capabilities that integrate the resources. Javidan (1998) has also 
demonstrated that competitive advantage evolved from a firm's resources over four levels: 1) 
conversion of resources into capabilities; 2) routinization of capabilities into competencies; 3) 
alternations of competencies into core competencies, and 4) transformation of core 
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competencies into competitive advantage. Zott (2003) further pointed out that differences in 
resource management process between organizations can result in disparate outcomes even 
among organizations holding similar resources and operating in comparable environmental 
contexts. These arguments echo Penrose’s (1950) view that the manner in which a resource is 
used is just as important as possessing or owning it. As Sirmon et al. (2007) reasoned: 
“heterogeneity in firm outcomes under similar initial conditions may result from choices 
made in the structuring, bundling, and leveraging of resources” (p.275). 
Integrating the RBV with contingency theory and organizational learning theory, Sirmon et 
al. (2007) developed a theoretical resource management process model to show how value 
could be created from resources by situating resource management within the environmental 
context. Sirmon et al’s (2007) resource managing process model views resource management 
as comprising three sequentially linked components: structuring, bundling and leveraging. 
 Structuring involves managing the firm's resource portfolio, which includes 
purchasing resources from strategic factor markets (acquiring), developing resources 
internally (accumulating) and shedding firm-controlled resources with considerable 
counteracting competitive disadvantage (divesting) (Sirmon et al., 2007). 
 Bundling involves combining firm resources to construct new or alter existing 
capabilities. It consists of making minor incremental improvements to existing 
capabilities (stabilizing), extending current capabilities beyond keeping skills up-to-
date (enriching); and creating new capabilities with which to address the firm's 
competitive context (pioneering) (Sirmon et al., 2007). 
 Leveraging refers to the application of a firm's capabilities to create value for 
customers and wealth for owners. This component comprises the process of 
identifying the capabilities needed to support capability configurations necessary to 
exploit opportunities in the market (mobilizing); the process of integrating identified 
capabilities into effective yet efficient capability configurations (coordinating); and 
the process of physically using capability configurations to support a chosen 
leveraging strategy, which includes the resource advantage strategy, market 
opportunity strategy, or entrepreneurial strategy (deploying) (Sirmon et al., 2007). 
Central to Sirmon et al.’s (2007) theoretical resource management process model is a 
temporal dimension, which suggests the three main components of resource management 
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process partially sequential in nature: firms must have resources to bundle into capabilities 
and resource leveraging can occur only when capabilities exist. With the incorporation of 
feedback loops, the model treats resource management as a dynamic process “with change 
resulting from adapting to environmental contingencies and from exploiting opportunities 
created by those contingencies” (p.275). 
The conceptual foundation of Sirmon et al.’s (2007) model was the integration of RBV with 
contingency theory and organization learning theory. Contingency theory posits that an 
organizational system must fit the environmental context in which it operates in order to be 
efficient (Hamann, 2017). The argument is that different market conditions impose different 
requirements and, hence, value impact on capabilities (Penrose, 1959, Meyer et al., 1993, 
Levinthal, 2000). The operating environment, therefore, is important in determining how a 
firm should invest its resources and build its capabilities (Ruekert et al., 1985, Song et al., 
2005). 
According to Donaldson (2001), three core paradigms undergird the contingency approach: 
1) the contingency factor and the organizational system are associated; 2) a change in the 
contingency factor would effect a change in the organizational system; and 3) a fit between 
the contingency factor and the organizational system positively affects the performance of the 
organization. Within the premise of contingency theory, organization design is thus a 
constrained optimization problem (Van de Ven et al., 2013), involving “maximizing 
performance outcomes by minimizing the misfit between diverse environmental demands and 
internal organizational arrangements” (Van de Ven et al., 2013, p.402). Contingency 
scholars (Perrow, 1967, Morgan, 1986, Scott, 2003, Fredericks, 2005) therefore, contend that 
development of contingent strategies, structures and resources that match environmental 
exigencies will result in higher firm performance since they are driven by firm-specific 
requirements. As no single best-resource mix exists, firms that manage to adapt to 
environmental preferences and align their resources accordingly have a higher chance of 
survival. In sum, an organizational system that fits well with its environmental context is thus 
expected to outperform other systems that are in misfit (Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985). 
Through a systematic literature review of contingency theory, Hamann (2017) found that 
three different conceptual approaches to fit have been employed in empirical contingency 
studies: selection fit, interaction fit, and systems fit (e.g., Donaldson, 2001; Drazin and Van 
de Ven, 1985; Gerdin and Greve, 2004). Selection fit analyses fit as a congruence 
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relationship between context and structure and process (Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985) and 
addresses only the first core paradigm, i.e., contingency factor and the organizational system 
are associated (Hamann, 2017). Interaction fit views fit as conformance to a linear 
relationship of context and design. Deviation from this relationship will end in low 
performance (Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985). This view addresses the first and third core 
paradigms, i.e., the contingency factor and the organizational system are associated; and a fit 
between the contingency factor and the organizational system positively affects the 
performance of the organization. System fit overcomes the limitations of the other two 
conceptual approaches to fit (Hamann, 2017), treating fit as the internal consistency of 
multiple contingencies and multiple organizational characteristics that leads to improved 
performance (Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985). However, longitudinal data is needed to assess 
how a change in the contingency factor would lead to a change in the organizational system 
using the concept of systems fit (Dyson and Foster, 1982, Pennings, 1998, Hamann, 2017). 
In dynamic environments, “fit” between context and structure in the contingency perspective 
is a process of adaptation. Organizational learning is an important aspect of fit through 
adaptation (Luo and Peng, 1999) and would become “even more critical in less munificent 
environments, where resource scarcity may prolong the effects of poor resource 
management” (Sirmon et al., 2007, p.275).  
Miller (1996) defined organizational learning as the "acquisition of new knowledge by actors 
who are able and willing to apply that knowledge in making decisions or influencing others 
in the organization" (p.486). Organizational learning thus provides firms with a potential 
capacity to adapt and adjust to create and maintain value through constant interactions with 
the operating environment to find a suitable system to fit its contingencies (Lei et al., 1996). 
This ability to learn to adapt is, in essence, the core of dynamic capabilities, which have been 
described as “the capacities to change the operational capabilities to make these fit a 
changing environment and/or proactively affect the environment” (Vahlne and Jonsson, 
2017, p.62). 
Dynamic capabilities, in fact, have been defined in multiple ways. In a bibliometric analysis 
of the literature on dynamic capabilities, Albort-Morant et al. (2017) singled out Teece et al. 
(1997b) definition as most influential: “the firm’s ability in building, integrating and 
reconfiguring internal and external competencies to address rapidly changing environments” 
(p. 516). Hodgson (2008), however, suggested that both resources and capabilities should be 
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conceived as capacities that enable a firm’s actions. Helfat et al. (2007), on the other hand, 
considered dynamic capabilities as a “capacity of an organization to purposefully create, 
extend or modify its resource base” (p.1). In addition, dynamic capabilities have also been 
described as organizational processes (skills, expertise, know-how, management) used by 
firms to explore their resources to obtain competitive advantage in changing environments 
(Cardeal and Antonio, 2012). On this note, dynamic capabilities can be disaggregated into 
three sub-processes: ‘sensing’ opportunities and threats, ‘seizing’ (or neutralizing) 
opportunities and threats via expedient investments to create new resources, and 
‘transforming’ (or reconfiguring) existing core resources and capabilities in response to 
environmental contingencies (Teece, 2007, Weerawardena and Mavondo, 2011, Teece, 2009, 
Helfat and Martin, 2015, Helfat and Peteraf, 2015, Matysiak et al., 2017).  
Teece (2007) summarized the concept of dynamic capability into “corporate agility” that 
could be achieved through creating capacity, seizing opportunities, and maintaining 
competitiveness by enhancing and reconfiguring assets. The basic dynamic capabilities, 
which are known as necessities of overcoming new challenges, are: 
 Capability of building strategic assets, transforming existing assets (Amit and 
Schoemaker, 1993) and asset orchestration (Hitt, 2014). Asset orchestration refers to 
identification, selection and configuration of resources, and utilizing them in the most 
productive ways (Hitt, 2014).  
 Capability of building assets in a unique combination, in which the tangible and 
intangible assets complement one another and provide a synergy. Assets are more 
valuable in combination than in isolation, giving a firm a more sustainable 
competitive advantage (Teece, 2009). Combining different assets by forming alliances 
(Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000) and acquisitions (Karim and Mitchell, 2000, Danneels, 
2002) are identified as other forms of dynamic capability. Karim and Mitchell (2000) 
defined acquisitions activity as a mechanism by which firms change their mix of 
existing resources, by extending into areas that require substantially different 
resources.  
 Capability of learning new patterns of activity or “routines” (Zollo and Winter, 1999). 
Teece (2007) described routines as patterns of interactions that represent successful 
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solutions to particular problems, and suggested collaborations and partnerships (i.e. 
mergers and acquisitions) as sources of new organizational learning. 
Wang and Ahmed (2007) also identified three important components of dynamic capabilities 
in a firm: i) adaptive capability (the capability to align internal organizational features with 
external environmental dynamics); ii) absorptive capability (the capability to absorb external 
knowledge and combine it with internal knowledge), and iii) innovative capability (the 
capability to link internal resources and capabilities with the product market).  
Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) argued that dynamic capabilities are necessary but not (by 
themselves) sufficient conditions for competitive advantage. This is because the functionality 
of dynamic capabilities can be duplicated across firms: competitive advantage is created from 
resource configurations, not from capabilities (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). Jurksiene and 
Pundziene (2016), in their conceptual study of the relationship between dynamic capabilities 
and competitive advantages, also found that the majority of research studies reviewed do not 
suggest that dynamic capabilities have a direct impact on competitive advantage. Typically, 
this relationship is mediated by variables that indicate resource restructuring or 
reconfiguration, such as new resource combinations (Teece, 2007, Weerawardena and 
Mavondo, 2011) or replacement of existing resources (Teece et al., 1997a, Helfat, 1997, 
Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000).  
In recent years, empirical studies on dynamic capabilities have discovered that dynamic 
capabilities have more complex performance outcomes than previously assumed. For 
instance, Schilke (2014), in a study of alliance management capability and new product 
development capability, found that these two dynamic capabilities are more strongly 
associated with competitive advantage in moderately dynamic, than in stable or highly 
dynamic, environments. Likewise, Girod and Whittington (2017), in their comparative 
analysis of the performance effects of two forms of reorganization - organizational 
restructuring and organizational reconfiguration, found that, in general, restructurings tend to 
be associated with positive outcomes, while reconfigurations are linked to negative outcomes. 
However, in dynamic environments, Girod and Whittington (2017) noted that the 
performance outcomes reverse the general case: reconfiguration outcomes become positive, 
while restructuring outcomes change to negative. Both Schilke’s (2014) and Girod and 
Whittington’s (2017) findings imply that dynamic capabilities are environment-specific 
(Arend and Bromiley, 2009). Applying the right dynamic capability to the right 
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environmental context is thus critical. In short, by their inherent adaptive, absorptive and 
innovative nature (Wang and Ahmed, 2007), dynamic capabilities should be evolving, or 
even destroyed, to serve the purpose of sustaining competitive advantage. This argument 
suggests that contingency theory (Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985, Donaldson, 2001), which 
posits that there is no one best approach to manage an organization, depending upon the way 
internal organizational needs are balanced against evolving external environmental 
circumstances, is an appropriate theory to provide a conceptual base for this research jointly 
with RBV and dynamic capability theories.  
2.4.2 Resource-Based Studies of Seaport Competitiveness  
The earliest application of RBV in port studies was by Coeck et al. (1996). Introducing a 
resource-based conceptual framework, they focused on strategic planning procedures for port 
authorities. In a study by Panayides and Gray (1999) on relational competitive advantage in 
shipping industry, it was argued that establishing and maintaining relationships are 
considered an intangible resource, which can be utilized by maritime organizations to achieve 
competitiveness. Later, Haezendonck et al. (2001) utilized the RBV approach to identify the 
key sources of competitive advantage in the Port of Antwerp. From the results of a factor 
analysis, Haezendonck et al. (2001) concluded that a bundle of critical resources formed a set 
of competencies. Superstructure, infrastructure and internal competition, as well as internal 
and external co-operation between the port operators and service providers, were highlighted 
as the main attributes of competitiveness in Antwerp. 
Gordon et al. (2005) also used the RBV framework to examine resources that contributed to 
competitive strength of the Port of Singapore. They argued that a combination of resources 
such as ample investment, supportive government policies, a well-designed information 
technology system and operation, along with a good location, contributed to the success of 
the Port of Singapore. Gordon et al. (2005) concluded that these resources not only have a 
direct impact on the competitiveness of that port but also indirectly compensated for some of 
its natural disadvantages. A successful application of information technology systems in 
increasing the island’s capacity for handling shipments, and overcoming the limitations of 
land area, is an example. 
The RBV framework was also used by Azevedo and Ferreira (2008) to analyze the 
competitive advantages of a main seaport in Portugal (Port of Sines). The resources examined 
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were infrastructures, maritime accessibility, operations, and information systems. Azevedo 
and Ferreira (2008) found that those four resources were key contributors to the Port of Sines' 
success and its international competitiveness.  
Using RBV and applying the linear additive multi-criteria analysis (MCA), Da Cruz et al. 
(2013b) studied the relationship of logistics resources within the framework of the overall 
performance of 16 seaport container terminals in the Iberian Peninsula (Spain and Portugal). 
Da Cruz et al. (2013b) focused on two performance indicators: operational performance and 
physical capacity. The results of the analysis revealed that physical capacity contributed to 
over 51% to overall performance of the terminals.  
Cho and Kim (2015) also used RBV as a theoretical framework to analyze competitiveness of 
container ports in 10 countries (seven Asian, two European, and one North American) with 
the highest volume of container traffic.  Through an evaluation of qualities of port 
infrastructure in the selected countries, Cho and Kim (2015) concluded that infrastructure 
quality of container ports is positively associated with the seaports’ competitiveness.  
In a more recent study, Wong et al. (2017) explored the explanatory force of RBV on seaport 
business operation in Hong Kong International Terminals (HIT). By examining the 
development of HIT, they revealed that the way the terminal operator has built a competitive 
advantage over two decades has changed. In a process of expansion, HIT built more resource 
bundles (i.e. value-added services and flexibility) for the generation of new competitive 
advantages. 
The above studies suggest that maritime scholars have recognized the vital link between 
VRIN resources and competitive advantage generation in seaport operations. Though RBV 
has been used as a theoretical lens to examine the contributory role of resources, the manner 
in which resources, both tangible and intangible, were strategically planned, developed, 
bundled, deployed and reconfigured in response to environmental changes has not been fully 
examined. This study will extend the resource-based line of enquiry by combining four major 
management theories – RBV, Organization Learning, Contingency and Dynamic Capabilities 
theories – to examine the resource development and management paths of three global 
seaports to answer the primary research question: How do global container seaports manage 
their resource base to achieve competitiveness? 
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This chapter outlines the research methodology adopted to study how the three case seaports 
systematically planned, organized and managed their resources, both tangible and intangible, 
to maintain and gain competitive strength across five decades. The chapter comprises three 
main sections. First, the methods used in this research, including the justifications for 
adopting the case study approach are described. Second, data sources, including interviews 
and onsite observations, and archival materials, are detailed. Finally, the chapter describes the 
methods of data analysis, covering within-case and cross-case analysis.  
3.1 Research Design  
Understanding the dynamic complexity determining seaport competiveness is not limited to 
identification of the factors contributing to seaport success. Such an understanding requires 
an in-depth evaluation of the growth and developmental path that a seaport has traversed, and 
involves a significant historical component where current changes are viewed against 
previous practices. Guided by the tenets of RBV (Barney, 1991, Makadok, 2001, Barney and 
Hesterly, 2010), dynamic capability (Teece et al., 1997a, Helfat and Peteraf, 2003, Cardeal 
and Antonio, 2012) and contingency theories (Donaldson, 1999, Scott, 2003, Fredericks, 
2005), this research examined the historical development of three global seaports, focusing 
on identifying the strategic action programs they undertook to build competitive capabilities 
through investment and exploitation of resources, both tangible and intangible. The objective 
is to understand how global seaports built their dynamic maritime capabilities to compete 
from the resource-based perspective. 
Studying historical development of global seaports to detect regularities and patterns of 
strategies deployed, to draw general conclusions for building theories, is suggestive of 
following an inductive logic (Locke, 2007). It has been suggested by scholars (e.g., 
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Danermark et al., 2001; Kovács and Spens, 2005) that inductive logic follows the pattern of 
case-result-rule. In a manner, inductive logic is to reason through a particular case (or a 
number of cases) that would lead to developing propositions and generalization in a 
theoretical framework (Kovács and Spens, 2005). Hence the process of building theory 
through observation of historical developments (facts) using an inductive logic (Danermark et 
al., 2001, Taylor et al., 2002, Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2009) is considered an appropriate 
approach for this study. Inductive reasoning is associated with the use of qualitative research 
methods (Hussey and Hussey, 1997, Locke, 2001), and is frequently operationalized as case 
studies (Eisenhardt, 1989, Yin, 2009). The value of the case study approach lies in its ability 
to construct theory from the rich stories generated by the case(s) (e.g., phenomena, 
organizations) studied (Hoskisson et al., 1999) using replication logic (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
This study thus adopted the multiple case study approach to examine how global seaports 
developed their competitive strength from the perspective of resource picking, building, 
deployment and utilization.  
3.1.1 Case Study 
The nature of the case study approach has been interpreted in many ways, though three 
distinct characteristics can be defined for it. One group of scholars, such as Stake (1995) and 
Schön (1985), observe that case study is not so much a choice of methodology but a choice of 
object to be studied. This group advocates that case study research should be conducted for 
analyzing any bounded social system (e.g., organization), as the method is reflective and 
interpretive. Another group of researchers, such as Yin (2009) and (Gerring, 2006), argue that 
case study research is a distinct method for social research and the object of analysis. The 
third group of scholars argue that case studies represent a frame (e.g., time, geography, and 
structure) in which social research can be conducted (Bromley, 1991, Stoecker, 1991). 
Despite the highlighted differences, the three approaches share a number of common 
elements that support the appropriateness of case study method for this research. 
1. Uniqueness: The observation of Stake (1995) on selecting the case study approach as 
a choice of object to be studied, rather than a methodology, is essentially a recognition 
that case studies are normally dictated by the choice of phenomena to be studied. A 
phenomenon is an unusual event, one that has little precedence and is highly unlikely, 
or improbable, to be repeated in the same manner in a different place and time. When 
a researcher studies an unusual event, other methodologies, such as surveys or 
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experiments, will not be sufficient, as those methods are designed to isolate common 
characteristics of the phenomena through a comparative analysis (Rowley, 2002). 
Obviously, comparisons cannot be made when a phenomenon is an unlikely event, 
and improbable to repeat. 
As pointed out in Chapter 2, current knowledge on the resource building and 
capability development paths of global seaports is limited. Exploring this 
phenomenon requires a systematic investigation on the historical growth and 
development of global seaports, where all the potentially important variables were 
unknown beforehand, to addressing a broad range of complex issues (Swanson and 
Holton, 2005). This calls for a case study approach to generate rich data for analysis. 
2. Research Questions: The methodology of using cases to build theory typically 
answers research questions that addresses “how” and “why” in unexplored or less 
trampled research areas (Edmondson and McManus, 2007), in contrast with questions 
about the relative empirical importance of constructs, such as “how many” and “how 
often” (Helfat, 2007). The main research question of this study is to understand “how” 
global seaports achieve competitiveness through resource building and exploitation, 
which requires using a variety of evidences, such as documents, artifacts and 
observations, to build a coherent rich story (Eisenhardt, 1989). This again suggests 
that the case study research method is most suited for the purpose of this study (Yin, 
2009). 
3. Importance of Holistic Analysis: According to Yin (2009) and Andrade (2009) the 
case study method allows researchers to gain a holistic and purposeful characteristics 
of real-life events. Other scholars (Benbasat et al., 1987, Eisenhardt, 1989, Creswell, 
2012) also elaborated on the advantages of case study research conducted in a natural 
setting with the intention of realizing the nature of current processes in a previously 
little-studied area. In this study, the unit of analysis, the seaport, is a complex entity 
with a diverse range of stakeholders, market regulators and state officials. The case 
study research allows these complexities to be unravelled in a comprehensive manner 
4. Flexibility: Case study research offers flexibility in designing research strategies and 
data collection methods, which may be modified to suit the circumstances as they 
arise (Stake, 1995, Eisenhardt, 1989, Van Maanen, 1988, Yin, 2009). The data for the 
current study rely on sieving through a wide range of historical records, archival 
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reports and published documents, in addition to semi-structured interviews and on-site 
visits. The uncertainties surrounding the availability of, and access to, historical 
records and schedule of long interviews require a flexible data collection method, 
which can be adjusted to suit the situation as it arises. The case study approach offers 
a research design that could be modified as the research proceeds (Yin, 1981).  
5. Theory building: Case studies has become a common research methodology for 
building theories in many disciplines and across a diverse range of topics, such as 
organization strategies (Mintzberg and Waters, 1982), internal organization (Galunic 
and Eisenhardt, 2001), group processes (Edmondson et al., 2001), institutional change 
(Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006), logistics studies (Dowlatshahi, 2010) and seaport 
studies (Becker and Caldwell, 2015, Wong et al., 2017). An advantage of using case 
study research for theory building, as explained by Swanson and Holton (2005), is 
that it does not rely on previous empirical evidence.  
Eisenhardt (1989) describes developing theories from case studies as a research 
strategy involving one or more cases to create theoretical constructs, propositions 
and/or a midrange theory from case-based empirical evidence. Ellram (1996) argued 
that the rich information gathered through case studies can reveal best practices and 
provide indicative evidence for theory building. Whether from historical accounts or 
contemporary events, cases provide a robust basis to develop theory inductively 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007).  
In the context of logistics research, a number of logistics scholars (Mentzer and Kahn, 1995, 
Garver and Mentzer, 1999, Stentoft Arlbjørn and Halldorsson, 2002, Näslund, 2002, Kovács 
and Spens, 2007) have observed the dominance of deductive research in logistics, and called 
for the need for more inductive research for theory development. Acknowledging the need of 
using both quantitative and qualitative methods for developing advance logistics studies, 
Näslund (2002) recommended the case study methodology as a suitable approach for logistics 
research due to the applied nature of logistics investigations, that require holistic, systemic 
thinking, and utilizing multi-disciplinary and cross-functional perspectives. Näslund (2002) 
contention was echoed by Kotzab et al. (2006), who highlighted the necessity of qualitative 
research methods for expanding the body of knowledge in logistics and supply chain 
discipline. 
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This study intends to build a theory of competitive global seaports based on resource 
development and management. The inductive case study approach is thus considered most 
suitable. 
3.1.2 Multiple Case Study  
Single-case studies are known to provide a rich description of a phenomenon (Siggelkow, 
2007). To obtain a stronger base to build theories, Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) argued 
that a broader exploration is required, for which multiple cases can better facilitate than 
single cases. Each case in a multiple case study individually would enhance the analytical 
power of the research (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007), and could offer several 
complementary aspects of a phenomenon (Eisenhardt, 1991). In a multiple case study, each 
case serves as a standalone analytical unit (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) and can be 
considered a self-contained experiment (Ellram, 1996), offering a basis for logic replication, 
which sits at the core of building theory (Eisenhardt, 1989). The quality of a theoretical 
framework developed from a multiple case study could be significantly enriched by the 
analytic power of a small number of rich cases (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). 
Yin (2009) describes multiple cases as discrete experiments, comparable to a series of related 
laboratory experiments (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007), which serve as replications, 
contrasts and extensions to emerging theory (Yin, 2009). However, laboratory experiments 
segregate the phenomena from their context, whereas case studies highlight the real-world 
context in which phenomena occur (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). A theory developed 
from multiple case studies is deeply grounded, testable, and likely to be valid empirically 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). 
In this research, the multiple case study method was carried out over three main stages, as 
illustrated in Figure 3.1. The first stage was developing a conceptual base to identify which 
seaports will be included in the study, and designing the data collection protocol. The second 
stage was to collect data through multiple data sources to construct the developmental path of 
each seaport individually. The final stage was conducting the cross-case comparison to 
identify unique and common resource-based strategies adopted by the cases, leading to the 
development of working propositions for theory building.  
54 
 Figure 3.1: Research Plan 
3.1.3 Case Selection 
Three main factors were considered when selecting suitable case seaports for this study: 
sampling plan, number of cases and case study boundaries. 
a) Sampling Plan: In selecting cases for studies, Lee (2006) and Eisenhardt and 
Graebner (2007) recommended that researchers should deliberately aim for a 
theoretical sampling plan. In contrast with hypothesis testing studies that mostly rely 
on random sampling, the goal of theoretical sampling is to choose cases that are likely 
to replicate or extend emergent theories (Eisenhardt, 1989). For case study selection, 
Lee (2006) stressed that cases should be chosen either to produce similar results as a 
literal replication, or to construct contrasting results as a theoretical replication. 
b) Number of Cases: On the number of cases to be selected, Eisenhardt (1989) suggested 
between four and 10, though no number can be considered as ideal due to various 
limitations, such as resource availability and time constraints. Eisenhardt (1989) 
argued that four cases would provide a convincing empirical ground for theory 
building. On the other hand, dealing with more than 10 cases would be problematic 
and complex in terms of reaching a concrete conclusion due to the large volume of 
data involved (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
55 
Given the limit on the number of cases to be used in case study research, Pettigrew 
(1990) suggested selecting cases as extreme situations and polar types in which the 
subject of interest is “transparently observable” (Pettigrew, 1990, p.275). Selecting 
cases that demonstrate high and low level of performance is an example of polar types 
on a study of relative firm performance (Pettigrew, 1990).  
c) Case Study Boundaries: Placing boundaries are suggested by Stake (1995) and Yin 
(2009) to border objectives for case studies. Baxter and Jack (2008) stated that 
binding the case study will ensure that study remains reasonable in scope. For binding 
the case study different methods have been suggested, including: i) by definition and 
context (Miles and Huberman, 2002), ii) by time and activity (Stake, 1995), and iii) 
by time and place (Creswell, 2013). To select appropriate candidates for case studies, 
a specific time frame and geographical location were considered in this study. 
- Time: the time frame for this study spans from late 1960s to the present, dating 
back to the period that containerization began to develop widely and at a global 
scale. Guerrero and Rodrigue (2014) identified five major waves of 
containerization, as the spatial and functional diffusion of the container. Each 
wave illustrated the periodic development of container port system in different 
areas across the globe. Since the focus of this study is on containerized traffic, 
selecting the initial date of late 1960s allows for a holistic view of seaports 
regardless of the wave their developments are associated with.  
- Geographical location: with the intention of obtaining a global view, and taking 
possible regional differences into account, the case seaports were deliberately 
selected from different geographical zones. The global scope of the study provides 
a broader scope of analysis, which is not limited to a specific region and reflecting 
diversity of approaches and strategies of the authorities involved.  
The research first identified six global seaports – Rotterdam, Singapore, Dubai, Shanghai, 
Kaohsiung and Long Beach - considered as polar types and extreme situation scenarios. The 
selection of the six seaports followed a purposeful sampling framework (Cavana et al., 2001) 
with the objective of capturing a range of variation to produce richness and depth in theory 
building (Coyne, 1997). The six global seaports identified have been, at one time or another, 
ranked among the top 10 containerized seaports in the world. The six were selected based on 
the following three groupings, with two seaports in each: 
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1. Group 1: Seaports that have maintained their status on the top 10 container traffic 
ports in the world during the last 30 years (1985-2015) and have been referred to as 
foci of international trade (Haralambides, 2002). Rotterdam, as Europe’s largest 
container port, and Singapore, a main hub port in the South Asian Pacific region, were 
the two selected case seaports in this group. Throughout the period of three decades, 
Singapore held a position on the top 10. Port of Rotterdam’s global position declined 
to rank number 11 since 2012, though it remained as the main player within the 
European region.  
2. Group 2: Seaports that have not been major participants in earlier decades but are 
presently ranked among the top 10 busiest seaports on the world list. Dubai, the 
leading port in the Middle East region, and Shanghai, the largest port in China were 
identified as the case seaports belonging to this group.  
3. Group 3: Seaports that had been on the top 10 list until mid-2000s, but have since 
lost that status as one of the top 10 container ports on the world ranking. In this group, 
the nominated case seaports were Kaohsiung, the main port of Taiwan, and Long 
Beach, one of the busiest container ports in the U.S. 
Due to issues with obtaining adequate secondary data and data validation for ports of 
Shanghai, and Long Beach, the sampling plan was modified to four case studies. At a later 
stage, the port of Singapore was excluded from the study when establishing direct contact 
with the respective port authority for interviews became difficult. The research plan was 
finally reduced to three case studies, one from each of the original three groupings and 
located in different geographic zones. Thus, though the number of cases was scaled down 
from six to three, all three sampling groups remained intact with one case in each, providing a 
global scope for the research. As Dyer and Wilkins (1991) argued, the number of cases per se 
is not a major issue in case study research as long as a thorough understanding of the context 
is achieved. Yin (2009) is also of the view that three to four cases would be sufficient to 
invoke the replication logic. 
Table 3.1 presents the rankings of the three selected seaports in terms of world container 
traffic from 1985 to 2015. All three case seaports are important logistics hubs in their own 
regions and important nodes in the global economic system. Port of Rotterdam has been a 
market leader in Europe since the early stages of containerization. Although its global 
ranking declined in mid 2000s, Port of Rotterdam still holds the position of a leading seaport 
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and top logistics hub in the European region. Port of Rotterdam connects the Western Europe, 
Eastern Asia and South Eastern Asia trade routes (Yap, 2009). 
Port of Kaohsiung, the largest international commercial seaport in Taiwan, has been a main 
hub in Asia since the early 1980s. Port of Kaohsiung currently links North Eastern, South 
Eastern and China trade routes (Cheng, 2012). Port of Dubai, compared to the other two 
seaports, was a late joiner to containerization. However, in a relatively short period of 20 
years, Dubai seaport has emerged as the main transshipment port and logistics hub in the 
Middle East region. Port of Dubai connects the important east-west trade routes (Jha, 2005). 
Table 3.1: Ranking of Selected Case Seaports 
Case Study 
Groups  
Seaports  
World Ranking 
(as per container traffic) 
1985 1995 2005 2015 
Group 1  
Rotterdam 
(The Netherlands) 
1 4 7 11 
Group 2 
Dubai 
(United Arab Emirates) 
37 14 9 9 
Group 3 
Kaohsiung 
(Taiwan) 
4 3 6 13 
Source: Compiled from (Rodrigue, 2010, WSC, 2017) 
The distinctiveness and diverse regional contexts surrounding the three case seaports, 
together with the significant role they have been playing in connecting the global economic 
systems, provide the “polar extremes” to explore the theoretical underpinnings of seaport 
competiveness on a global scale. 
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3.2 Data Collection 
The use of multiple data sources is a distinctive feature of case study research, which is a 
strategy of enhancing data credibility (Patton, 1990, Baxter and Jack, 2008). This study used 
two main categories of data sources: 1) primary data, comprising semi-structured interviews 
and onsite observations; and 2) secondary data, predominantly government publications, 
seaports annual reports, publicly available archival records, media releases, academic 
research papers, and web information. Due to the historical nature of the study, this research 
relied heavily on published documents to construct the developmental paths of the case 
seaports. The semi-structured interviews conducted were generally limited to developments 
within specific periods of the five-decade time frame under investigation, since most 
informants did not generally have sufficient in-depth knowledge on the entire development 
history of the case seaport. 
3.2.1 Interviews  
Interviews are one of the primary means of data collection, and are commonly combined with 
observations and archival sources in case study research in building theories (Eisenhardt, 
1989). According to Myers (2013), there are three main types of interviews:  
- Structured interview: Questions are defined in advance (pre-formulated) and the 
interviewee has limited choice in answering. This is to ensure consistency across 
various interviews. 
- Semi-structured interview: Some of the questions are pre-defined, but answers are not 
limited to the questions posed. Other questions can be, and generally raised during the 
interview, based on the responses of the interviewees. As interviews usually start with 
a similar set of questions, some level of consistency can be expected across several 
interviews. 
- Unstructured interview: More open-ended questions and very few pre-formulated 
questions, with the intention of allowing the interviewees to narrate candidly on the 
case. Maintaining consistency across multiple interviews is not an objective for 
unstructured interviews. 
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This study used semi-structured interviews as the means to collect primary data. In 
recognition of the demand for information stretching over a period of five decades and taking 
cognizance of the difficulty in locating informants with adequate knowledge of the historical 
development of the case seaports, this study devoted considerable time to locate appropriate 
informants for interviews and consultations. 
Informants for this research were identified through an extensive iterative search process, 
beginning with making contacts with top management executives of the selected case 
seaports (Port Authorities), followed by approaching staff at various operational levels 
working in organizations that have a close working relationship with the case seaports (e.g., 
shipping companies, freight-forwarding companies and trading companies). Other informants 
with specific knowledge of any of the case seaports were identified through a snowball 
process based on recommendations from academics, maritime industry professionals as well 
as global seaport officials through networking at international conferences, visits to industry 
sites and universities. These informants could be classified into three groups: 
 Top executives and senior management in case seaports (Port authorities) – This 
group of respondents was sourced to provide information and understanding on the 
strategic approaches undertaken by the case seaport authorities with regards to 
resource planning, development, usage and management. Depending on the extent of 
their knowledge of the operations of the case seaport, these informants also described 
the challenges faced - market competition, environmental issues and social pressures - 
and the development directions of the whole port complex and port networks. 
 Staff at various operational levels in the maritime industry (Industrial Stakeholders) – 
This group of informants comprised managers and executives of Shipping 
Companies, Terminal Operators, Freight Forwarders, Trucking Companies, and 
Customs Clearing Agents. They provided information and understanding on how the 
competitive environment affecting the case seaports had impacted the operations of 
the case seaports. Availability of seaport infrastructure, and development plans of 
road, rail and waterway network, proximity of sources and market, cost of port 
services and the labor climate were among the main topics of discussion with this 
group of informants.  
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 Maritime Academic Scholars – This group of informants were identified mainly 
through their publications and research into the case seaports. Many were informally 
interviewed through coffee-break, lunch and dinner discussions at conferences. Others 
were contacted through emails and social media. These informants provided vital 
directions to published resources and shared their insights based on their research 
findings.  
Table 3.2: Informants participating in Semi-structured Interviews 
Port Informants  
Number of 
Interviewees  
Maritime Industry Knowledge, Experience 
Top executives at 
management level 
(Port Authorities)  
Dubai – 2  
The interviewees were selected from a range of port 
executives, including strategic and operational 
planners, business analysts and a harbormaster. The 
first-hand knowledge and experience of this group has 
been instrumental in understanding the developmental 
paths of the case seaports.  
This group of interviewees also provided guidance to 
other valuable information sources on the historical 
developments of the case seaports.  
Kaohsiung – 4  
Rotterdam – 2  
Staff at operational 
level in seaports  
(Industrial 
Stakeholders)  
Dubai – 5 
Interviews conducted with a number of industrial 
stakeholders, including managers and executives of 
shipping companies, and freight forwarding operators. 
The managerial and operational experience of this 
group gave insights to factors affecting 
competitiveness of the case seaports.  
Kaohsiung – 3  
Rotterdam – 3 
Maritime 
Academics  
Dubai – 3  Maritime scholars who have conducted extensive 
research on the case seaports provided direction to 
published resources and shared their extensive 
knowledge and views.  
Kaohsiung – 5 
Rotterdam – 4  
Formal semi-structured interviews were conducted with the first two groups of informants 
(see Table 3.2). The interview protocol (see Appendices 1 and 2) comprised a series of open-
ended questions designed to gain an understanding of how the three case seaports selected, 
built, utilized, deployed and managed their resources, both tangible and intangible, to gain, or 
maintain, their competitive edge at different time periods in response to changes in the global 
market and regional economic environments. The role of the infrastructural, socio-economic, 
political and environmental features surrounding the three case seaports since 
containerization was explored. Particular attention was also directed to exploring factors that 
determine seaport competitiveness listed by Biederman (2007): port infrastructure, 
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availability of modern distribution centers, markets that can be reached within one day, as 
well as liner services. As the knowledge of most informants and stakeholders were limited to 
the period of their engagement with the case seaports, the semi-structured interviews also 
focused on seeking directions towards historical data resources throughout the time span of 
the study, apart from gaining the knowledge of seaport informants for the period they were 
most conversant with. 
All the semi-structured interviews were conducted between October 2013 and November 
2014. During the interviews, interviewees were given a brief introduction on the topic, nature 
and purpose of the research, and were given the opportunity to describe their experiences in 
the maritime industry, especially those related to the case seaport(s). 
All interviews were conducted in English, and were audio recorded. The length of each 
interview ranged from 45 minutes to 3 hours. Interviews with personnel of the port 
authorities were conducted in the port area, followed by an on-site visit to understand the 
range and extent of the activities carried out at the respective seaports. Interviews with the 
industrial stakeholders were undertaken at locations chosen by interviewees, and were mainly 
held in the interviewees’ work premises. All the interviews were conducted in a 
conversational style with questions raised whenever additional clarification was considered 
necessary in a manner similar to what is described by Sutton and Callahan (1987).  
3.2.2 Secondary Data  
Secondary data formed the predominant source of information used to compile the historical 
resource development profiles and affairs affecting the development of the case seaports. The 
use of an extensive range of secondary data, which contains views from both insiders (i.e., 
port authorities) and outsiders (i.e., stakeholders, and media), allows multiple perspectives on 
similar issues be discerned. For each of the case seaports, the secondary data collected 
include, but are not limited to:  
1. Port strategic plans, and/or government economic plans relating to port development: 
These documents formed the prime sources of secondary data on port development 
(e.g., in the case of Port of Rotterdam, Port Plan 2010, 2020, and 2030). Although the 
plans are by no means the sole source of strategic planning for ports, they do represent 
a coherent effort of the port policy makers in setting priorities. Moreover, the plans 
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constitute a source of systematic data that are available for the period this study 
encompasses (from late 1960s to 2015).  
2. Port cargo statistics for containerized traffic: This research relied on port statistics for 
a period of 30 years (from 1985 to 2015) to review the rate of growth of containerized 
traffic. While focusing on the total throughput, the export, import and transshipment 
statistics were reviewed to identify the role of the seaports within their regions during 
the period of the study.  
3. Port annual reports and financial statements: These documents were examined to trace 
the implementation of projected plans in the port, and their realization. The aim was 
to validate consistency as per the original plan or deviations with plausible 
clarifications. Considering the dynamic nature of the global economy, diversions from 
long-term plans and anticipating new developments are not uncommon.  
4. Press releases and multimedia reports: These reports, in particular maritime news 
magazines, provide multiple views of stakeholders external to the case seaports on 
projected and executed development concerning the case seaports. They served as a 
source of data validation and authentication. 
5. Published reports of International Organizations and publications of consultancy 
organizations: Publicly available reports of international agencies (e.g., UN, OECD, 
EU Commission) and consultancy organizations were reviewed to acquire an 
understanding of regional competition and market dynamics confronting the case 
seaports in different time periods (e.g., Northern Europe for Port of Rotterdam, 
Middle East for Dubai seaport, and South East Asia and East Asia for Kaohsiung).  
6. Academic journals and research reports of academic institutions: These publications 
were systematically examined, not from the conventional perspective of performing a 
structured literature review although that was also done to profile the knowledge base 
for this study as presented in Chapter 2, but explicitly for identifying factual 
information that contribute to building the developmental paths of the case seaports.  
These secondary data were augmented and corroborated by specific information obtained 
through semi-structured interviews. 
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3.3 Data Analysis  
This research follows the inductive logic process (Miles and Huberman, 2002), with two 
major forms of analysis: within-case analysis and cross-case analysis. Sirmon et al. (2007) 
dynamic resource management model of value creation, discussed in Chapter 2, provides the 
substantive base on which the two forms of analysis are conducted. Mintzberg (2003) 
definition of strategy, i.e., “the pattern, plan, ploy, position or perspective that integrates an 
organization’s major goals, policies, and action sequences into a cohesive whole” (p.10), is 
the premise on which the strategic intent of the three case seaport authorities was interpreted 
from their resource developmental paths.  
3.3.1 Within Case Analysis  
This study investigates global seaport competitiveness by examining the resource 
development paths of the three case seaports based on the progressive proactive and reactive 
actions they took to attain and/or maintain a competitive position over the last five decades. 
In the within case analysis, the growth and development of each seaport was examined as a 
stand-alone entity (Miles and Huberman, 2002). The focus was on the major historical events 
that contributed to strategic changes in the developmental paths of the case seaports from the 
perspective of resource structuring, bundling and leveraging, the three main components 
highlighted in Sirmon et al.’s (2007) resource management process model (discussed in 
Chapter 2). The aim is to understand the strategic intent of the case seaports from their 
resource management perspective, as per Mintzberg’s (2003) view on strategy: “the pattern, 
plan, ploy, position or perspective that integrates an organization’s major goals, policies, 
and action sequences into a cohesive whole” (p.10).  
Following Miles and Huberman (2002), the analytical process was iterative, requiring 
frequent movement between the various data sources, the academic literature, and the 
theoretical frameworks of RBV, organization learning, dynamic capability and contingency 
theory. In general, the analysis process was conducted over five main stages, following 
Ritchie and Spencer (2002):  
 Familiarization: This is the data exploration and immersion phase in which 
background information was scrutinized, covering containerized traffic statistics 
(import, export, and transshipment), key historical events affecting seaport 
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development (national, regional, and international levels), major changes in hinterland 
and foreland characteristics, port strategic plans and development priorities (including 
government economic policies, and long term urban plans), changes in the seaport 
(terminal) ownership, and implementation of port related physical infrastructure as 
well as introduction (or removal) of soft cargo-generating initiatives. Simultaneous 
with this process, the interviews and site visits were conducted, and interviews were 
transcribed. For this research the interview materials were transcribed personally, over 
a period of about eight months. The transcripts, and the observational notes from site 
visits were reviewed and information relevant to understanding dynamic resource 
management (Sirmon et al., 2007) was identified.  
 Identification of a thematic framework: This is the process of abstraction and 
conceptualization after getting familiar with the collected data. For this study, the data 
gathered for each seaport was compiled into a longitudinal framework to reveal a 
broad understanding of the operational, tactical, and strategic procedures, leading to 
the construction of an overall evaluation framework comprising infrastructural, 
political, socio-economical, and environmental competitiveness dimensions.  
The series of “event timelines” on the development of each case seaport that spanned 
the time period of this study, i.e., from mid 1960s when containerization was first 
introduced to the present date, was constructed. The purpose of the exercise was, 
firstly, to construct an ordering system for the collected data. Secondly, to develop a 
mechanism of identifying and categorizing the collected data based on their theme, 
and linking those themes to the competitive resource building strategies. The “set of 
sequences of events”, as described by Abbott (1995), provided an analytical tool for 
detecting frequency and pattern of the repetitive strategies amongst the case seaports. 
In each seaport, the specifications of container terminals, including the number of 
terminals, quay length, depth, total area, and overall handling capacity, were 
examined to reveal the scale and scope of available infrastructural resources.  
 Indexing: This refers to the process of inferring and making decision on the meaning 
of the collected data. During this process the significance of different events was 
judged, and ordered in a way to identify patterns and contexts in which they might 
arise. The collected data were organized into coded categories as suggested by Miles 
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and Huberman (2002), with a specific focus on resource (both tangible and intangible) 
building, picking, usage and deployment.  
 Charting: During this stage, the data were organized into charts according to the 
thematic framework with a view to identifying dimensions that could have significant 
impact on the data patterns (Ritchie and Spencer, 2002). The resultant chart reveals 
patterns of both tangible and intangible resource building, development, utilization, 
deployment and management, as well as economic transformations at local and 
regional levels.  
 Mapping and Interpretation: This is the last stage of the within case data analysis. 
This phase is to locate associations emerging from data charting, providing 
explanations that would lead to developing strategies. For this study, the final part of 
data analysis was interpreting strategic intents of the case seaports based on the 
development path charted from the data. This part is guided less by theory than the 
results of previous analytic steps, as the aim is to understand how the resource 
development and management processes of the case seaports reflect their strategies.  
3.3.2 Cross Case Analysis  
According to Eisenhardt (1989) and Miles and Huberman (2002), identification of similar 
themes that emerged in multiple settings and findings from multiple cases will offer broad 
exploration of research questions and theoretical elaboration. The multiple settings offered by 
this research are the three geopolitical zones, i.e., Northern Europe (Rotterdam), Middle East 
(Dubai) and East Asia (Kaohsiung). Each of these three zones holds particular conditions in 
terms of their regional dynamics: social, political, and economic. 
The first step in the cross-case analysis was comparing the infrastructural investment and 
resource development programs used of the three case seaports in relation to changes in both 
their regional environment and maritime global trends in different eras (1960s-1980s, 1990s, 
2000s, and 2010s) (Figure 3.2). The insights gained from the comparative analysis guided the 
study to developing resource-based constructs.  
The next step was associating the main themes extracted from strategic development paths to 
concepts drawn from RBV, dynamic capability, organization learning, and contingency 
theory. This led to identification of eight resource-based constructs, which form the building 
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blocks for interpreting the resource-based strategies of the three case seaports for the various 
eras. 
The third step was a review of the temporal linkages between the resource-based constructs 
for each of the three case seaports to gain an understanding of how the resource-based 
strategies of the three case seaports differ. This was accomplished by tracing the recurrence 
of “old” (i.e., already appeared in an earlier period) resource-based constructs re-appearing in 
later periods and the emergence of “new” (i.e., not having appeared in an earlier period) 
resource-based constructs in latter periods to detect the existence of specific path-dependent 
resource management strategies among the three case seaports. 
The last stage of the cross-case analysis extended the analysis of the third step to find answers 
to why the three case seaports differed in terms of their resource-based strategies. This is 
done by mapping the resource-based strategies of the three case seaports onto a two-
dimensional framework with “strength of regional competition” as one contingent dimension 
and “size of hinterland and foreland” as the other (see Figure 3.3). 
 
Figure 3.2: Steps involved in Cross-Case Analysis 
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(Martin, 2015) argued that strategy is “about both resources and positioning” (p.1). The two 
dimensions - “strength of regional competition” and “size of hinterland and foreland” - form 
the contingent contextual base on which the three case seaports positioned their resource-
based strategies in response to the changing regional environment within which they operated 
over the period of investigation. The “strength of regional competition” lays out the relative 
intensity of the evolving regional market dynamics in which the case seaports competed over 
the five decades. The “size of hinterland and foreland” indicates the relative endowments of 
the case seaport – the context that determines the position of the case seaports within which 
they sought to develop a bundle of VRIN (valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable) 
resources to achieve competitive advantage (Barney, 1991, Peteraf, 1993), which is 
elaborated in the next two paragraphs. 
The captive hinterland plays a significant role in capturing gateway cargoes and is a leading 
factor driving competition between seaports in a region. Zhang (2008) outlined a number of 
advantages for seaports with larger hinterlands, including: i) gearing a higher load factor for 
shipping lines, so that a port is selected by shipping lines as a main port of call and/or a load 
center (Heaver, 2006), ii) deriving economies of scale by allowing more frequent services by 
shipping lines and the use of larger vessels, iii) shaping more value-added clusters with a 
variety of port products (transport, logistics, and manufacturing) (De Langen, 2002, De 
Langen, 2004b), and iv) strengthening the role of the port in global supply chains. 
The size of forelands, referred to as “the offshore zone of influence” (Roa et al., 2013, 
p.1058), indicates a seaport’s captive markets with regards to its transshipment cargoes. 
Transshipment functionality is a key element of seaport attractiveness (Ng, 2006). The rise of 
containerization and inter-modality over the past decades has led to a strong interdependency 
between seaport’s foreland and hinterland (Rodrigue and Notteboom, 2010). Therefore, the 
joint elements of hinterland and foreland are crucial to the hub functionality of seaports. 
Thus interpreting the findings of this study along the two dimensions of “regional 
competition”, and “size of hinterlands and forelands” is an appropriate step of making sense 
of the shift in the strategic intent of the case seaports. The process of mapping the resource 
development, utilization, and management of the case seaports in the mentioned framework 
underscores the rigor of the research according to four operating environments shown as 
Quadrants 1 to 4 in Figure 3.3. This process leads to the development of the working 
propositions, which are the main contributions of this study toward theory building.  
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“Quadrant 2”       “Quadrant 4” 
 
 
“Quadrant 1”      “Quadrant 3” 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Comparison framework of resource development strategies based on operating 
environment characteristics 
3.4 Reliability and Validity of Case Study Research  
Rigor and quality in qualitative studies is generally tested using a number of criteria that 
examine validity, reliability, and generalizability issues (Lincoln and Guba, 1986, 
Halldorsson and Aastrup, 2003, Ali and Yusof, 2011). In the context of logistics research, the 
criteria of construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability have been the 
commonly accepted determinants of research quality (Dunn et al., 1994, Mentzer and Kahn, 
1995, Ellram, 1996, Mentzer and Flint, 1997). In case study research within the logistics 
domain, Da Mota Pedrosa et al. (2012) suggested that, quality criteria of true-value 
(credibility), transferability, and track-ability are most pertinent due to a number of reasons. 
First, case study is different from quantitative research methods in logistics, therefore quality 
assessment of case study research should also be different to support the generation of new 
knowledge (Gammelgaard, 2004). This argument has been supported by a number of scholars 
(Erlandson et al., 1993, Creswell and Miller, 2000, Halldorsson and Aastrup, 2003), who 
argued that judgment of qualitative research and quantitative research should benefit from 
different criteria. Second, statistical generalization is not the main concern for case study 
research (Barratt et al., 2011). Third, the three criteria are based on the notion that quality has 
to be both “ensured and demonstrated for case study-based research to be rigorous” (Da 
Mota Pedrosa et al., 2012, p.278). 
Extensive Hinterland & Foreland 
Limited Hinterland & Foreland 
Intense Regional Competition  Limited Regional Competition 
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3.4.1 Credibility  
Credibility or the “truth-value” of the research, as defined by Halldorsson and Aastrup (2003) 
is the match of information presented by participants and, research findings and 
interpretations within the same context. Thus, it is similar to internal validity, which is the 
extent of variations between a study’s findings and the real world (Guba and Lincoln, 1989). 
For case study research, Spiggle (1994) and Da Mota Pedrosa et al. (2012) highlighted a 
number of elements as a systematic approach to support the truth-value of the study. 
These elements comprise categorization (identification of data units) (Glaser and Strauss, 
2009), abstraction (identification of units into conceptual classes) (Da Mota Pedrosa et al., 
2012), comparison (identification of similarities and differences in the data, aiming to detect 
patterns across case studies) (Miles and Huberman, 1994), dimensionalisation (identification 
of varied properties) (Da Mota Pedrosa et al., 2012), integration (development of 
relationships between conceptual constructs) (Corbin and Strauss, 1990), iteration 
(verification of validity of identified categories through continual data screening) (Da Mota 
Pedrosa et al., 2012) , and refutation (verification of truth of interpretations) (Da Mota 
Pedrosa et al., 2012). These elements, in combination, contribute to nurturing the true value 
of research by matching the findings presented by the researchers and realities provided by 
informants.  
3.4.2. Transferability  
Transferability refers to the level that research findings and interpretations can be applied in 
other contexts (McCutcheon and Meredith, 1993, Halldorsson and Aastrup, 2003, Da Mota 
Pedrosa et al., 2012). Therefore it can be the case of generalizing the findings across random 
samples of a population, referred as external validity (Marshall and Rossman, 2006). A 
number of indicators have been suggested by scholars (Seuring, 2008, Yin, 2009) to monitor 
transferability of the findings, such as documenting the theoretical aim of the study (building, 
testing or extending), unit of analysis (providing boundaries of the case), reasoning of case 
study selection (providing literal or theoretical replication), and number of case studies. 
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3.4.3 Track-ability 
Track-ability includes joint qualities of dependability (stability of data overtime) and 
confirmability (internal coherence of data in relation to findings, interpretations, and 
recommendations) (Da Mota Pedrosa et al., 2012), and relates to the process of documenting 
the research and its data sources (Halldorsson and Aastrup, 2003). 
Track-ability entails evidence for the consistency of the research findings and duplicability of 
the processes potentially leading to the same results (Miles and Huberman, 1994, Stuart et al., 
2002). Document of the case study protocol (Yin, 2009) enhances track-ability, in which the 
evidence of the case study questions, data collection guideline, number of informants and 
their selection, data sources and types, and any changes made during the research process, are 
provided (Yin, 2009, Da Mota Pedrosa et al., 2012). This protocol is also called “an audit 
trail” (Bowen, 2009), a technique of achieving rigor and transparency in qualitative research, 
to bolster confidence in the research results. 
3.4.4 Test of Rigor for this Study  
As a traditional test of rigor, validity of the current study is constructed through usage of 
multiple sources of information (Jick, 1979, Eisenhardt, 1989) to form a chain of evidence. 
The use of multiple sources of information to attain accuracy and precision is a recommended 
tactic in case study research (Sinkovics and Ghauri, 2008, Neuman and Robson, 2004). 
Baxter and Jack (2008) also highlighted the use of multiple data resources as a means of 
attaining a holistic understanding as “the various strands of data are braided together to 
promote a greater understanding of the case” (p.554). This research used the two most 
common forms of data in case studies: interviews, and secondary data (maritime business 
information archives, government publications, media releases, and academic research).  
This study followed the criterion of trustworthiness suggested for qualitative research in 
logistics (Da Mota Pedrosa et al., 2012). The quality of research is assessed through tests of 
credibility, transferability, and track-ability. Table 3.3 provides the trustworthiness criteria 
used in this study, the suggested measures, and steps taken to achieve qualitative rigor.  
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Table 3.3: Trustworthiness Criteria used for this Study based on Da Mota Pedrosa et al. (2012) 
Criterion  Definition  Suggested Measure How addressed in this study  
Credibility  
(Truth-value) 
Refers to the confidence in 
the truth of findings 
Categorization  
Identification of relevant data to build a theme for each case seaport 
(Timeline of development schemes, both tangible and intangible, since the advent of containerization 
were built in the case seaports. Regional dynamics for each seaport were featured. Role of port 
authorities in developing resources were highlighted).  
Abstraction  
Identification of group categories into conceptual classes 
(Strategic developmental path for the case seaports were identified). 
Comparison 
(within and/or between cases) 
Recognition of similarities and differences across groups and identification of patterns 
(Periodic strategic developments compared within and between the case seaports). 
Dimensionalization  
Identification of category properties that vary within the category 
(Competitive resource building, deployment and utilization strategies for the case seaports were 
identified). 
Integration  
Integration of identified resource building strategies into a framework based on two dimensions of level 
of regional competition and size of hinterland/foreland.  
Mapping the resource-based strategies onto the mentioned framework described in section 3.3.2.   
Iteration  
Verification and validity of identified categories established by moving between multiple data sources 
gathered and alternative interpretations of the resource development strategies into resource constructs. 
This included a process of organizing, connecting and reconnecting the collected data with the identified 
strategies.  
Refutation  
Verification of the correctness through discussion with informants and external stakeholders 
(e.g., presented four peer reviewed conference papers, preliminary findings presented to the institutions' 
doctoral review panel).  
Transferability  
Refers to the applicability of 
findings to other contexts 
Theoretical aim of study  Aim of the study stated along with the main research question as well as sub-questions.  
Unit of analysis 
Boundaries of the case seaports provided by unit of operation (containerized traffic), and timeframe of 
studies (historical development since introduction of containerization).  
Justification of case study  Motivation of research and rationale of case study research explained. 
Number of cases used  Process and criteria used for selecting case seaports systematically developed and explained. 
Track-ability 
(Traceability)  
(Dependability) 
Refers to the stability of 
findings over time  
Justification of informant 
selection 
Number of informants  
Rationale for selection of participants explained.  
Number of informants and their professional background listed in Table 3.2.  
(Confirmability) 
Refers to internal coherence 
of the data in relation to 
findings, interpretations, and 
recommendations  
Description of data collection 
guideline 
Description of changes in the 
research design  
Interview protocol used provided in Appendices 1 and 2. 
 
Changes in number of seaport cases selected described in section 3.1.3.  
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This chapter presents the case analysis of three selected seaports: Dubai, Kaohsiung and 
Rotterdam. The focus is on examining the development path each seaport has travelled since 
the advent of containerization in late 1960’s. The aim is to understand how they have 
navigated the competitive landscape that confronted them by structuring, bundling and 
leveraging, in the terminology of Sirmon et al. (2007), resources, both tangible and 
intangible, to develop dynamic capabilities and respond to environmental contingencies. 
Particular attention will be directed to identifying the strategic intent underpinning the 
resource building and exploitation process.  
For this reason, each case is organized into four main sections. It will begin with an outline of 
the case seaport’s global and regional competitive position as indicated by its global rankings, 
container throughputs, and regional market shares. Then an overview of the governance 
structure of the case seaport is presented, followed by various port developing ventures 
throughout the five decades. Lastly, the strategic developmental path for each case seaport is 
described based on the strategic approaches adopted towards building infrastructure and 
service resources. The case analysis highlights the distinctive resource features of the three 
case seaports, leading to the identification of key similarities and differences in strategic 
resource building and utilization.  
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4.1 Port of Dubai  
Dubai is home to the largest seaport, port of Jebel Ali, in the Middle East region. Since 2004, 
Jebel Ali has emerged as one of the top 10 container ports in the world. Located at the 
Persian Gulf (Figure 4.1.1), Dubai is one of the seven emirates that founded a federation in 
1971 and formed the country United Arab Emirates (UAE) (Jacobs and Hall, 2007). In early 
1900s, prior to formation of UAE, Dubai was part of a larger British protectorate system in 
the Middle East region established to support peaceful passage of trade between Britain and 
its colonies in East Asia and India (Ramos, 2010). Exploration and development of oil in Iran 
and Saudi Arabia in late 1930s boosted the British interest in regional affairs and led to active 
participation of British firms within the Middle East region (Owen, 2008). The presence of 
British government and firms, along with wealth generated from oil exploration, as well as 
aspirations of local leaders, shaped the earliest development of modern Dubai (Ramos, 2010). 
 
Figure 4.1.1: The Middle East Region Map 
Historically, Dubai has been associated with trade. During the last few decades the city-state 
of Dubai attained the status of a global city by taking advantage of “global spectacle” (Ewers 
and Malecki, 2011), which aims to gain media attention, and attract foreign investors, 
corporations, workers, and tourists by building infrastructure and promoting global events 
(Rennie-Short, 2013). In 2014, about 54 percent of UAE’s US$2,478 billion merchandise 
trade (WITS, 2016, DubaiCustoms, 2016) was conducted through Dubai.  
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Dubai’s earliest port development commenced in 1959 with a project of dredging and 
widening Dubai Creek to accommodate modern vessels. The project was considered 
ambitious and risky at the time, as Dubai was not financially capable of managing the project 
and had to use a few finance sources, such as imposing import tax, introducing bonds, as well 
as borrowing funds from Kuwait, an oil rich neighboring country (Balakrishnan, 2008). 
Nevertheless, as a result of creek modernization, Dubai’s trade was increased by 20 percent 
over a period of one year in 1960 (Sampler and Eigner, 2008).  
Gradual increase of traffic alongside the creek (mostly building materials for numerous 
construction projects) caused long waiting times for ships, and delayed cargo discharge 
processes. The necessity of a deep-sea port soon became apparent for Dubai policy makers 
and initial plans for building Port Rashid were made in 1967. Port Rashid opened in 1972. 
 
Figure 4.1.2: Overall Map of Dubai Ports 
Source: Adapted from 2DAYDUBAI (2010) 
The Dubai free port policy, introduced as early as 1904 (Gabriel, 1988) to attract traffic from 
the other side of the Strait of Hormuz, was extended by offering free sea-air cargo transfer 
(Dubai airport was established in 1960), which was facilitated by building a ring road around 
the Creek, Deira tunnel, and Al-Garhoud Bridge (Wilson, 2006, Ho, 2008).  
By end 1970s, additional cargo handling capacity was created in Port Rashid in parallel with 
another capacity expansion project, the development of a new port in Jebel Ali area to make 
it the largest man-made harbor in the world, a unique development at the time. Cargo loading 
and unloading operations in Jebel Ali port commenced in 1979 (DPWorld, 2014e)with five 
berths, and the first phase of port construction was completed in 1983.  
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Strong performance of the twin ports (Port Rashid and Jebel Ali) in the 1980’s and 1990’s 
positioned Dubai as the major transshipment and logistics hub in the Middle East region 
(Figure 4.1.2). In 2001, cargo operation in Port Rashid officially discontinued as it became a 
location for cruise terminals, and ever since cargo operations has concentrated in the port of 
Jebel Ali (Figure 4.1.3). With formal closure of cargo operations in Port Rashid in 2008, 
“Jebel Ali’s position went from strength to strength” (Chapman, 2016).  
 
Figure 4.1.3: Aerial image of Jebel Ali Port, and location of Container Terminals 
Source: (DPWorld, 2015) 
With 67 berths and a size of 134.68 square kilometer, Jebel Ali has played a key role in 
transforming Dubai into a modern port city and commercial hub (DPWorld, 2011a). 
Currently Jebel Ali is the largest container hub in the Middle East region, with three deep-
water terminals (see Figure 4.1.3), fully owned and operated by Dubai Port Authority (DPA). 
The fourth terminal is under construction and would add another 3 million TEUs to the 
present capacity of Jebel Ali by 2018 when it becomes operational. In 2015, over 15.5 million 
TEUs were handled by Jebel Ali port. With a capacity of about 19 million TEUs, the average 
rate of utilization has been 82% (Table 4.1.1). 
76 
Table 4.1.1: Specifications of Container Terminals in Jebel Ali and their Overall Utilization Rate, 2015 
Container 
Terminal 
Quay 
Length 
(Meter) 
Water 
Depth 
(Meter) 
Total 
Area 
(Hectare) 
Capacity 
(TEUs) 
Capacity 
(TEUs) 
 2015 
Annual 
Throughput 
(TEU) 
2015 
Utilization 
Rate 
(2015) 
T1 4875 11 to 17 165 
15,000,000 
19,000,000 15,592,000 82% 
T2 2600 17 165 
T3 1862 17 72 4,000,000 
T4 (Phase I) 
(Completion 
by 2018) 
1200 18 72 3,100,000 
Source: Compiled from DPWorld (2014b) 
In addition to port development, a free zone adjacent to the port land was introduced in 1985 
as an intermediary trading hub between Asia and Europe as well as a gateway to the 
developing North African and Middle Eastern economies (Sampler and Eigner, 2008). Ever 
since the mid-1980s, an interdependent relationship between the port and free zone has been 
shaped, laying the foundation to position Dubai as a main commercial center of the Middle 
East region.  
Jebel Ali Free Zone (Jafza) grew from a small group of 19 companies in 1985 to 500 
companies within a decade of operation. As of 2016, there were over 7,000 companies from 
more than 125 countries registered in Jafza, about 100 of which were on the Fortune 500 list 
(Jafza, 2016). Firms located in Jafza supported over 144,000 jobs, handling about 50% of 
Dubai’s total exports and contributing to 32% of the UAE’s FDI in 2016 (Jafza, 2017b). Jafza 
based companies are from a wide range of sectors, and market leaders in their own right. In 
the logistics sector, eight out of 10 largest global logistics and supply chain service providers 
are present in Jafza (e.g., DHL, Keuhne + Nagel, and DB Schenker). A sample of global 
companies located in Jafza is presented in Table 4.1.2 with their respective industries, and 
ranking in the Fortune Global 500. In 2016, Jafza’s trade value was estimated at USD $80.2 
billion (Jafza, 2017a), about 20% of Dubai’s GDP (DSC, 2017).  
Almost three decades after Jafza’s opening, another initiative was introduced in 2010 to 
further strengthen Dubai’s multi-modal logistics functions (John, 2010). “Dubai Logistics 
Corridor” platform was launched based on the concept of embedding Jebel Ali seaport and a 
new airport (Al Maktoum), within a distance of 10 km, as a single customs free zone (Figure 
4.1.4) (DubaiAirports, 2013). A logistics district adjacent to the new airport was also opened 
in 2010 as a new free zone, allowing 100% foreign ownership, zero tax regime and free 
capital transfer (DubaiSouth, 2016).  
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Table 4.1.2: Global Firms located in the Jafza - Fortune Global 500 
Industry  Company Rank 
Chemical & Petrochemical 
Shell 5 
Exxon Mobil  6 
British Petroleum (BP) 10 
Total  24 
BASF  88 
Manufacturing 
Nestle  66 
Procter & Gamble  86 
Sony  113 
Unilever  147 
Energy Schneider Electric  354 
Source: Compiled from FORTUNE500 (2016) 
 
 
Figure 4.1.4: Dubai Logistics Corridor  
Source: (Yuen, 2014) 
4.1.1 Global and Regional Competitiveness  
Large-scale infrastructural development in Dubai (e.g., roads, bridges, seaport, and airport) 
began in 1966, prompted by discovery of oil in UAE. With regards to port developments, the 
first milestone was the establishment of Port Rashid in 1972, which created a capacity for 
handling 100,000 TEUs in 11 berths (UAEFTA, 2017). The infrastructure was further 
developed and expanded to Jebel Ali area, where a bundle of port products was offered by a 
new seaport and a free trade zone within close proximity of 4 kms. While the port area was 
designed to offer the traditional seaport services (e.g., vessel loading, unloading), the free 
trade zone became an extension to the port and home to numerous firms active in 
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transportation, manufacturing and other services (Jacobs, 2007). The rapid infrastructural 
developments in Jebel Ali area (from late 1970s to late 1990s) transformed Dubai from a 
small port city to the major transportation hub in the region (Akhavan, 2017). In 1997, a 
decade after the establishment of Jafza, joint performance of Port Rashid & Port Jebel Ali 
positioned Dubai on the league of global top 10 container ports (see Figure 4.1.5), though the 
following year its rank took a dip. Six years later, in 2004, port of Jebel Ali managed to get 
back on the list of top 10 global seaports, and has remained a strong global contender since. 
In terms of container throughput, since 1990 Dubai ports (Port Rashid and Jebel Ali) have 
witnessed a steady growth with the exception of 2009, year of the Global Financial Crisis 
(see Figure 4.1.5).  
 
Figure 4.1.5: Dubai Ports Container Throughput (TEU), and Global Ranking (1990-2015),  
Source: Compiled from (Rodrigue, 2010, JOC, 2012, WSC, 2017)  
According to Akhavan (2017), during the 1980s (the earliest phase of containerization), only 
a few seaports in the Middle East region were capable of offering containerized services. The 
region was thus experiencing an imperfect competition, a case of an oligopoly between Saudi 
Arabian ports (Dammam and Jeddah), and UAE main ports of Dubai (Port Rashid and the 
Port of Jebel Ali) (Figure 4.1.6). During this period, the larger share of container traffic was 
owned by the Saudi Arabian ports of Dammam and Jeddah (see Table 4.1.3). Ports of Dubai 
(PoD) had a lesser market share, and the smallest stake in the region belonged to Port 
Shuwaikh in Kuwait (Shuwaikh statistics are not included in the regional market share 
figures due to lack of available data). However regional circumstances, in addition to 
conditions that were created in Dubai, which were unmatched by other ports in the region, 
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generated a specific situation for PoD to attract the largest part of the regional traffic from 
1990s onwards.  
 
Figure 4.1.6: Middle East Regional Seaports Map  
In terms of regional occurrences, Molavi (2007) called Dubai a rare success story, 
particularly in an area dealing with failure and stagnation caused by major conflicts and wars 
in the region that occurred from early 1980s onwards. As described by Walker (1989), the 
disequilibrium in the Persian Gulf maritime economy began in 1979 with the revolution in 
Iran. Other outbreaks and hostilities in the region such as the civil war in Lebanon (1975 to 
1990), Iran-Iraq war (1980 to 1989), the first Gulf War (Iraq – Kuwait) (1991 to 1992), the 
second Gulf War - Iraq war (2003), Arab Spring (2011) followed by the Syrian civil war 
(from 2011 till date), as well as the ongoing conflict between Israel, Lebanon and Palestine, 
are a number of contemporary events of conflict in the Middle East region with tremendous 
impacts on local economies. 
In a region of such high political unrest and economic instability, Dubai has demonstrated its 
capability in offering an immune environment over the last three decades (Ewers and 
Malecki, 2011) and became a prime location for trade, transport and tourism. Dubai’s safe 
haven position within its region is further elaborated by Sigler (2013): 
“The Emirate has specialized in connecting nearby regions where free markets have 
been restricted by social unrest (Iraq), autocratic leadership (Iran, Saudi Arabia), 
red tape (India), or a combination of all three (former USSR)” (p.627).  
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Dubai’s status as an island of prosperity and stability, as described by Brook (2013), is the 
outcome of the unquestioned policies of the ruling family and a commitment to laissez-faire 
economics born of trading and port conditions.  
Table 4.1.3: Regional Market Share of Main Seaports in the Middle East Region  
Container Sector (1980-2010) 
 Seaports  1980 1990 2000 2010 
Dammam (Saudi Arabia) 24.8% 12.5% 6.4% 5.2% 
Dubai Ports (UAE) 19.8% 49.2% 43.4% 44.8% 
Khorfakkan (UAE) Nil 8.7% 14.4% 11.7% 
Salalah (Oman)  Nil Nil 14.6% 13.5% 
Jeddah (Saudi Arabia)  55.5% 29.5% 14.8% 14.8% 
Bandar Abbas (Iran)  Nil Nil 6.4% 10.0% 
Source: Compiled from Rodrigue (2010) 
As for the transport sector, PoD benefited from special conditions that were not fully matched 
by other seaports in the region. The attributes of the PoD structure are physical, institutional 
and political (Jacobs and Hall, 2007). First, Dubai has the advantage of a strategic location as 
a bridge between east and west. However, the key to PoD success is its superior facilities that 
are widely recognized as state-of-the-art infrastructure and superstructure (Drewry, 2000). 
Second, its institutional arrangements are designed in a way (e.g., no corporate or personal 
taxes, full foreign ownership in free zones, and attractive tariffs and discounts to shipping 
lines) to confer competitive supply chain advantages to companies utilizing its cutting-edge 
facilities.  
Third, the Emirate of Dubai is under a governance structure fully committed to a growth 
agenda, with encouraging and relatively easy implementation procedures (Jacobs and Hall, 
2007). Dubai governance attributes are combination of: 
“an (soft) autocratic rule, strong developmental visions, a lean and efficient state 
apparatus, active market interference, reliance on the market mechanism and a 
pragmatic approach to development” (Hvidt, 2006, p.4). 
Dubai’s management style bears much resemblance to a private commercial business. The 
so-called “Dubai Inc” is managed by a creative, active and risk taking leadership, and its fast 
decision making processes (Sampler and Eigner, 2008), that institutes a pro-business attitude, 
and leading to formation of a strong private sector. By viewing the development path of 
Dubai since early 20th century, Hvidt (2009) identified nine key parameters characterizing its 
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growth: 1) government (ruler)-led development, 2) rapid decision making and “fast track” 
development, 3) flexible labor force, 4) a service economy that bypasses industrialization, 5) 
initiatives that create investment opportunities, 6) internationalization of service provision, 7) 
market positioning (via branding), 8) supply-generated demand, 9) synergistic development 
with international partners.  
In the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business for the 2017 report (WorldBank, 2017), Dubai 
was picked as the reference city for the UAE. The ranking was based on indicators of 
processes for starting a business, credit, taxation and resolving insolvency, dealing with 
construction permits, utilities, and property registration, enforcing contracts and protecting 
minority investors, as well as trading across borders (WorldBank, 2017). Dubai, as a 
representative of the United Arab Emirates, is ranked the most favorable place in the Middle 
East region, and its global position has improved significantly from 69th in 2006 to 26th in 
2017. 
4.1.2 Dubai Port Authority 
PoD is managed by Dubai Port Authority (DPA), which provides a full range of services 
required to function the two seaports, and is entirely in charge of the ports infrastructure, 
superstructure, and land (Jacobs, 2007). DPA is the exclusive owner and operator of PoD. 
The port management model of Dubai falls under the definition of a “public service port” 
(i.e., port authority owns, maintains, and manages every available asset, and is fully in charge 
of the port operation) (WorldBank, 2007). 
However, at the earlier phases of development during 1970s and the early years of 1980s, the 
management, operation, and development of PoD were contracted to two companies 
(Akhavan, 2017). Its management model then was thus a “public and private mix”. Port 
Rashid’s management was awarded to Gray Mackenzie Co. (company under the UK’s 
Inchcape group), which established a separate firm called “Dubai Port Services” for the sole 
purpose of running the operation. In a similar fashion, Jebel Ali’s management was granted to 
an American Shipping company called Sealand Shipping (Chapman, 2016). In 1984, with 
increasing throughput in PoD, particularly in Port Rashid, Dubai government took over the 
financial and investment control of the ports, and established “Port Rashid Authority” and 
“Jebel Ali Port Authority”. Not long after, in 1991, the two port authorities merged and 
formed Dubai Ports Authority (DPA) (DPWorld, 2015) which initiated a move towards 
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regional expansion. In 1999, Dubai Ports International (DPI), a wholly-owned subsidiary, 
was established to manage and operate container terminals beyond UAE domain.  
Also the port organization gradually became a part of the network affiliates under the control 
of Dubai government. The earlier network was shaped in 2001 with the merger of DPA, 
Customs, and Jafza to form the Ports, Customs, and Free Zone Corporation (PCFC). PCFC 
was further diversified and strengthened through a number of other subsidiaries, and 
progressively became the most resourceful and successful state-owned enterprise of Dubai 
(Hall and Jacobs, 2007). Becoming a part of the network chain of firms under the umbrella of 
PCFC gave PoD two key advantages. First, the structure of PCFC allows mobilizing capital 
within the network of subsidiaries, thus PoD can rely on financial support from PCFC for 
development of ports. Second, due to the consolidated governance structure of PCFC, 
policies of subsidiary firms are aligned. This mechanism allows PoD to engage in strategic 
pricing in alliance with the Customs and Free Zone Authority (Hall and Jacobs, 2007).  
In 2006, the PCFC became a part of a state-owned global holding company called Dubai 
World, that focuses on three main categories of activity: i) logistics, transportation, and 
maritime services, ii) urban development, and iii) investment and financial services (see 
Figure 4.1.7). Consolidation of a diversified range of activities under one group was 
advantageous for PCFC, since it could rely on investment and financial services provided by 
the holding company for developing (building and acquisition) diversified assets. As Ramos 
(2010) described it:  
“While Dubai World searched the globe for port management, logistics, and real 
estate opportunities, the investment arm of the holding company, Istithmar, went 
shopping. Istithmar purchased stake in Barneys of New York, Cirque du Soleil, W 
and Mandarin Oriental hotels, and even the Queen Elizabeth II Luxury liner. Dubai 
World raised credit in both Islamic sukuk bond markets and the Western bond 
markets, heavily leveraging Dubai’s foundational trade assets and services for 
speculative investment in real estate and finance sectors to increase its international 
portfolio command and diversity” (Ramos, 2010, p.143). 
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Figure 4.1.7: Organizational Diagram outlines operating subsidiaries (supply chain relevant) held by Dubai World Group 
Source: Own elaboration based on DubaiWorld (2017) 
4.1.3 Port Planning and Provision  
A sequential order of major events in Dubai (within ports, and in the region) is presented in 
Figure 4.1.8, revealing the development path that Dubai went through since the mid 1960’s 
when containerization began. The growth began by a vision of Dubai’s ruler prior to the 
discovery of oil in 1959, that got actualized by borrowing funds to dredge the creek and 
making it deep and wide enough for movement of ships, along with building wharves, and 
warehouses (Molavi, 2007). Dubai creek was considered the focal point of trade and 
economic livelihood, according to the earliest development plan of modern Dubai, known as 
the First Master Plan proposed in 1960. However, from 1966 onwards and with anticipation 
of oil wealth, the government of Dubai began to invest heavily on infrastructure, building 
roads, modern airport and seaports aiming at underpinning the long-term economic 
sustainability (Baluch, 2005).  
Although the process of development was continuous in 1970s, it was not until early 1980s 
(third wave of containerization) that the strong presence of PoD within the region was 
recognized. In a time span of less than a decade (from late 1970s to mid-1980s) PoD 
managed to build capabilities of offering cargo transfer products, logistics products and 
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manufacturing through the free trade zone within the proximity of Jebel Ali port. While 
expansion of the free zone was still ongoing in 1990s, the highlights of that decade were 
unification of the port authorities, and formation of a local terminal operator. In 2000s, 
further integration of three authorities (i.e., Port, Free Zone, and Customs) initiated, while the 
capacity expansion in Jebel Ali port also commenced. Meanwhile, the local terminal operator 
(DPI) grew steadily by winning a number of port concessions within the region, and went 
global through two major acquisitions of CSX Terminals and P&O (Mongelluzzo, 2004).  
In 2000s a multimodal logistics platform was introduced (called Dubai South, branded 
initially as Dubai World Central) in Jebel Ali area. Multi functionality of the platform, as 
well as merger with the port and free zone, created conditions for Dubai to evolve from a 
transshipment hub into a more specialized logistics hub. Part of the mentioned platform was 
the construction of a new airport that began its cargo operation in 2010. The new airport, 
along with project of a rail terminal, which is already in the pipeline, would contribute to 
enhancing multimodality in Jebel Ali port (King, 2011).  
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Figure 4.1.8: Development Path of PoD1, Source: The Author 
                                                 
1 The earliest commencement of development strategies is not included in the diagram as they occurred before the containerization era. 
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4.1.3.1 1960s, 1970s, and 1980’s: Developing to an Entrepôt-Port 
Establishment of Dubai and development of roads, bridges, ports and investment in 
infrastructure does not go before 1966 and prompted by discovery of oil in UAE. As such, the 
second master plan of Dubai for fostering infrastructural development came into effect in 
1971, shortly after Dubai began exporting oil in 1969 (GulfNews, 2010).  
Not long after United Arab Emirates was founded as a federation, in 1972 the earliest 
milestone with regards to port development in Dubai, the establishment of Port Rashid was 
achieved. Port Rashid’s development created capacity for handling 100,000 TEU in 11 berths 
initially, followed by further development of infrastructure in 1978, expanding the handling 
capacity to 1,500,000 TEU in 35 berths. Proximity of the port to the city center was the key 
of an instant success for this facility (DPWorld, 2014d). However, the major milestone for 
port development was in 1976, and expansion of the historical seaport of Port Rashid through 
establishing a new port in Jebel Ali area. Jebel Ali port was a unique development project at 
the time as it was “the largest man-made harbor in the world” (Economist, 2004).  
Figure 4.1.9 displays the multiple aerial images of Jebel Ali port from 1977 to 2008, which 
demonstrate the extent of development in the Jebel Ali Port area over a period of 30 years.  
 
Figure 4.1.9: Jebel Ali Port in 1977, 1979, 1984, 1988, and 2008 – United Arab Emirates 
Source: Adapted from DP World (2014e) 
Physical expansion was the most crucial growth element in PoD. Introduction of a range of 
ancillary activities, such as shipbuilding, repair and maintenance during late 1970s through 
establishment of Dubai Drydocks was a new form of development. It created capability for 
PoD to offer ship repair and maintenance services, that were not typical port products, but 
instrumental in building a bundle of maritime services in Dubai (Ramos, 2010). Dubai’s 
Drydocks added a lucrative activity to PoD by offering a safer location for servicing vessels 
compared to Kuwait and Iran (Zahlan, 2016). Zahlan (2016) referred to these facilities an 
“added bonus”:  
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“Dubai dry docks - one of the largest in the world and until recently considered to 
be a white elephant – is busy maintaining and overhauling tankers as well as 
repairing those damaged in the fighting” (p.10).  
When the construction of Jebel Ali port was completed in 1979, it not only complemented 
Port Rashid in terms of handling trade and transshipment volumes, but also introduced an 
industrial complex in the Jebel Ali area, which was the Jebel Ali Free Zone (Jafza). The Jebel 
Ali port and Free Zone complex was not an innovative model, but a distinct prototype in the 
region for its ambitious scale and modern facilities on offer (Ramos, 2010). Operation in 
Jafza officially commenced in 1985 with the launch of a platform, geared towards 
manufacturing, trade, and logistics services. Sampler and Eigner (2008) called Jafza a less 
risky undertaking as it was created only after Jebel Ali port became operative.  
Proximity of the free zone to the port area, advanced facilities, and competitively priced 
overheads were a number of advantages of Jafza for international businesses seeking a 
favorable location to establish a Middle Eastern hub. Beside a tax free regime (no corporate 
or income taxes) that was already in practice in Dubai (Brook, 2013), new incentives, such as 
100% foreign ownership, free capital inflows and outflows, and streamlined bureaucratic 
procedures, were introduced that made Jafza an attractive choice for Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) (Brook, 2013). Moreover, within the borders of Jebel Ali, separate laws 
applied. Beyond the gates of Jebel Ali, corporates were governed by the traditional Sharia 
Law which is stricter (e.g., under Sharia law those who cannot pay their debts would be 
imprisoned) comparing to corporate regulation inside the free zone (Brook, 2013).  
The first major firms setting up their regional distribution centers in Jafza were Japanese 
electronics manufacturers (e.g., Sony and Aiwa) (Cuthbert, 2011a). Gradually manufacturing 
companies began to locate their facilities in the Free Zone, though overall growth in the Jebel 
Ali area was relatively slow, mainly due to two factors (Cuthbert, 2011a). First, the port was 
operated by an American shipping company, Sealand. Competing shipping lines were 
reluctant to use Jebel Ali. Second, the Jebel Ali area was perceived to be far away from the 
center of the city and local companies preferred the convenience of Port Rashid over Jebel 
Ali. These two issues, in addition to the fact that the two port operators were competing for 
the same business, created a dilemma for Dubai government. On the one hand, the overflow 
of cargo in Port Rashid required ample investment. On the other, the underutilized facilities 
in Jebel Ali was a waste of valuable resources. Other hurdle was limitation of financial 
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resources due to fluctuation and drop in oil revenue in 1980s. During this period, an 
unpredicted event in the region brought an element of luck for Dubai, the Iran-Iraq war which 
broke out in 1980 and lasted for 8 years.  
Throughout the war, Iran and Iraq ports were no longer safe for commercial vessels as they 
were under attack in the Persian Gulf. This situation created an opportunity for Dubai to 
receive international cargo flows and re-route them for local and regional distribution 
(Walker, 1989, Pacione, 2005). Subsequently, Dubai’s transshipment volume increased as a 
large part of regional traffic was redirected to PoD that were offering safer conditions and 
capable of handling the increased traffic (Ramos, 2010). During this period the extensive dry 
docks facility opened nearby Port Rashid in 1979 received significant business from servicing 
vessels owned by the warring parties. Dubai dry docks facility, once called the white elephant 
(Krane, 2009), was benefiting from Dubai’s free port policy, and by being a safer alternative 
to Kuwait or Iranian ports (Pacione, 2005), provided repair service for all sides of the conflict 
(Early, 2015). Maintaining a good relationship with both sides of the conflict during the war 
was the key to attract trade diverted from zones of conflict. UAE was an exception among 
Arab countries in the Persian Gulf for not having a hostile relationship with Iran during the 
war. When the war ended in 1988, the diverted trade did not decline but entered into a new 
phase of growth initiated by international sanctions imposed on Iran.  
Apart from ventures in ports and Free Zone, in 1985 the Dubai government founded its own 
airline, called Emirates (TheEmiratesGroup, 2016). In the early years of its creation, the 
airline was predominantly focused on passenger services through fleet development and route 
expansion. Cargo services were introduced within a decade of establishment and contributed 
to creating intermodal capabilities in Dubai.  
Combination of the above resources contributed to making Dubai an “Entrepôt” port, which 
Ho (1996) described it as a “specialized port-of-calls serving as collective centres, where 
cargoes are held for collection and/or distribution” (p. 5-6). 
4.1.3.2 1990s: Transition to a Regional Transshipment Hub-Port  
The regional conflict in the Middle-East entered a new phase in August 1990 with the first 
Gulf War (Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait). Same as the previous war, PoD Authority identified 
the new conflict as an opportunity for their own benefit, and capitalized on the trade-related 
opportunities while providing facilities and policies for a smooth operation (Ramos, 2010). 
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Port Rashid Terminal became the distribution hub for a number of motor vehicle 
manufacturers as a result of the Gulf War (Jacobs, 2007). Dubai also benefitted from 
relocation of a significant number of businesses from Kuwait in 1991, and three years later 
from Bahrain due to the Shia unrest (Davidson, 2005).  
Moreover, international sanctions imposed on Iran were expanded in early 1990s, which 
strengthened the commercial activities of Iranian traders in Dubai. The conditions created 
opportunities for Dubai in two ways: i) by becoming a location for hosting sanctions busting 
companies, and ii) by serving as a convenient transshipment point for sanctions busting 
transactions on Iran’s behalf during the politically unstable period (Early, 2015).  
Jafza was also experiencing a substantial growth. Only 5 years after the conception, in 1990 
the Free Zone was accommodating 276 firms and attracted investment of US $600 million 
(Ghanem, 2001). The respective figures in 1985 were 19 firms and US $50 million (Ewers 
and Malecki, 2011). Jafza became a location for regional offices of global and multinational 
corporations utilizing the port for distribution of their products to India, Iran, Iraq and the 
wider Middle-East region. In fact, as illustrated in Figure 4.1.10, there appears to be a close 
association between at PoD and the rise in number of businesses in the free zone and the 
container throughput, reaffirming that the port and free zone relationship is complementary. 
The port and the free zone share an interdependent relationship: the port’s proximity attracts 
various value-added activities (e.g., assembling, labeling, and repacking) into the free zone, 
which safeguards the transshipment capacities of the port.  
“The Free Zone and the Port clearly have a symbiotic relationship. The Free Zone’s 
location near the port has given Dubai a focus on transshipment, and the proximity 
of the port has attracted numerous businesses into the Free Zone. Almost two thirds 
of Dubai’s trade is re-exported, with exporters and manufacturers benefitting from 
tax-incentives in the Free Zone” (Jacobs, 2007, p.128).  
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Figure 4.1.10: Jafza companies and PoD throughput (includes both Port Rashid and Jebel Ali)  
 Source: Figures compiled based on (Ghanem, 2001, Eur, 2002, Sharma, 2007, Emirates24/7, 2010a, 
DPWorld, 2011b) 
While the regional circumstances increased PoD throughput, the dilemma of the two ports 
managed by two rivals remained unresolved. In 1991 Dubai government terminated the 
management contracts of both ports, and merged the management of the twin ports into a new 
single establishment – the Dubai Port Authority (DPA). A government owned entity but 
commercially autonomous, DPA’s primary task was to increase throughput while balancing 
volume in the two ports. This was achieved by encouraging shipping lines to relocate to Jebel 
Ali port by offering inducements. DPA allocated a fleet of trucks to move containers between 
the two ports free of charge for local consignees, which changed their mindset for using Jebel 
Ali port (Cuthbert, 2011b). PoD began to thrive with the combination of new strategies. In 
1991 when the port authorities merged, the twin ports managed to handle over one million 
TEUs, positioning Dubai as the 18th busiest container port in the world. Six years later, in 
1997, PoD succeeded in entering the ranking of the top 10 container ports worldwide. In 
order to provide a streamlined flow of services, in late 1990s, manifest submission through 
EDI and Mirsal system (online customs declaration system) were implemented by Dubai 
customs (DubaiTrade, 2017).  
At about the same period, entry of the global terminal operators (e.g., PSA and APM) to the 
Middle East region posed a major threat to DPA, which had a dream of developing into a 
leading hub (Jacobs and Hall, 2007). In 1998, DPA reacted by establishing an international 
division – DPI, and began an abroad expansion.  
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4.1.3.3 2000s: Towards a Regional Logistics Hub-Port  
In the new millennium, the developments of PoD encompassed a range of local and 
international mergers and acquisitions. In 2001, DPA merged with the Jafza and founded the 
Ports, Customs and Free Zone Corporation (PCFC). This integration accommodated a “one-
stop” idea as preference of global supply chains operators when interacting with public 
authorities and port operators. Another advantage was that the revenue of the custom duties 
flows directly to the PCFC, rather than the state treasury (Jacobs and Hall, 2007).  
In 2004, Dubai Ports International (DPI) acquired CSX World, a U.S. based terminal 
operator, and took over management of nine container terminals worldwide with a total 
capacity of 14.6 million TEUs. This takeover enabled DPI to strengthen its position in 
Southeast Asia, China, Australia, Europe, and the Americas. As stated by Dubai Ports 
Managing Director:  
"The acquisition of CSX World Terminals will be a strong strategic fit for DPI, 
bridging our terminal network between East and West'' (JOC, 2004).  
In 2005, DPA and DPI merged and formed “DP World”. Another acquisition followed in 
2006, Dubai ports took over one of the world’s major stevedoring companies, the UK-
Australian company, P&O Ports. As a global operator, P&O Ports was unique with holding 
terminals in all continents (Vanelslander, 2008). The acquisition provided PoD an 
opportunity to penetrate the stevedore markets in Europe and Australia, while expanding 
activities in India and East Asia (Jacobs and Hall, 2007). Expanding its portfolio through the 
two key acquisitions of CSX World and P&O Ports, as well as winning numerous 
concessions across the globe, DP World lifted its status from a regional port operator to a 
global port operator (DPWorld, 2014a). In 2015 DP World was placed 4th on the ranking of 
global terminal operators (LloydsList, 2016).  
In addition to the new acquisitions, projects of physical expansion commenced in Jebel Ali 
port in order to expand the handling capacity as Jebel Ali was operating to the maximum 
capacity in 2004 (DPWorld, 2017a). Jebel Ali port was initially established with one 
container terminal, and ongoing development plans created facilities with handling capacity 
of nine million TEUs in Terminal 1. In 2001 construction of Terminal 2 began, which 
increased PoD capacity by another five million TEUs at the time of completion in 2006. 
Meanwhile Port Rashid formally ended its cargo operation in 2008 after 36 years, and 
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became a location for cruise ship operations (Chapman, 2016). With the concentration of 
cargo operations in Jebel Ali, capacity expansion became inevitable. Further development in 
Terminal 2 added another million TEUs to Jebel Ali, followed by construction of container 
Terminal 3 that created an overall capacity of 19 million TEUs for the port. In 2016, 
construction of Terminal 4 in Jebel Ali commenced. Expecting complete by 2018, Terminal 4 
would bring Jebel Ali port’s capacity to 22.1 million TEUs (DPWorld, 2016). 
In line with the physical expansion, other initiatives were taken by PCFC in early 2000s to 
streamline operations throughout Dubai’s trade and logistics cluster that contained seaport 
operations, airport cargo operations, Jebel Ali and Dubai Airport Free Zone authorities, UAE 
Customs and other governmental agencies (ECC, 2012). In 2003, PCFC launched a port 
community portal, Dubai Trade, to facilitate online services and provide customers a higher 
level of productivity while reducing time and cost of transactions (DPWorld, 2017c). As a 
result, a number of IT initiatives were launched to support collaboration among various 
actors, modernizing the trade process through paperless communication (see Table 4.1.4).  
In 2003, the Middle Eastern region moved into another period of turmoil, the second Gulf 
War, which re-enforced Dubai’s position as a safer location for commercial and maritime 
activities (Keshavarzian, 2010). The FDI in Dubai, particularly from Saudi Arabia, was 
already on the rise following the 9/11 terror attacks in 2001 (Hvidt, 2007). Once again Dubai 
managed to benefit from the region’s volatile conditions. The huge port complex at Jebel Ali 
in particular profited vastly from the trade spawned by U.S. invasion of Iraq (Davis, 2006). 
During the war, PoD managed to maintain their customer base despite high insurance rates, 
by taking a risky financial commitment, which was taking full responsibility for all vessels 
bound for Dubai. This strategy directly paid back as generating profit from transshipment 
cargos (i.e., logistics supply of allied forces in Iraq, and materials for reconstruction) in PoD 
(Davis, 2006). The conflict in the region resulted in some other opportunities for Dubai, such 
as providing bases to US military operations, as well as serving as an entrance for US goods 
coming into the region (Davidson, 2007). 
Furthermore, economic sanctions imposed on Iran during mid-1990s were tightened 
progressively in early 2000s, which made direct dealings with Iran increasingly problematic 
for international organizations. In order to overcome the legal barriers of direct trade, Iran 
bolstered its economic ties with UAE, despite political tensions between the two countries. 
UAE became the most important connection for Iran to link its commercial activities to the 
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global economy (Sadjadpour, 2011). Consequently, the flow of indirect Iranian trade through 
PoD gradually increased. Dubai’s position in relation to Iran’s trade can be understood from a 
statement by an Iranian businessman “The best place to do business in Iran is in Dubai” 
(Early, 2015, p.113).  
Table 4.1.4: Dubai Government Port and Free Zone IT Initiatives  
Period Initiatives  
2000-2005 
- MyJAFZA, Online portal for Jafza launched  
- MyDPA, Online portal for ports launched  
- (electronic transaction facility for port operations) 
- Dubai Trade portal launched through consolidation of MyJAFZA, and 
MyDPA services. Dubai Trade is a single window for integrated 
electronic services for trade and logistics providers 
- E-Mirsal launched  
 2006-2010 
  
- E-Token launched  
- (providing port users a time slot for their operation) 
- E-Payment launched  
- (facility of payment of services online) 
- Emirates Skycargo joined Dubai trade  
- Mirsal 2 launched  
- (Comprehensive Customs declaration system allowing clients to 
complete clearance procedures around the clock and without their 
physical presence, saving time and cost of operation) 
Source: Compiled from DubaiCustoms (2010) and DubaiTrade (2017)  
Based on official statistics of UAE’s Ministry of Foreign Trade, Iran was the 2nd re-export 
partner of UAE with approximately 17% share of total re-export trade (estimated US 
$8.5billion) in 2010, and ranked 1st as the re-export partner of UAE in 2014 with 16.5% share 
of UAE’s total annual re-export trade (Almansouri, 2015). Although unofficial estimates 
were way above the declared statistics, the re-export trade figures restate that the surrounding 
conditions of PoD have contributed significantly to its growing throughput (Sadjadpour, 
2011). 
Nonaggressive regional circumstances also stimulated Dubai’s traffic, such as UAE’s 
participation in the Customs Union of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 2003. The 
organization was formed over two decades earlier in 1981 to foster economic, business and 
scientific cooperation among six oil-exporting countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia and UAE. The real work of GCC commenced in 2001 when its members 
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decided to focus on achieving economic integration by forming a customs union and a joint 
market (Abdulqader, 2015), which resulted in an increase in GCC inter-regional trade. As 
emphasized by Balakrishnan (2008), UAE’s participation in GCC’s Customs Union 
reinforced Dubai’s position (as the main seaport of UAE) in becoming a major port of entry 
to the Middle East and Africa. The GCC intra-regional trade statistics in 2013 (Table 4.1.5) 
confirmed that UAE held the highest market share (28%) among all states. 
The combination of regional settings, and the rapid local developments shaped superb 
conditions in Dubai that could not be matched by any other seaports in the region. The 
threefold increase in number of companies established in Jafza, as well as rising container 
throughput in PoD from 2000 to 2010 (see Figure 4.1.10), are evidences of Dubai’s success 
as a commercial and maritime hub. The parallel growth and inter-connectivity of the port and 
free zone eventually led to their merger in 2015 when DP World took over Jafza. 
Significance of Jafza’s acquisition as a strategically located asset is stated by the Chairman of 
DP World:  
“Combining the two assets makes economic and strategic sense for all parties 
involved, including customers, particularly in the context of a significant growth 
phase in port capacity at Jebel Ali and a strong economic outlook for Dubai and the 
wider GCC region”(WorldMaritimeNews, 2015). 
Dubai’s industrial growth pole in Jebel Ali area entered into a new phase of strategic 
development in 2006 with the introduction of an integrated logistics platform, called the 
Dubai Logistics Corridor (Emirates24/7, 2010b). Officially launched by Dubai government in 
2010, the corridor spreads over approximately 200 sq. km, linking sea, land and air as a 
single customs bonded free zone. The development is expected to create 500,000 jobs, which 
would further enhance Dubai’s competitiveness as a global logistics hub. At the heart of this 
logistics platform is the Dubai World Central (DWC) project, rebranded as “Dubai South” in 
a 145 sq km area encompassing eight districts (DubaiSouth, 2016), with the largest plot 
allotted to Al Maktoum International Airport (Figure 4.1.11). The airport, which is located 
less than 10 km away from Jebel Ali port was opened for cargo operations in 2010, and upon 
completion is expected to serve as a multimodal logistics hub for 16 million tons of freight 
per year (DubaiAirports, 2013). 
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Table 4.1.5: GCC Intra-Regional Trade (Million Dollars) 
 Qatar 
Saudi 
Arabia 
UAE Oman Kuwait Bahrain 
Qatar  0 2,454 8,381 1,571 1,481 456 
Saudi 
Arabia  
2,454 0 8,141 4,623 2,630 5,051 
UAE  8,381 8,141 0 15,689 1,692 1,267 
Oman 1,571 4,623 15,689 0 778 386 
Kuwait  1,481 2,629 1,692 778 0 279 
Bahrain  456 5,051 1,267 386 279 0 
Total Value $14,344 $20,445 $26,790 $21,476 $5,379 $6,983 
Market 
Share  
15% 21% 28% 23% 6% 7% 
Source: Adapted from Abdulqader (2015) 
Dubai South project, located ideally with direct access to the Jebel Ali Port, UAE’s main 
trans-emirates highways and the projected Etihad Rail network, offers a unique operational 
speed, connectivity and flexibility (Saidi et al., 2010). This multimodal logistics platform will 
have the first and only integrated air-sea corridor that allows offloading containers from a 
ship to be airborne within a couple of hours that includes custom clearing and all 
administration processes (Saidi et al., 2010). Because of its easy access as an international 
transit hub, as well as being conveniently situated between Dubai International Airport, Abu 
Dhabi International Airport, and Jebel Ali seaport, Dubai South has been picked as the site 
for Dubai Expo 2020, the global event of exposition (EXPO2020, 2016). 
In 2011, an initiative for collaboration, the Dubai Logistics Cluster Platform, was launched 
by the Dubai Department of Economic Development (DED). This platform was set as a 
public and private collaborative forum (a permanent network of experts) to strengthen the 
competitiveness of Dubai’s logistics (Emirates24/7, 2011). The coordination mechanisms 
created by the platform resulted in the introduction of a “Virtual Freight and Logistics 
Corridor” in 2015, which is an automated customs procedure connecting Dubai airports, 
seaports and free zones (TradeArabia, 2015). As stated by Rodrigue (2016):  
“This corridor enables simplified customs procedures for the bounded cargo, 
reducing transactions costs and improving the velocity of freight.”  
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Figure 4.1.11: Dubai Logistics Corridor 
 Source: Adopted from DPWorld (2017b)  
4.1.4 Expansion in International Level 
According to Thorpe and Mitra (2011) Dubai’s economy has gone through three major 
phases of diversification:  
1. 1980s: focus on trade, transportation, logistics and tourism;  
2. 1990s and 2000s: focus on services, finance, technology and IT, media; and  
3. 2005 onwards: focus on education, R&D, wireless and nanotechnology, bio-
technology and pharmaceuticals 
The three phases reveal a shift in Dubai’s economy from resource based industries to service 
and knowledge intensive industries, and the gradual migration of resource based industries 
(e.g., transport and logistics) to a global scale (Thorpe and Mitra, 2011). The same strategic 
parameters also guided DP World to become a global terminal operating company.  
As a subsidiary of Dubai World holding, DP World is the marine operating division that was 
initially set up in 1999 (under the name of Dubai Ports International - DPI) to apply its 
expertise of managing ports in an international scale. The earliest project of DPI commenced 
in Saudi Arabia (1999), but its operation soon expanded to Djibouti (2000), India (2002), and 
Romania (2003). The network of DP World was expanded by two major acquisitions (CSX 
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World Terminals, and P&O Ports) and became a major global terminal operator (DPWorld, 
2017e).  
In 2016, DP World handled 63.7 million TEUs in 77 container terminals (marine and inland) 
in 40 countries, scattered across 6 continents and employed 37,000 people from 110 countries 
(DPWorld, 2017d).  
4.1.5 Strategic Developmental Path 
The economy of Dubai, despite common belief, is not based on oil revenues. Dubai state oil 
reserves are small and expensive to produce (Hvidt, 2007). According to GulfNews (2010), 
Dubai oil productions have been steadily declining since 1991 and the reserves are expected 
to be gradually exhausted within 20 years. Hence building a developed, sustainable and non-
oil reliant economy has been the long term prospect of Dubai leaders. As stated by the ruler 
of Dubai, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum:  
“We have continuously stressed in the past 10 years, through legislation and 
policies, the importance of diversifying our economy away from dependence on oil” 
(GulfBusiness, 2016).  
During its oil heydays (during 1970s and early 1980s), Dubai created opportunities for a 
diversified and active economy, predominantly following the motto of its leader Sheikh 
Rashid; “What’s good for the merchants is good for Dubai” (Krane, 2009, p.266). The 
earliest initiatives took shape in late 1980s for building a non-oil reliant economy in Dubai 
(Elbadawi and Selim, 2016) as:  
“The authorities initially turned to foreign trade as the engine of economic 
development but soon realized the need for diversification: foreign trade offered 
ample possibilities but also generated significant risks for the local economy. 
Therefore, they embarked on series of policies aimed at fostering the development of 
strategic industries, including tourism, the financial sector and retail and wholesale 
trade” (p.417).  
Moreover, major investments in seaports, airport, and a sizable free zone adjacent to the port 
land were made to foster an internationally linked economy, and to diversify Dubai away 
from reliance of oil. The interdependent relationship between the Port and Free Zone, laid the 
foundation for positioning Dubai as a main commercial center of the Middle East region. 
Dubai’s low tax and customs regime, cheap labor, and subsidized energy prices had been 
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instrumental in creating commercial advantages and attracting new commerce (Garg and 
Gupta, 2012). 
The predominant source of funding for Dubai investments in local mega projects had come 
from international borrowings on short term payment plans (Thomas, 2009). These 
developments positioned Dubai as the main transportation hub in the Middle East, ranked in 
2009, after Hong Kong and Singapore, as the third most important re-export center in the 
world (Hvidt, 2009) with 60% of the region’s imports transiting its borders (Thorpe and 
Mitra, 2011). Attaining such a position, as described by Thrope and Mitra (2011), is 
associated with the following factors: 
 Accessibility by air, sea and land due to prime geographical location and multimodal 
connectivity. Jebel Ali is connected through the main UAE / GCC road network 
accessible anywhere in the GCC by land transit within 2-3 days. In terms of sea 
connectivity, Jebel Ali offers more than 98 weekly services to over 115 direct ports of 
call (DPWorld, 2014c).  
 Strong local and regional economies that demand excess logistics and distribution 
capacity. As Figure 4.1.12 shows, container throughput in the Middle East region 
increased by 250% from 2001 to 2012 (Griffith, 2013), with the Persian Gulf’s 
throughput having the highest level of increase in the region. In 2012, about 53% of 
the 25 million TEUs of throughput via the Persian Gulf area were handled by PoD. 
 
Figure 4.1.12: Middle East Container Throughput (1990-2012) 
Source: (Griffith, 2013) 
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 Lack of significant regional competition. The World Bank’s Logistics Performance 
Index (LPI) ranks the UAE 13th in 2016 and the top performer within its region with a 
track record for arranging competitively priced shipments (WorldBank, 2016b). LPI is 
a benchmarking tool comparing performance of logistics operations among 160 
countries across the globe, based on indicators of 1) customs, 2) infrastructure, 3) 
international shipments, 4) logistics competence, 5) track and trace, and 6) timeliness 
(WorldBank, 2016b). LPI for UAE can be looked upon as a representative index for 
Dubai as it accounts for a major part of the logistics infrastructure in UAE (Fernandes 
and Rodrigues, 2011). In 2016, across the gulf region among competitor countries, 
Qatar ranked 30, Saudi Arabia 52, Oman 48, Kuwait 53, and Iran 96 (WorldBank, 
2016b).  
In terms of location, although Dubai is positioned favorably midway between Europe and Far 
East, it still does not own a superior locational advantage when compared with a number of 
other ports in the region. Seaports, such as Khor Fakkan in UAE, and Sohar in Oman, both 
located on Indian Ocean coast have an advantage of easy access to open sea and saving 
vessels detour through the Strait of Hormuz. Therefore, the key characteristics of Dubai’s 
success and its main competitive advantage can be attributed to its superior facilities, and the 
availability of different transport modes that offer easy access to the entire region (Fernandes 
and Rodrigues, 2011). Further interpretations drawn from the development timeline of PoD 
can be elaborated in three areas:  
1. Capacity Building: Dubai’s successful anticipation of containerization in the early 
1970s led to development of a seaport with ample capacity. Combination of the 
regional conditions, and the deliberate planning of Dubai government for nurturing 
business environment, transformed Dubai from a local import-oriented port to a 
regional transshipment-oriented hub.  
2. Logistics Cluster: In conjunction with development of ports, a bundle of logistics 
services (e.g., seaports, Dry Docks, Free zones, airports, and airline) became 
progressively available in Dubai. The strategic clustering of infrastructure 
developments in Dubai began in 1970s by carrying out the visions of its leader: 
“Sheikh Rashid invested strategically throughout the decade, in reaction to 
regional infrastructure competition and to augment Dubai’s trade capacity 
and international profile. This strategic clustering found its maximum 
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territorial expression in the Jebel Ali Port, Industrial Area, and Free Zone, 
and later, as an international business strategy, for the Dubai World Holding 
Company” (Ramos, 2010, p.92). 
The bundle introduced new sources of speed and efficiency in business transactions, 
which could not be matched by neighboring countries. For instance, the bundle of free 
zone and port, as described by Wang and Oliver (2006), allowed Dubai to insert itself 
into the global production chain. Since re-exports comprise about two third of Dubai’s 
total trade volume (Jacobs and Hall, 2007), the collaboration between port and free 
zone became a key element in Dubai’s success. 
Moreover, by air-linking the local economy to the world, Dubai created new 
opportunities for trade and transport, and also supported the further advancement of 
seaports following the notion of expanding from stand-alone and terminal focus to 
linking fundamentally to the global distribution chain described by Thrope and Mitra 
(2011). The mix of logistics services on offer positioned Dubai as a globally 
integrated logistics hub. The concept of “Global Integrated Logistics Hub” has been 
described by a number of scholars (Al-Hajri, 1999, Tongzon, 2004) who outlined the 
factors contributing to the formation of a successful integrated logistics hub as: 
Strategic location (along the main shipping and trade routes); extensive linkages and 
connectivity to the world through land, sea and air; favorable capabilities in 
warehousing and value added services; and highly efficient and adequate 
infrastructure (physical, IT and financial). Majdalani et al. (2007) argued that Dubai’s 
characteristics fit into the specifications of a global integrated logistics hub, offering: 
o an economic environment that attracts foreign firms; 
o a large free zone built around a seaport and airport with world class facilities;  
o highly competitive handling charges;  
o high level performance in seaport and airport in managing and operating 
complex processes; and  
o living standards that meet demands of a large expatriate population:  
“…especially by Arab standards, Dubai is remarkably open to 
foreigners. Of its 1.5m people, over 80% are expatriates. In the business 
world, Brits, Indians, Iranians and Lebanese are prominent, while for 
the grunt work of building artificial islands there are plenty of job-
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hungry Indians and Pakistanis from across the ocean. Dubai's easy-
going style—alcohol is readily available; foreigners can even own 
freehold property—has made it such a positive place to live and work 
that success feeds on itself. In that sense, it has much in common with 
two other vibrant city states, Singapore and Hong Kong” (Economist, 
2004).  
3. International Expansion: DP World managed to capitalize on knowledge and 
expertise gained from operating the twin ports of Port Rashid, and Jebel Ali, in an 
international scale, and transformed itself from a local port operator to a global port 
operator. Fundamental aspects of this transformation were main phases of 
organizational unifications, and promotion of Dubai’s global port operating 
capabilities through acquisitions and mergers. By becoming a global port operator, 
DP World generates value from its current global undertakings, as well as securing 
long-term ventures across the globe that would potentially maintain the position of the 
company as a market leader for future decades. As stated in 2015 by the Chairman of 
DP World Sultan Ahmad Bin Sulayem: 
“DP World’s concessions run for an average of 40 years, so we can invest for 
long term”.  
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4.2 Port of Kaohsiung 
Kaohsiung has been one of the busiest seaports in the world since the 1980’s, serving as one 
of the shipping hubs in East Asia. It held its position as one of the top 10 busiest container 
ports in the world since 1988, though its ranking has been on the decline from 2000 onwards. 
Kaohsiung is also called the gateway of Taiwan, handling about 70% of the island’s 
containerized throughput (TIPC, 2016a). The balance of the country’s traffic is managed by 
three seaports - Keelung, Taichung, and Taipei (see Figure 4.2.1).  
 
Figure 4.2.1: Overall Map of the Port of Kaohsiung, and main container ports of Taiwan 
Source: (Yap and Lam, 2006) 
Development of the port of Kaohsiung (PoK) can be briefly divided into two main phases. 
The first phase started from 1945 after the 2nd World War when Taiwan - a Japanese-ruled 
country - was returned to China. The Kaohsiung Harbor Bureau (KHB) was established in 
December 1945 to take charge of harbor restoration, which was, by and large, completed in 
1955. The port stevedoring operation, exclusively handled by five Japanese firms prior to the 
war, was reorganized and transferred to a provincial-owned general transportation 
corporation (Chen and Ngo, 2011). In 1958, the KHB began a 12-year project to reclaim 544 
hectares of shoreline to support increasing trade volumes (TIPC, 2016e).  
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Figure 4.2.2: Areas of the PoK  
Source: (Cheng, 2012) 
The second phase of development started from 1970 up till 1999, with the progressive 
construction of five container terminals under a plan adapted to the new trends of Port-Urban 
interface, defined by Hayuth (2008) as containerization, inter-modality and globalization. 
These five terminals (Figure 4.2.2), with a total of 26 berths and a combined capacity of 10 
million TEUs, were fully operational by 2000. Between 2000 and 2006, there appeared to be 
a hiatus in port infrastructure expansion in Kaohsiung. In 2007, the construction of Terminal 
6 commenced, and two phases were completed in 2014, adding three million TEUs to the 
overall container handling capacity of PoK (KMCT, 2012, WorldMaritimeNews, 2014). In 
2015, 10,260,000 TEUs were handled by PoK with the capacity of about 12,800,000, the 
average rate of utilization has been 80% (Table 4.2.1). Currently, construction of the 7th 
container terminal is underway involving five deep-water berths, which can handle vessels up 
to 22,000TEUs. The first phase of the project is expected to be completed by mid-2018 
(Mooney, 2015).  
Kaohsiung has played an important role in Taiwan’s economy and has been the supporting 
point of import/export commodities and industrial production. A report by Chung-Hua 
Institution indicated that in 2004, about half off goods traded in Taiwan was transported 
through the PoK, which contributed to 10% of Taiwan’s national output as well as national 
employment (Chia-Hong, 2013).  
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Table 4.2.1: Specifications of Container Terminals in PoK and their Overall Utilization Rate, 2015 
Container 
Terminal 
Quay 
Length 
(Meter) 
Water 
Depth 
(Meter) 
Total 
Area 
(Hectare) 
Capacity 
(TEU) 
Capacity 
(TEU)  
2015 
Annual 
Throughput 
(TEU) 
2015 
Utilization 
Rate 
(2015) 
T1 848 10.5 10.5 
10,000,000 
12,800,000 10,260,000 80.00% 
T2 1204 12 45 
T3 1072 14 48 
T4 2533 14 100 
T5 2444 14 to 15 90 
T6 Phase I 1500 16.5 74.5 2,800,000 
T6 Phase II 
(Completion by 
2020)  
6515 16 to 18 422.5 4,000,000 
Source: Compiled from (Chien-Chang et al., 2003, PoK, 2014) 
4.2.1 Global and Regional Competitiveness  
A large natural port in the center of the Asia-Pacific region, PoK’s container traffic had a 
steady growth since the introduction of containerization in late 1960s. By 1979, PoK was 
already on the league of the world’s top 5 container ports. Throughout the 1980s, and 1990s, 
its growth and global ranking remained relatively strong and stable (see Figure 4.2.3).  
 
Figure 4.2.3: PoK Throughput (TEU), and Global Ranking (1990-2015) 
Source: Compiled from (Rodrigue, 2010, JOC, 2012, WSC, 2017) 
In early 2000s, PoK’s global ranking began to tumble, though its container volume was still 
on the rise. In 2006, its global competitive position took a sharp dive that ultimately led to its 
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exit from the top 10 global rankings in 2008. Though PoK no longer holds a position among 
the top 10 global seaports, its container traffic has been rising steadily since the global 
financial crisis and remains an important player within the East Asia region.  
In the East Asian region, PoK competes with a number of hub ports, such as Shanghai 
(China), Shenzhen (China), Busan (Korea), and Hong Kong (China). In 1980s with the 
growth of containerized traffic, Kaohsiung along with Singapore, Hong Kong, Kobe (Japan), 
and Busan (South Korea) were handling more than 70% of the Far Eastern region’s 
throughput (Table 4.2.2). However, the economic environment of the region changed within a 
few decades, resulting in a major loss of market share for Kaohsiung and Kobe. For Kobe, its 
status as a key player was severely affected in early 1990s by the declining Japanese 
economy, and the Kobe earthquake in 1995 (Robinson, 1998, Chang, 2000). In the case of 
Kaohsiung, its competitive position was eroded since early 2000s, first by complications with 
economic restructuring in Kaohsiung (Chien and Wu, 2010) and secondly, due to the absence 
of direct shipping between Taiwan and China (Wang, 2004, Wu, 2005).  
Table 4.2.2: Regional Market share of Kaohsiung, Singapore, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Kobe, and 
Busan – Containerized Traffic (1981-2010) 
  1981 1990 2000 2010 
Singapore 13.3% 21.9% 26.1% 14.9% 
Hong Kong  19.5% 21.3% 27.8% 12.4% 
Kaohsiung  14.1% 14.6% 11.4% 4.8% 
Shanghai 0.6% 1.9% 8.6% 15.2% 
Kobe 16.7% 10.0% 3.5% 1.3% 
Busan 9.3% 9.8% 11.7% 7.4% 
Total  73.5% 79.5% 89.1% 56.0% 
Source: Compiled from (Chien-Chang et al., 2003, IAPH, 2016)  
After World War II, the countries of East Asia (Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, and 
China) have enjoyed a notable record of high and sustained economic growth which has been 
remarkably higher than other regions in the world (Wang, 2015b). As an indication, the 
average GDP growth per capita from 1960-1994 for East Asian countries was 6.8%, 
compared with a rate of 3.5% for industrialized countries (Collins and Bosworth, 1996). The 
economic growth was even stronger in Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, 
named “Asian Tigers“ that enjoyed an average GDP growth of 9% from 1960 to 1980 (Roy et 
al., 2013). 
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Transformation of the shipping environment in the East-Asian region is closely linked to the 
high rate of economic growth (Wang, 1997). A comparison of container flow in 1990 and 
2012 in the global main trade routes (see Table 4.2.3) confirms a major increase within a 
period of two decades in container volume handled worldwide. However, the weight of Intra-
Asian sector is immense when compared to the rest of world, which is reflective of the 
flourishing economies of the region, particularly the stronger players in Eastern Asia. The 
heavy cargo flow within East Asia is attributable to regional integration of economies of the 
region, which is linked to production factor endowments (e.g., Japan processing sophisticated 
technologies, while South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan process mid-level technologies, 
and China serving as a key market and also a provider of labor, and land), economic 
structures (e.g, adjustment of exchange rates, and other means of amending trade 
imbalances), and geographical proximity (e.g., integration of economies in Southern China, 
Hong Kong and Taiwan, as well as Northern China with Japan and South Korea) of the 
countries (Cai, 2008). Cai (2008) also highlighted a number of advantages of regional 
integration of economies in East Asia, such as cost benefits in movement of goods and 
services, direct investment, and technological exchange.  
Table 4.2.3: Share of Intra-Asian Service in the Global Container Traffic (1990 and 2012) 
 Main Shipping Routes  
1990 
Million 
(TEU) 
2012 
Million 
(TEU)  
Average  
Annual 
Growth % 
Europe - North America 3.05 6.30 17.2% 
Europe - Asia  2.89 19.61 56.6% 
Asia - North America  5.34 21.92 34.2% 
Intra-Asia  3.50 56.10 133.6% 
Source: Compiled from Wang (2015b) 
Among the countries in the East Asian region, China experienced the fastest sustained 
growth. With GDP surging nearly 10 percent a year on average, China has become the 
second largest economy in the world, playing an influential role in the global economy 
(WorldBank, 2016a). The astounding performance of port of Shanghai from 2000s onwards 
evidenced from its top spot on the global ranking since 2010 on the till date has been 
attributed to China’s strong GDP growth (Wang, 2014b). Like other major seaports in the 
East Asian region, PoK’s hinterlands extend beyond its continental borders (see Figure 4.2.1) 
and include nearby regions located offshore, due to the long coastlines with large islands in 
close proximity (Yap and Lam, 2006). The geographical location of PoK, and its centrality in 
the region, offers the shortest links to the major international harbors nearby (Singapore, 
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Shanghai, Hong Kong, Busan, Manila and Tokyo), by an average sailing time of 53 hours 
(Chen, 2002). The ideal natural advantage, in addition to modern facilities on offer, created a 
condition for PoK to position itself as a transshipment hub between the west coast of North 
America and South East Asia (Wang, 2014a). 
Moreover, a set of circumstances in global trade and distribution networks since early 1980s 
had a major impact on the position of PoK. The most relevant circumstance to containerized 
traffic is the liner services networks. In East Asia, the liner services developed as a hierarchy 
of networks with a mix of hub and direct-call ports in the lower order networks, and high-cost 
but high efficiency hubs at the higher order networks (Robinson, 1998). PoK was positioned 
in the higher order networks, along with Hong Kong and Busan, because it was serving as a 
hub to regional distribution networks (Haynes et al., 1997). The framework of regional 
networks, however, was reshaped during the period of 1970 to 2000s and the variation 
affected the competitive position of Kaohsiung. Robinson (1998) outlined the changes of East 
Asian distribution networks into three main phases (Figure 4.2.4):  
1. From 1970 to the mid-1980s: this was a period with a rather simple configuration of 
distribution networks with the Japanese ports, Hong Kong, and Singapore as primary 
key hubs in the region. Rapid development of Busan and Kaohsiung as container ports 
in late 1970s and early 1980s, positioned the two as major hubs in the center point of 
the region.  
2. From mid-1980s to the mid-1990s: the development of China ports and inclusion of 
these ports into the regional feeder networks in this period added further complexity 
to the earlier pattern. Role of regional hubs was intensified due to high growth rates of 
traffic. By mid 1990s, all of China was served by feeder services through Hong Kong 
and Japanese ports, while Busan was a new comer to handle Chinese traffic. At this 
period, PoK was handling a sizable containerized traffic in the region, though it was 
excluded from China-oriented traffic, due to political reasons.  
3. From mid-1990s to 2000s: at this phase direct calls by shipping lines to a number of 
China ports began. This was also the period when major new shipping alliances were 
formed. By 1997, about 70% of the East-West trade were handled by the four main 
strategic shipping alliances (e.g., Global Alliance, Grand Alliance, Maersk Sea-Land, 
and Tricon) (Wang, 2015a). These shipping alliances managed to expand their direct 
services throughout the region to penetrate new markets by calling at newly 
developed seaports, and also to capture value from ports which have surpassed the 
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volume threshold. By early 2000’s the share of Japanese ports was already in decline, 
while Hong Kong, Singapore, Busan, and Kaohsiung managed to maintain their 
position as major hubs. At about the same period, political conflict between Taiwan 
and China started easing, facilitating operation in Kaohsiung as a hub for container 
traffic of central and southern parts of China. Stronger presence of Kaohsiung as a 
transshipment hub is evident from the growth of its transshipment cargo. In year 
2000, 53% of total throughput in PoK was transshipment cargo, an increase of about 
15% compared to a decade earlier (Chien-Chang et al., 2003). Transshipment cargos 
reached a high of 55% in 2001 (Yap et al., 2006) when liberalization of direct trade 
with China was introduced (Chen et al., 2014). 
 
Figure 4.2.4: Change of Shipping Networks in Asia 
Source: (Robinson, 1998, p.36) 
With the rapid growth of other ports in the region, particularly those in Mainland China, 
which benefitted from the fast-growing Chinese economy, considerable threats were posed to 
the competitive strengths of PoK, gradually shaving off its share of the regional container 
traffic. A study by Tongzon and Yang (2016) which examined the effects of Chinese ports 
growth on East Asian major seaports, both in short and long run, reveals that with the shift in 
the center of gravity from Japan to China in 1990s, the major ports handling container traffic 
in East Asia gradually lost their dominance. The impacts are discussed by Tongzon and Yang 
(2016) as follows:  
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 Short run: the rise of China ports had a positive effect on Singapore and Hong Kong 
mostly due to the increasing trade between ASEAN countries and China and the role 
of two ports as transshipment hubs. In contrast, PoK and port of Keelung did not 
benefit from the developments in China.  
 Long run (from 1980-2010): Singapore, Hong Kong, Busan and main Japanese ports 
were negatively affected by the rise of China ports. Though Kaohsiung and Keelung 
have lost their hub status, they repositioned themselves as second level hub ports.  
Evidently, the ports in East Asia have been developed and operated on various strategies. In 
the case of Kaohsiung, implementation of growth strategies by the port authority could not 
lead to a competitive position. Despite experiencing continuous growth in container traffic in 
the early 2000s, PoK exited from the list of the top 10 container ports in the world in 2008. A 
number of significant factors influencing PoK’s vulnerability are identified by Su et al. 
(2016), such as diminishing cargo sources from Taiwan, lack of subsidy incentives, and less 
response resilience to market impacts by the PoK authority. The downturn of PoK in relation 
to its complex institutional arrangement dividing the local, regional and national priorities, 
was also highlighted earlier by a number of other scholars (Haynes et al., 1997, Chen, 2009, 
Chen and Everett, 2014). Hence understanding the port’s organizational structure as a key 
factor impacting competitiveness of the port is crucial for revealing barriers to the growth of 
PoK. 
4.2.2 Port of Kaohsiung Authority  
In Taiwan the port authorities, namely Harbour Bureau, are administrative organizations 
under the Ministry of Transportation and Communications (MOTC). As Taiwan government 
is the source of finance and provider of public services to the ports, the central government is 
considered the ultimate manager of the seaports (Chen, 2009). This port governance model is 
based on the perspective that seaports are public goods, and of great value to national security 
and safety.  
Kaohsiung’s Harbor Bureau (KHB) was established in 1945, the year Japan surrendered to 
allied forces at the ending phase of World War II. Taiwan was returned to China, and KHB 
took charge of restoration of the heavily destroyed harbor, which was mostly completed by 
1955. In 1954 PoK’s management and administrative authority, which was responsible for 
the land management, shipping services and navigation policies (Chien et al., 2014), was 
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delegated to the Taiwan Provincial Government (TPG) (Haynes et al., 1997). Though the 
Kaohsiung City Government attempted for autonomy in 1998 when TPG was abolished, the 
port management functions were directly transferred to the MOTC (Chien et al., 2014).  
In 1989, the government of Taiwan initiated a process of port reform, which went through 
many phases. The reform was to facilitate the development of ports. As part of the reform, a 
program to deregulate dock labor, and privatize stevedoring operation was launched in 1999, 
resulting in privatization of most of commercial activities in PoK (except towage and 
warehousing). In 2003, Chen (2003) highlighted a number of shortcomings in Taiwan’s port 
structure hindering ports commercial activities, such as government intervention, financial 
constraints, bureaucracy and civil servants’ attitude towards institutional change. Although 
most of commercial activities in Taiwan ports were already privatized, the port authorities 
were still directly engaged in operations, despite their position of port regulator (Wu et al., 
2007).  
In 2011 a proposition by MOTC to merge the major ports of Taiwan through establishment of 
a state-owned port company was passed by parliament. The main objectives of this reform 
were to decrease inter-port competition, and promote collaboration, and co-ordination among 
the local ports, as well as separate the port administration and business management functions 
from MOTC. The new establishment called Taiwan International Ports Corporation (TIPC) 
was set up in 2012 with four subsidiaries formed by the former port authorities of Keelung, 
Taichung, Kaohsiung, and Hualian. Under the new framework, the four port authorities were 
consolidated into Maritime and Port Bureau (MPB) and TIPC. MPB was in charge of 
maritime and port related administration, whereas TIPC operates as a state-run enterprise and 
was tasked to handle resource integration, key strategic planning, information management 
and legal support (Chen and Everett, 2014). TIPC also took charge of comprehensive seaport 
operations to enhance operational efficiencies, raise the international profile of Taiwan’s 
commercial ports, and spur domestic regional economic growth (Tseng and Pilcher, 2017). 
Yet, this governance model does not seem to promote a high degree of autonomy for port 
authorities, as port land is still publicly owned. 
“In fact, without control of the land itself the TIPC does not have the necessary 
freedom to make decisions itself about how to generate profit using it, despite the 
government's establishment of it to do precisely this” (Tseng and Pilcher, 2017, 
p.43). 
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Under the nation’s constitution, Taiwan Central Government has jurisdiction over the all 
ports (Chen, 2009, Chen and Everett, 2014). Though TIPC is a commercial entity, it could 
not operate without reference to the central government for its budgeting and financial 
decisions. Hence, the move prompted by private decentralization, which aimed to create 
efficiency and competition, does not appear to be fully productive due to an extra layer of 
management that needs to be passed through prior to any decision (Tseng and Pilcher, 2017). 
Tseng and Pilcher (2017) refer to the governance model of Taiwan ports as:  
“a unique form of landlord model, aspiring for privatization and efficiency, yet 
retaining public ownership of management processes and overall control.” (p.45). 
4.2.3 Port Planning and Provision  
As Taiwan’s largest container port, PoK’s development has always been of national interest 
and concern. According to the governance structure of Taiwan seaports, the port planning’s 
were centrally and nationally determined. PoK was no exception to this rule, and its planning 
followed various comprehensive governmental strategic plans throughout the decades (e.g., 
Six-year national development plan, Challenge 2008, i-Taiwan 12 projects, etc). Figure 4.2.5 
presents a timeline of national plans of Taiwan from late 1960s to date, and major national 
events that had an impact on maritime environment countrywide, as well as the main phases 
of development in PoK. 
In 1960s, following the introduction of export oriented policies, Taiwan’s first Export 
Processing Zone was launched in PoK. In 1970s, areas around the PoK undergone a dramatic 
industrialization, and construction of container terminals in the port commenced, which 
continued till early 1980s. The combination of infrastructural developments in the port and 
Taiwan’s flourishing economy, created conditions for PoK to position itself at the pinnacle of 
global rankings throughout 1990s. In late 1990s, major shift in Taiwan’s economy directed 
the manufacturing towards technology intensive industries. Following the easing of 
relationship with Mainland China, an offshore shipping center was established in 1997.  
In early 2000s, the 50-year direct trade ban with China was lifted and direct shipping to 
China commenced. A new container terminal was constructed and became operative. 
However, due to the shift of export products to low-volume, high-value goods, the port 
throughput began to record a modest growth. In late 2000s Free trade zones were introduced 
in Kaohsiung port however they were not actively promoted until after 2010s when the port 
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governance was reorganized, and the Free Trade Zones targeted “Double V” (trade value + 
trade volume) (TIPC, 2016e). Following to approval of a comprehensive development plan 
for Taiwan ports in 2011, construction of new container terminals in PoK commenced.  
113 
 
Figure 4.2.5: Development Path of PoK, Source: The Author
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4.2.3.1 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s: Decades of Rapid Growth  
Taiwan’s move from an agriculture-based economy to an industrial based economy began in 
1950s. In 1962, Taiwan’s economy took-off towards industrialization (McDonnell, 1988), 
and within a period of a few decades, became one of the fastest growing economies of the 
world. Taiwan’s average double digit growth in 1970s (Copper, 2014) was supported by a 
strong small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) dominated economy, which was 
fundamentally directed towards a transition from agriculture and fishery to an export-oriented 
economy (Welle-Strand et al., 2011). In a period of 30 years (from 1950 to 1980) the number 
of factories in Taiwan increased over 11 times (McDonnell, 1988). Earlier on between 1910 
and 1940 Taiwan’s trade was dominated by Japan taking 85% of country exports and 74% of 
all imports (Hamilton, 1983). Japan’s strong influence on Taiwan’s export trade continued 
throughout 1950s and mid-1960s, mainly for agricultural products.  
By mid-1960’s Taiwan’s economy was modernized and industrialized with its trade relying 
heavily on United States and Japan. Taiwanese factories were subcontractor to Japanese 
companies (e.g. Sony, Canon, Mitsubishi, Mitsui, and Hitachi), importing components from 
Japan to re-model, assemble or process and re-export to United States and Western European 
countries (Cai, 2008). The triangular relationship between Taiwan, United States and Japan is 
labeled as the “backbone” of the speedy development of Taiwan’s economy (Hsiao and 
Hsaio, 2002). Hong Kong was another major trading partner of Taiwan during this era who 
had a large share of Taiwan’s exports after United States and Japan (Cai, 2008).  
In the path of Taiwan’s modernization in early 1970s, the government implemented a growth-
pole strategy to shape the development by spatial division of labor (Chou et al., 2015). High-
tech industries were located in the northern part of the country, and heavy industries were 
developed in the south. At the time, a national plan called “The Ten Major Construction 
Projects” was implemented by the government to upgrade and improve the key utilities of 
highways, seaports, airports, and power plants that comprised three categories with an overall 
cost of NT300 billion (Kuo, 2015). The Ten Major Construction Projects comprised:  
1. Six transportation projects: Upgrading the National highway (Keelung to Kaohsiung), 
Electrification of Western Line Railway and the North-link line, Chiang Kai-shek 
International Airport, Taichung Port, and Suao Port.  
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2. Three industrial projects: China Shipbuilding Corporation (CSBC), China Steel 
Factory (CSC) in Kaohsiung, an Oil refinery and industrial park.  
3. One nuclear power plant construction project. 
The high rate of government savings was the key component that conferred domestic 
financing for investment projects. In fact, between 1965 and 1981, Taiwan’s development 
was nearly all financed by domestic savings, which implies that Taiwan has a very high level 
of financial autonomy in shaping the growth of its economy (Welle-Strand et al. (2011).  
In the national plan, the agenda designated for Kaohsiung was based on the notion of an 
extensive shift from a traditionally agricultural area to an industrial precinct to serve as a raw 
material supplier for Taiwan’s growing industries (Chou et al., 2015). The area around the 
PoK was among the first to experience the dramatic change (Hsu and Cheng, 2002) which 
soon became an industrial cluster encompassing light and heavy manufacturing, shipbuilding, 
oil refining and petrochemicals, as well as other industries (Chien and Wu, 2010). The 
Chinese Petroleum Corporation (CPC), Chinese Steel Corporation (CSC), China Ship 
Building Corporation (CSBC), China Petrochemical Corporation and Naphtha Cracker Plants 
were a number of industrial establishments in the Kaohsiung area during the booming period 
(Chou et al., 2015) and PoK:  
“has since then functioned to reduce industrial dependency on foreign sources for 
intermediate and capital goods” (Chou et al., 2015, p.153).  
The process of PoK’s transformation into a commercial harbor area began in 1960s when 
Containerization was introduced. The continuous construction projects of container terminals 
(see Table 4.2.4) were an immediate response of policy makers to the new trend, and their 
rapid actions taken to diversify the role of port functions. In addition to the construction of 
the terminals, three major projects were implemented by the KHB to streamline the cargo 
flow and expand the seaport area. The three major ventures during this period were:  
1. Establishment of Export Processing Zones (EPZ): Setting up Export processing 
zones was initiated in 1950s as a response to the issues Taiwan was dealing with at 
the time, such as high unemployment rate, increasing population, shortage of foreign 
reserves, and the government’s financial difficulty. Establishment of Export 
Processing Zones in Taiwan was based on a strategy of reorienting existing industries 
from import substitution to export promotion, while avoiding the complex 
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bureaucratic and administrative procedures (Yuan and Eden, 1992). Amirahmadi and 
Wu (1995) referred the establishment of EPZs in Taiwan as a strategy of a custom-
free manufacturing with the assistance of foreign investment. Major gains of EPZs in 
Taiwan were from employment, foreign investments, earnings of foreign exchange, 
and increase in domestic value added exports (Amirahmadi and Wu, 1995):  
“In Taiwan’s three EPZs, local supplies of materials and equipment meet 
almost half of the needs of the industries in three EPZs, and technology 
transfer occurred largely through training of workers. In addition, the 
Kaohsiung EPZ has aided in modernization and development of its 
surrounding region” (p.835).  
The first EPZ was established in PoK in 1966, with four major goals of increasing job 
opportunities, attracting foreign investment, exploring external trade, as well 
introducing modern technology. For investors (both foreign and local), a number of 
incentives were introduced, such as exemption from duty, tax, and Value-added tax 
(VAT) for imported raw materials, semi-finished materials, equipment and machinery 
from a foreign country, imported fuel, trade promotion service fee, and harbor service 
fee. In addition, other incentives were rendered to the export industries, such as access 
to ready plant sites with water, power supply, and warehouse at a competitive cost, 
and proximity to harbor facilities (Sharma, 2003). The only constraint was that 
products manufactured in EPZs were not permitted to be sold domestically (Crook, 
2010). 
The strategy of EPZ succeeded in attracting foreign investment, earning foreign 
exchange, and creating jobs. In terms of FDI, Kaohsiung EPZ recorded an average 
annual growth rate of 49.5% in the first four years of establishment, and received 
22.9% on Taiwan’s total FDI (Schive, 1999). In 1973, annual growth rate of FDI in 
two export processing zones in Kaohsiung area (Kaohsiung EPZ and Nantze NEPZ) 
jointly recorded 64% or US $112.7 million in value (Yuan and Eden, 1992).  
With regard to foreign exchange, a regulation was enacted in 1965 for a close 
monitoring of foreign currency earnings of EPZ enterprises. The statuary also set a 
financial mechanism for firms in EPZs, regulating them to convert their earnings to 
hard currencies after settlement of local costs (e.g., wages, utility and rent fees, raw 
materials locally obtained). The method was instrumental in leaving a substantial sum 
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of foreign exchange in Taiwan. As an indication, during the period between 1966 and 
1980, total earnings of Taiwan’s three EPZ’s (Kaohsiung, Nantze, and Taichung) 
accounted for nearly 75% of the local costs (Fitting, 1982). In terms of job creation, 
the EPZs have been a significant source of industrial employment. In 1967, a year 
after the formation of Kaohsiung EPZ, 5,625 people were employed by firms in the 
EPZ (Crook, 2010). Two decades later, in 1980, the total number of direct 
employment in three EPZs in Taiwan was 81,147 people (Fitting, 1982). 
Establishment of EPZs in Taiwan was also a very favorable approach to poverty 
alleviation, as the job opportunities created contributed to improving the livelihood of 
those in the bottom income quintile (Tsai and Tsay, 2003).  
The success of the formation of the first EPZs in Kaohsiung (Kaohsiung EPZ), a 68-
hectare harbor side enclave in December 1966, which was the also first EPZ in the 
Asia-Pacific region (Crook, 2010), led to the establishment of other EPZs on the 
island, including another in the Nanzte suburb of Kaohsiung (now spelled as Nanzi 
EPZ) in 1971 (Crook, 2010). With the burgeoning activities of two EPZs in 
Kaohsiung, the role of the port as the primary gateway of Taiwan’s trade was 
enhanced (Table 4.2.4).  
Table 4.2.4: Export Processing Zones in Kaohsiung, established in 1960s and 1970s 
Export 
Processing 
Zone  
Year 
Established 
Area Type Main Features  
Kaohsiung 
(KEPZ) 
1966 72.4ha Production 
o Located at a section of the pier 
warehouse 
o Accommodating upstream and 
downstream industries, and logistics 
facilities (warehousing, transportation, 
packaging, certification, testing, etc), 
and becoming a hi-tech and high value-
added electronic industry 
manufacturing center 
Nantze EPZ 
(EPZA)  
1971 97.8ha Production 
o Located at Nanzte suburb 
o Residency of hi-tech companies and 
producers of integrated circuits 
structures, and testing process 
equipment 
Source: Adapted from investtaiwan.org (2017) 
2. Construction of the 2nd Harbor Entrance (1967-1975): Building the 2nd harbor 
entrance was a project that marked a new milestone in the PoK’s history (Figure 
4.2.6). Apart from overcoming national defense concerns on a single entrance port, 
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the 2nd entrance improved operational capabilities of the port by opening access to 
inner harbor area for larger vessels. Accessibility of larger vessels to PoK was also a 
transportation cost saver for port users, including heavy industries located adjacent to 
the port, and companies relying on Kaohsiung port for their transshipment activities. 
The project was a plan for utilizing the port land in Qijin district by constructing a 
number of deep water wharfs along the 2nd entrance to the port, to enhance PoK’s 
overall handling capacity (TaiwanToday, 1975).  
 
Figure 4.2.6: Arial View of the PoK before and after building the 2nd harbor entrance 
3. Construction of the Cross Harbor Tunnel (1981-1984): This was another 
engineering project to connect the isolated island of Qijin to the opposite bank. The 
tunnel, about 18 km long and 440m wide, is the only road transportation route from 
the port to the island (Chen et al., 2002). With a dual two-lane carriage way, each 7 
meters wide and 4.6 meters high, the tunnel was designed to serve container trucks 
(TIPC, 2016c). The construction of the tunnel was also designed to streamline cargo 
traffic plying the new container terminal on Qijin Island along the 2nd entrance of the 
port. In other words, Cross harbor tunnel contributed indirectly to capacity growth of 
the port. The tunnel project was completed prior to the construction of container 
Terminal 4 (Table 4.2.5), the largest terminal in PoK.  
Another initiative adopted by the PoK authorities for attracting cargo was leasing out 
container terminals to a number of strategically selected shipping lines for their 
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dedicated use (Chiu, 2011). This was one of business models of container terminal 
operation under which the port authority offered dedicated use of container berths and 
the affiliated facilities to container shipping companies through a long-term tenancy 
agreement (Lu and Chang, 2014). For port authorities, dedicated terminals are a means 
of reducing public investment in the ports (Haralambides et al., 2002) while 
facilitating development of integrated services, and engaging the commitment of 
shipping companies (Lun et al., 2010). On the other hand, dedicated terminals provide 
a number of benefits for shipping lines, such as higher level of flexibility, reliability, 
short turnaround times, enhancing their overall efficiency in global supply chains 
(Haralambides et al., 2002).  
Table 4.2.5: Container Terminals constructed in PoK during 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s  
Container Terminal 
Construction 
Period 
Water Depth 
(meter) 
No. of 
Wharfs 
Terminal 1 1969-1970 10.5 4 
Terminal 2 1970-1975 12 4 
Terminal 3 1976-1981 14 3 
Terminal 4 1983-1993 14 8 
Source: Compiled from TIPC (2016e) 
4.2.3.2 Late 1980s, and 1990s: Period of Transformation in Industrial Structure  
In 1987, the 38-year Martial law in Taiwan ended and a period of reform commenced. 
Recognizing the significant changes in the international trading environment, the Taiwan 
government took some measures to liberalize trade, such as easing foreign exchange controls, 
reducing limits on outwards investments, as well as cutting and reducing tariffs on imports. 
These changes were followed by a new foreign trade law passed in 1993 to facilitate 
Taiwan’s application to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) and develop Taiwan as an 
Asia-Pacific Regional Centre (APROC) (Chiu, 2007).  
Beyond the borders of Taiwan, a major change was also emerging which had a profound 
impact on both regional and global economic dynamics. This was the Chinese economic 
reforms. The first phase of those reforms was initiated in late 1970s and early 1980s, with 
introduction of policies under which China allowed FDI into the country, and expansion of 
International trade (Tung, 2005). Taiwan’s economy was experiencing a strong growth, 
reinforced by governmental developing plans which were designed to address growth related 
problems. The “Six-Year National Development Plan” was the agenda of government 
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towards modernization of Taiwan during 1991-1996, and included introduction or completion 
of about 700 projects (TaiwanInfo, 1991). Approximately one third of the plan’s expenditures 
were allocated to transportation projects covering highway development, urban 
transportation, railway and aviation development, as well as a port and harbor development 
(Shen, 1993). At the time, Taiwan had four main international seaports (Kaohsiung, Keelung, 
Taichung and Hwalieng) and the government planned to spend $1.8 billion on infrastructural 
and cargo facilities development through expansion of docks, piers, storage areas, and cargo 
handling facilities (Shen, 1993).  
Throughout 1990s both domestic and oversea economic investments of Taiwan underwent a 
rapid change. On the international level, Taiwan faced the global and regional economic 
integration in which the Asia-Pacific region was becoming increasingly important. Hence 
Taiwan’s strengthening trade links with its regional counterparts was essential. Taiwan joined 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Corporation (APEC) forum in 1991, anticipating a spillover effect 
in domestic and international politics (i.e., open regionalism) that potentially could lead to 
economic collaboration between Taiwan and its regional counterparts (Kueh, 2012, Cheng 
and Lee, 2016).  
In 1995, while political enmity between China and Taiwan started easing, the Taiwan 
government approved a plan to develop the country as an Asia-Pacific Regional Operations 
Centre (APROC), which became the most important element in the government’s policy for 
adjustment in economic structure in the 1990s. With a vision of stimulating ongoing growth, 
accumulating investment capital, and industrial upgrading, Taiwan moved to develop 
operations center on manufacturing, transportation (sea, air), financial services, 
telecommunications, and media under the APROC plan (Mai and Shi, 2001). To encourage 
private sector investment for expanding the country basic infrastructure projects, the BOT 
(buy-operate-transfer) scheme was promoted. The first phase of ARPOC (1995-1997) was 
mostly about tuning the economy as a whole by revising the legal system, and an orderly 
investment. The second phase of APROC (1997-2000) focused on responding to the situation 
of Hong Kong’s return to China, the expansion in the scale of operations in the various 
operations centers and implementation of all round economic reform (Mai and Shi, 2001).  
Hong Kong’s return to Mainland in 1997 coincided with the entrance of Mainland China as a 
formal trade partner in Taiwan (Welle-Strand et al., 2011). In response to the rising demand 
for cross-strait sea transport between two sides of the Taiwan Strait, which was suspended 
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since 1949, the Taiwanese government set up an “Offshore Shipping Center” in PoK. The 
purpose of Offshore Shipping Center was to handle transshipment cargo shipped between 
Fuzhou or Xiamen on mainland China and Kaohsiung, i.e., cargos that neither get customs 
clearance nor enter Taiwan. Otherwise, ships carrying regular cross-strait trade cargo had to 
anchor at a third place, such as Ishigaki in Japan or Hong Kong, to get customs clearance 
without unloading for transshipment before arriving at Taiwanese ports to avoid the direct 
shipping prohibition. Following the establishment of the Offshore Shipping Center, 
Kaohsiung’s transshipment services to China soared from 127,509 TEUs in 1997 to 630,337 
TEUs in 2003 (TIPC, 2004). In 2001, the Taiwanese Government amended the regulation of 
the Offshore Shipping Center, introducing the sea-air transport mode to allow cargoes 
transported by sea from China (Xiamen, or Fuzhou) to Kaohsiung Offshore Shipping Center, 
and air freighted to another third area via Kaohsiung Airport (Yang, 2010).  
The establishment of the Offshore Shipping Center removed the operating inefficiency, saved 
additional cost and time of operation, and lessened risk of detour for transporting cross-strait 
trade cargo (Yang and Chung, 2013). Despite the emergence of new ports in China (e.g., 
Shanghai and Shenzhen) in 1990s and the political disputes between China and Taiwan, 
China based cargo processed at Kaohsiung’s offshore shipping center rose from less than 8% 
between 1997 and 2004 (Chen, 2007) to 16% in 2009 (Chen, 2010). The higher rate of 
transshipment was a reflection of PoK’s ability to recapture what appears to be lost 
opportunities, despite the reduction of weekly calls at PoK between 1997 and 2002 due to 
industries relocating from Taiwan to China (Ducruet et al., 2010).  
Container terminal operation in PoK became fully privatized in 1998 (Chiu, 2007). Although 
the privatization did not improve the performance of PoK (Chiu, 2011). The other major 
change during this period was related to the dedicated terminals. Both facilities and services 
on offer for vessels in the dedicated terminals were limited to the exclusive use of shipping 
lines leasing the terminal, making it difficult for PoK to extend services to other shipping 
lines. This policy was reviewed after more than two decades (Chiu, 2011) when service 
restriction on dedicated container terminals was lifted in 1998, and shipping lines leasing the 
berths were upgraded to “terminal operators” (Chen, 2007). The change enabled PoK to 
secure new strategic business with other international shipping lines. However, during this 
period, major shipping lines began to adopt different growth strategies, and capitalizing on 
direct calls at Chinese ports was one of their key approaches. A comparison in share of slot 
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capacity deployed by main shipping lines at major ports in East Asia from 1995 to 2001 
reveals a drop of direct calls at PoK (Yap et al., 2006), leading to loss of traffic. PoK, 
however managed to benefit from loyalty of the Taiwanese shipping lines (e.g., Evergreen 
Marine Corporation, Yang Ming Marine Transport and Wan Hai Lines) that hold the status of 
terminal operators, and maintaining dedicated wharves in the port (TIPC, 2016d).  
Both the removal of service restriction on dedicated container terminal and the establishment 
of the Offshore Shipping Center resulted in a sharp rise in transshipment cargos at PoK, from 
2.18 million TEUs (43% of total throughput) in 1995 (Chien-Chang et al., 2003), to over 4.12 
million TEUs (55% of total throughput) in 2001 (Yap et al., 2006).  
In the national level, Taiwan was also in the process of liberalizing its maritime market. The 
main deregulation measures that took place between 1995 and 1999 were: 1) allowing foreign 
companies to establish a local firm handling warehousing and storage services, trucking, 
shipping agency, and freight forwarding activities, and 2) allowing foreign shipping 
companies to set up a branch in Taiwan (Chiu, 2007).  
Furthermore, 1990s was a period that Taiwan’s economy went through a major 
transformation. Manufacturing was gradually shifting from high-volume and low-value goods 
to low-volume and high-value products (Gereffi, 2001, Liu and Shih, 2013). The industrial 
transformation from capital-intensive to technology-intensive industries with particular 
emphasis in the EPZs had, to a certain extent, affected the volume of container traffic handled 
by PoK. Moreover, a number of changes in regulations of EPZ were made, impacting the 
non-transshipment cargo at PoK. Up till 1986, all goods manufactured within the EPZs were 
required to be exported. The relaxation of this rule in 1987 allowing domestic sale of up to 
50% of EPZ productions, and its eventual removal in 1997 (Crook, 2010) also had an impact 
on the volume of container traffic going through PoK, with the volume of non-transshipment 
cargo dropping by 0.3% between 1997 (3,187,294 TEUs) and 1998 (3,178,618 TEUs) 
(Chien-Chang et al., 2003).  
Nonetheless, the trend of establishing EPZs remained strong in Kaohsiung area. A new EPZ 
called Linguang (LEPZ) was launched in 1999 that mainly focused on production of mid-to-
high end key electronics components. In an area of 9 hectares with a close proximity to 
international airport, seaport and national highway, LEPZ was designed to cater to electronic 
industries, such as LCD, backlight modules, fibre optics, IC designs, and heat dissipator.  
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4.2.3.3 Throughout the 2000s: Era of Global Deployment  
In the early years of the new millennium, the Taiwan government introduced a number of 
fresh policies relevant to hub port development. These included the 2002 Global Logistics 
Development Plan (GLP), and the National Development plan called Challenge 2008, the 
2003 Free Trade Zone Plan (FTZP), and the 2009 i-Taiwan 12 projects. The main agenda of 
these plans were to further develop Taiwan as regional operations headquarter for Taiwanese 
manufactures and businesses, through infrastructural development as well as institutional 
revamp. A summary of the national implemented polices in 2000s is presented in Table 4.2.6, 
which highlights the key components related to development of PoK.  
Table 4.2.6: National Implemented Policies related to Development of PoK in 2000s 
Plan  Period Key Plans  
Global Logistics 
Development Plan 
(GLP) 
2002 
 Establishment of Free ports, and  
 accelerating development in PoK and Kaohsiung Air cargo 
park  
Challenge 2008  2002-2007 
 Developing Kaohsiung Harbor Intercontinental Container 
Center 
Free Trade Zone 
Plan (FTZP) 
2003  Introduction of Free Trade Zone in PoK 
i-Taiwan Projects  2009 - 2016 
 Construction of Intercontinental Container Terminal 
 Construction of a harbor eco-park and establishment of marine 
technology and culture center 
 Redevelopment of Qijin area into an-international-class 
marine amusement area 
 Transformation of old harbor districts 
 Expansion of warehousing and logistics facilities at 
Kaohsiung International Airport, and improvement of 
peripheral transportation 
Source: Compiled from PoK (2002), NDC (2004), TIPC (2004) and ITSC (2016) 
At the core of the Global Logistics Development Plan (GLP) was the promotion of 
Taiwanese ports as free ports. The GLP aimed to enable Taiwanese ports to operate through a 
single-window administration, and facilitate free flow of goods within free ports. For 
companies operating in the free ports, the plan offered advantages, such as autonomous 
management, and free commercial activities (TIPC, 2004). Wang and Kuo (2012) described 
Free port as a strategy to expand the volume of re-export trade by generating profit from the 
trade service fees to increase income in foreign currencies. For Kaohsiung, this was another 
approach to augment the previous plans of “Export Free Zones” and “Offshore shipping 
centers”, as the free port plan was expected to improve benefits from integration with 
neighboring businesses and create a multiplier effect (TIPC, 2004).  
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The Free Port plan paved the path for PoK to launch a Free Trade Zone in the port area in 
2004. The free zone plan was essentially a program of coping with the intense regional 
competition by deregulating prevailing operating procedures for transshipment, re-export, 
and utilizing capacities of seaports and airports. The plan was based on the notion of value 
creation for enterprises in the free zone, through their integration with supply chains, and 
convenience of proximity to seaports and airports. Evolution of PoK into free trade zone is 
described by Taiwan’s transport minister (SCMP, 2014):  
"Value is more important than quantity. If we can sustain the No 13 ranking, that's 
good enough." 
The key principal was to enable PoK to operate “within national territory but outside customs 
territory”, as a means of liberalizing trade as well as facilitating free flows of human 
resources, commodities, finance and technologies within the free trade zones (TIPC, 2016b). 
A few years after launching the Free Trade Zones in Taiwan, the overall economic effects of 
Free Trade Zones was evaluated by Yang (2009) who observed that:  
“FTZs in Taiwan have yielded economic benefits that include attraction of foreign 
investment, increased foreign exchange earnings, job creation, promotion of 
technology transfer, enhancement of local industrial growth, increased port 
operating revenue, and encouragement of cargo consolidation and transshipment 
businesses” (p.286).  
PoK introduced the Free Trade Zone in anticipation of upgrading the port from an Asian 
transshipment center to a “Logistics and Distribution” center in 2004 (TIPC, 2016f). The Free 
Trade Zone offers opportunities for its tenants to perform various type of trade services, such 
as transshipment, distribution, reassembly, consolidation of containers, as well as simple and 
in-depth processing (Yang, 2009). Incentives offered to the Free Trade Zone’s tenants 
included exemption from custom duty, tax and service fees for goods, machinery and 
equipment transported from overseas for their operations, and zero tax rate on goods sold to 
an occupant enterprise for its business operation by a business entity in a tax zone or bounded 
area (Yang, 2009).  
Another plan in the national level that was instrumental in the evolvement of PoK was 
“Challenge 2008”. It was a six-year national development plan (2002-2007), setting up three 
categories of reform, based on the concept that Taiwan’s economic growth can no longer be 
dependent on contract manufacturing and low-value added processing (NDC, 2004). 
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Challenge 2008 comprised ten key individual plans, which included building a deep water 
harbor in PoK with a storage capacity of 15,000 TEUs. Construction of this terminal 
commenced in 2007.  
The last blueprint for Taiwan’s infrastructural development for the decade was “i-Taiwan”, 
which consists of 12 public construction projects. Kaohsiung Free Trade and Ecology Harbor 
were among the 12 infrastructural plans, which projected continuous construction at 
Intercontinental Container Terminal, creation of a harbor eco-park in the port area, renovation 
of old harbor areas, and expansion plan for warehouse and logistics zones of the Kaohsiung 
international Airport (ITSC, 2016).  
From 2000 to 2009, while the governmental plans were focused on large scale developments, 
a number of other ventures took place in the PoK area such as:  
1. Completion of Container Terminal 5, with 8 deep water wharfs and a total storage 
capacity of 49,000 TEU 
2. Provision of a faster and more secure service for shipping companies by completion 
of Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) and Vessel Traffic Centre (VTC), the online global 
guide systems to the vessel traffic services in ports.  
3. Obtaining ISO-14001 quality certification.  
4. Enactment of ISPS code to improve port and vessel security against terrorist threats.  
In the Kaohsiung city area, two new EPZs were also established: ChengKung Logistics Park 
(CLP) and Kaohsiung Software based Technology Park (KSTP), which had a rather diverse 
functionality compared to those established decades ago. The export free zones formed 
previously were production oriented, whereas the two new zones were logistics and software 
centered, and in alignment with the government’s development strategy, as well as Taiwan’s 
industrial focus (see Figure 4.2.7). Combination of the port and related operation centers 
formed an industrial cluster in the Kaohsiung area.  
126 
Table 4.2.7: Export Processing Zones in Kaohsiung area, established in 2000s 
Export 
Processing 
Zone  
Est Area Type Key Features  
Chengkung 
Logistics Park 
(CLP) 
2002 8.4ha Logistics  
 One of the biggest logistics centers in 
south-eastern Asia, offering an 
automated warehouse.  
 Beside warehousing, processing goods 
and transshipment, air cargo 
forwarding, and international express 
mail services are provided. 
 Facilities for International convention, 
exhibition and business services are 
offered in this logistics zone.  
Kaohsiung 
Software 
Industrial 
Park (KSIP) 
2008 7.9ha 
Software 
-base 
 A newly developed technology park 
located in downtown Kaohsiung, with 
a focus on ICT software, digital 
contents and research and design.  
Nantze  
2nd EPZ 
2012 8.5ha Production 
 Supporting the current industry chain 
of semi-conductors and electronic 
components 
Source: Adapted from investtaiwan.org (2017)  
In 2010, PoK was the world’s 12th largest container port and Taiwan’s largest international 
commercial harbor. With the exit from the league of top 10 seaports, it became apparent that 
Kaohsiung could no longer rely on the strengths of its “convenient” location. In line with the 
national economic growth agenda, in 2011, a new port plan was approved by the Council for 
Economic Planning and Development (CEPD), which considered Taiwan’s 7 international 
ports as a strategic whole (Wang, 2012). This new port plan, regarded as a comprehensive 
blueprint (Wang, 2012), has two main objectives: 1) ongoing development of Taiwan into a 
competitive hub for Asia Pacific shipping, and 2) promotion of tourism and development of 
cruise ship. For Kaohsiung, the plan was directed towards making the port:  
1. container transhipment hub port;  
2. comprehensive value-added logistics port;  
3. import and export centre for major energy, heavy industry and petrifaction 
materials and a logistics centre for petroleum products; and  
4. international tourism and commercial service port” (TIPC, 2016f).  
Based on the above agenda, the PoK authority decided on a set of developments under a 
scheme called “Port of Kaohsiung 2040 Master Plan” to address the main aspects of 1) land 
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development, 2) modification of port and water area facilities, 3) accessibility improvement 
(both berths, and hinterlands), 4) improvement of inner port connectivity and transportation 
network, and 5) port sustainability (TIPC, 2016f). Based on the mentioned objectives, the key 
components of the Master Plan comprised: 1) reconstruction projects on breakwater, wharf 
and warehouse facilities, 2) land development, 3) public utilities, 4) extension of the 
International Container Terminal – Phase II. 
At the local level, in addition to the physical expansion for accommodating larger vessels and 
increasing port capacity, PoK authorities lowered the port tariffs, as well as reorganizing its 
bureaucratic procedures for cargo processing (PoK, 2013, KaoPort, 2013). At the national 
level, an agreement with China was reached in 2008, lifting the cross-strait ban, which 
suspended trade between two sides of the Taiwan Strait since 1949 (Yang and Chung, 2013). 
This was one of the most instrumental approaches for achieving economies of scale through 
direct shipping to and from China. The dynamics of cross-strait economic relations and the 
impact on shipping routes is elaborated further below. 
4.2.4 Cross-Strait Economic Relations  
China and Taiwan relations have been geopolitically characterized by limited contact, 
tensions and instability (Welle-Strand et al., 2011). The rise of cross-strait investment, and 
trading between Taiwan and China began in 2001, when both countries joined the WTO and 
underwent substantial economic liberalization. The annual cross-strait trade had a dramatic 
boost from $10 billion in year 2000 to $90 billion in 2007 (Rosier et al., 2016), and over $121 
billion by 2012 (Meltzer, 2014). Since 2003 China became the largest export market, and 
number one trading partner of Taiwan, and the leading source of FDI in Taiwan. By end 
2015, the inward FDI from China in Taiwan was $4,172 billion compared to $132.77 billion 
from other countries, with major investments of China in real-estate, insurance and finance 
sector, and in the electronic parts, computers, optical products as well as retail trade (Chow, 
2016). 
The intensity of economic relationship raised concerns for Taiwan, firstly its overdependence 
on China, and secondly the vulnerability of Taiwan’s local industries with the emergence of 
China’s “red supply chain”, which refers to the gradual penetration of firms from Mainland 
China into the global supply chain during the last 20 years. In 2013, Financial Times 
(Mishkin, 2013) highlighted that apart from Taiwanese firms, the Chinese “red supply chain” 
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has become a major threat to existing Japanese and Korean businesses. For Taiwan, 
electronics firms are the hallmark of its economy, contributing to 40% of exports and 15% of 
its GDP (Economist, 2016). At the core of the industry is the semiconductor sector, a global 
market leader that used to be the main source of supply for China. However, during the last 
few years China manufacturers started reducing their order quantities from Taiwanese firms, 
as they began to rely on local China-based suppliers (Rosier et al., 2016). Consequently, 
Taiwan recorded a major decline in semiconductor exports to China.  
In terms of direct shipping links, the cross strait relationship was disrupted since 1949 due to 
political enmity between Taiwan and China. China’s denial of legitimacy of Taiwan 
government was the core of the conflict, which prevented the two countries from negotiating 
on equal basis (Chang and Chen, 2008). With the return of Hong Kong to China’s 
sovereignty in 1997, and entitlement of Hong Kong to retain a dual status called “one 
country, two systems”, the direct navigation became operative on a trial basis between the 
offshore shipping center of PoK and the Chinese ports of Xiamen and Fuzhou for 
transshipment cargos. Hong Kong’s dual status created an opportunity for China and Taiwan 
to interpret the concept of direct navigation in two different ways (Figure 4.2.7):  
 China’s perspective: Navigation from Shanghai, Xiamen, Kaohsiung, Hong Kong, 
Kaohsiung, Xiamen, Shanghai was considered a “domestic route”.  
 Taiwan’s perspective: Shipping routes of Kaohsiung’s off-shore shipping center were 
Xiamen, Kaohsiung, Hong Kong, Kaohsiung, Okinawa, Shanghai, Xiamen was called 
“Xiamen-Kaohsiung special route”.  
Though the traffic volume between China and Taiwan was deemed insignificant compared to 
the total throughput of PoK, the 2nd phase of cross-strait relationship, called “Mini three 
links”, began in year 2000 with direct links between port of Kinmen in Taiwan and Xiamen 
in China, as well as Matsu in Taiwan and Fuzhou in China (Chiu, 2013).  
The 3rd phase was in 2008, when China and Taiwan signed an official agreement and direct 
cross-strait shipping links were formally launched. The treaty however created new 
challenges for Taiwan ports, rather than helped boost its throughput (Chiu and Yen, 2015). 
Initially the Taiwanese authorities were keen on a direct shipping link with China based on 
perception of acquiring economic benefits, such as finding a new market for agricultural 
products (vegetables, fruits, and flowers), saving time and cost of transport, while 
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augmenting logistics efficiency (Chiu, 2013). However, Taiwan’s reliance on the direct 
shipping treaty impeded other plans for increasing its ports throughputs. Besides, the direct 
shipping link poised a number of potential challenges for Taiwan seaports, such as possible 
(non-commercial) interventions, un-favorable occurrences for Taiwanese shipping liners 
operating in direct-sailing markets, and intense competition between China and Taiwan ports 
(Chiu and Lin, 2013). 
Since 2008, it has become possible to travel directly across the strait, although access is 
limited to Chinese and Taiwanese carriers and ships with Chinese (including Hong Kong) or 
Taiwanese registry, and foreign carriers have no access to transshipment containers from 
China. Because of diminishing cargo sources from Taiwanese ports and a lack of subsidiary 
incentives, large international container carriers have reduced their callings at Taiwanese 
ports (Su et al., 2016). 
  
Figure 4.2.7: Shipping Routes of PoK Offshore Shipping Center  
Source: (Chang and Chen, 2008, p.510)  
4.2.5 Strategic Developmental Path 
Taiwan’s economy has gone through major transformation in 1960s, when the island 
emerged as a world leader in manufacturing, and created the “Taiwan Miracle” 
(KaohsiungCity, 2017). Since 1960s the process of economic reorganization had been 
continuous, though a diverse range of development strategies were implemented throughout 
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the subsequent decades (Figure 4.2.8). These strategies guided the industrial focus by shifting 
production from labor intensive to capital intensive, and later towards technology intensive 
industries.  
The two most significant areas for Taiwan’s industrial development are establishment of 
EPZs and Industrial Parks (Wu and Huang, 2003). Predominantly EPZs were developed to 
promote the influx of FDI and became the contributory factor to 1) increase foreign exchange 
earnings by exporting new products and finding markets, 2) create jobs, raise the standard of 
living, and upgrade the local human resource skills, 3) transmit new technology by training 
local people, and 4) generate linkages with the hinterland (Ota, 2003). Even half a century 
after the establishment of Taiwan’s first EPZ, their advantages still remain relevant for 
manufacturers. As stated by a senior manager of a company located at KEPZ, benefits such 
as lower management and rental fees, proximity to major customers and supply chains, and a 
convenient location for R&D are their main reasons for setting up facilities in EPZ (Crook, 
2010). Convenience of the location is confirmed by another manager, saying “In terms of 
logistics, we’re only about 15 minutes from the airport and the harbor is right here” (Crook, 
2010).  
In line with the national development schemes, Taiwan’s EPZs also progressed over five 
main phases (Imin, 2012);  
1. 1966 - 1976: Rapid growth of manufacturing industries, mainly consumer electronics 
products, garments and apparel. 
2. 1977 - 1986: Manufacturing activities upgraded to high level consumer electronics 
and components. The volume of garment and apparel production decreased. 
3. 1987 - 1996: Products manufactured in the EPZs, which were not permitted to be sold 
domestically since the introduction of EPZs, were allowed for domestic sales. More 
than 75% of the total production consisted of electronics components. 
4. 1997 - 2004: More than 80% of products were mid-to-high end key electronics 
components (e.g., LCD, IC and optical). 
5. 2005 onwards: Increased focus on high added-value industries (e.g., LCD, IC, optical 
and digital contents). 
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Figure 4.2.8: Taiwan’s Industrial Transformation 
Source: Compiled from (EPZA, 2012, IDB, 2016)  
As the largest seaport in Taiwan, PoK’s development has followed the path of the national 
export-oriented industrialization programs. The competitive position of PoK can be 
interpreted from its development path in three areas:  
1. External Alignment: In 1960s and 1970s, PoK, a publicly-owned entity and a core 
element of Taiwan’s transport infrastructure, operated as a distribution center for 
domestic demand and production (Haynes et al., 1997). PoK’s rapid growth was 
powered by two factors, the economic growth in Taiwan, and very limited alternatives 
in the country. In late 1980s and 1990s, PoK began to transform into a transshipment 
hub. This was due to the rising production cost in Taiwan which forced local 
manufacturers in Taiwan to re-position their production plants to low-cost 
neighboring countries. Since seaport facilities in those countries (e.g., China, 
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Philippines) were not capable of handling the 
mounting flow of goods (Chien-Chang et al., 2003), PoK evolved to become a 
regional transshipment hub. A comparison in share of transshipment cargoes of the 
total throughput in PoK in 1983 (17%) and 15 years later in 1998 (49%) (Chou, 2010) 
reveals the transformation of PoK. Since 2000s, maintaining the position of a regional 
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transshipment hub had been a primary focus for PoK. However, development of 
China ports had a major impact on PoK’s throughput, and its transshipment hub 
status. PoK upgraded its position to a regional logistics and distribution center by 
introducing a Free Trade Zone in the port area. With this strategy, PoK moved 
towards becoming a multi-functions port, offering various types of trade activities, 
such as transshipment, distribution, and reassembly, consolidation of containers, as 
well as simple and in-depth processing.  
2. Industrial Transformation: PoK served the export driven local industries, which 
had a boost with introduction of EPZs in late 1960s and 1970s. The port throughput 
contained raw material imports, and product exports from high growth sectors, such 
as textile, electromechanical, electric appliances, plastics, and machinery. With the 
emergence of high tech industries in 1980s and 1990s, the nature and volume of 
goods moving through PoK began to change from low-value, high-volume to low-
volume, high-value products. This trend has been sustained since early 2000s with 
Taiwan local industries concentrating on knowledge, technology, and innovation 
intensive industries, such as IC products, LCD modules, and Optoelectronics parts.  
3. Hinterlands to Forelands: As PoK is located on an island, with no landlocked 
countries, its initial hinterland-based activities in 1960s and 1970s were reliant on 
local industries. With the expansion of transshipment trade during 1980s and 1990s, 
PoK moved towards foreland-based activities. In early 2000s supply chain 
integrations with China initiated by FDIs (Meltzer, 2014), and the direct trade with 
China, underpinned the movement of goods in PoK, and reinstated PoK’s position as 
a foreland-based regional hub. This position is anticipated to remain for a longer 
period, given the high level of economic integration with China and the importance of 
Taiwanese shipping companies (e.g., Evergreen, Wan Hai, and Yang Ming) to the 
local economy (Rodrigue and Notteboom, 2010).  
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4.3 Port of Rotterdam 
Located at the northern part of Europe, with a hinterland population of 350 to 450 million 
people (Figure 4.3.1) (OECD, 2010), Rotterdam has been one of the busiest seaports in the 
world since 1960’s. It has held its position as one of the top 10 container ports in the world 
since 1989, though its ranking has been on the decline in general.  
 
Figure 4.3.1: Port of Rotterdam in relation to the European Market Population 
Source: OECD (2010) 
The beginning of Port of Rotterdam (PoR) can be traced as far back as mid 1300’s, when its 
primary economic activities were based largely on fisheries and cargo handling. Location and 
political circumstances (e.g., establishment of an admiralty, and chambers of governmentally 
owned trading companies such as Dutch East Indies, and West Indies, and Merchant 
Adventurers) favored Rotterdam to flourish through trade with other European countries and 
even America. While the PoR experienced significant growth between 1850 and 1940, major 
development occurred after World War II, anchored by a reconstruction plan designed to 
develop a bigger and deeper port in Rotterdam to act as a gateway to Europe. Figure 4.3.2, 
depicts the phases of development in the PoR, showing that the port has been expanding 
steadily westward since the early 1900s. 
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Figure 4.3.2: Historical Development of PoR 
Source: (PoR, 2016a) 
Since the 1960’s development of PoR has been associated with rapid economic growth in the 
Netherlands. Subsequent to the economic growth, major ventures of oil refining, chemicals, 
and distribution were positioned around PoR. Accumulation of industries generated a unique 
position for the port and raised its importance to the economy of the Netherlands (Schulze, 
2014).  
At the national level the PoR has a substantial strategic value for the competitiveness of the 
Netherlands, by contributing to the direct and indirect value added, as well as direct and 
indirect employment (Van den Bosch et al., 2011). In 2013, the direct added value of Dutch 
seaports to the Dutch economy (see Table 4.3.1) was estimated as €22.2 billion (Netherlands, 
2015), out of which more than half (€12.4 billion) was generated by the port area of 
Rotterdam (Rotterdam-Rijnmond region) (PoR, 2016c). In terms of direct employment, 
Rotterdam region also contribute to 55% of overall Dutch seaports employment. A 
comparison of the added value and employment figures of PoR, with the 2nd largest port in 
the Netherlands, Amsterdam, reveals a considerable gap between scales of operation in two 
ports, which signifies the position of PoR at the national level. Moreover, a sizable difference 
between container throughputs of PoR (12.23 million TEUs) and Amsterdam (51,634 TEUs) 
in 2015, demonstrates a monopoly of the PoR in the Dutch container port system, and 
reflecting its operational advancement.  
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Table 4.3.1: Economic Value of the PoR (2013) 
Economic Values  
Port of 
Rotterdam  
Port of 
Amsterdam  
Dutch 
Seaports  
Direct added value (in million Euro) 12,498 3,610 22,242 
Indirect added value (in million Euro)  7,269 NA 14,798 
Direct employment (people) 93,759 33,949 170,489 
Indirect employment (people)  53,014 32,865 155,336 
Source: Compiled from (PoR, 2016c, PortofAmsterdam, 2016b, Netherlands, 2015) 
During the last few decades, the focus of PoR authority gradually shifted from a traditional 
port operation of loading and unloading towards formation of a port complex that consists of 
all activities related to the handling of ships and cargo, and comprises companies active in 
transport, stevedoring, logistics, trade and manufacturing. Amongst all activities, stevedoring 
is the core, which forms a geographical linkage to all port related activities. Apart from the 
logistics, transport and stevedoring activities, there are manufacturing and trading companies 
in the port cluster that are dependent on deep water and either produce or trade goods that are 
maritime related. Many business entities in the PoR are part of various international groups of 
companies. The presence of global players in the port cluster is an indication of superior 
seaport conditions on offer, in addition to availability of value added operations, and strong 
distribution networks. While the port authority acts on behalf of all port stakeholders, as a 
cluster manager, it also binds firms and cargoes. These qualities can be considered a major 
strength and a fundamental element in achieving competitiveness (De Langen, 2004b). Table 
4.3.2 illustrates a number of global players based on their ranking in the Fortune Global 500 
that are located in the PoR.  
Table 4.3.2: Leader Firms located in the PoR – Fortune Global 500 
Industry  Company  Rank 
Container Terminal Operators & 
Shipping 
APM Rotterdam - Maersk Group  208 
Chemical & Petrochemical  
Shell 3 
Exxon Mobil 5 
British Petroleum (BP)  6 
Energy  E.ON 22 
Manufacturing  
General Electric (GE) 24 
Thyssen Krupp 179 
Source: (FORTUNE500, 2016)   
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4.3.1 Global and Regional Competitiveness 
As the largest container port in Europe, PoR’s traffic has grown steadily since 1990s when it 
was ranked among the top 5 container ports in world (Figure 4.3.3). The rate of growth 
surged in early 2000s and has been sustained since, except for 2009, the year of the Global 
Financial Crisis. In 2015, over 12,200,000 TEUs were handled by PoR. With a capacity of 
about 17,250,000 million TEUs the average rate of utilization has been 71 per cent of late 
(Table 4.3.3). Developing the capability to handle such a large volume of traffic requires 
strategic long-term planning. With regards to container traffic in specific, PoR has witnessed 
a series of innovations and developments (Gijt et al., 2010), e.g., operating automated guided 
vehicles (AGV), and introducing the first automated terminals, which propelled this port to 
become the largest container hub port in Europe, ranking among the top 10 ports on the 
global scale. 
 
Figure 4.3.3: PoR Container Throughput (TEU), and Global Ranking (1990 – 2015) 
Source: Compiled from (Rodrigue, 2010, JOC, 2012, WSC, 2017) 
Within the region, PoR competes with a number ports located along a stretch of 850 
kilometers in North-West Europe called the ‘Hamburg – Le Havre’ range (Figure 4.3.4). The 
seaports within the Hamburg – Le Havre range collectively handle about half of the total 
European container throughput. In addition to PoR, there are four large load centers in the 
range that jointly control about 90% of the total range throughput (Table 4.3.4). 
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Figure 4.3.4: North Europe Seaport Ranges 
Source: (Notteboom et al., 2014, p.25)  
Within the Hamburg- Le Havre range, the two main rivals of the PoR have been Port of 
Antwerp (PoA) in Belgium, and Port of Hamburg (PoH) in Germany since 1980s. The market 
shares of container traffic of these three ports in the Hamburg – Le Havre range has risen 
from 59% in 1970 to almost 74% by 2010 (see Table 4.3.4). Beside an overall stronger 
presence of the trio, the statistics also reveal a reduced share for PoR, which appears to be 
captured by PoA. 
Table 4.3.3: Specifications of Container Terminals in PoR and their Overall Utilization Rate, 2015 
Container Terminal 
Quay 
Length 
(Meter) 
Water 
Depth 
(Meter) 
Total Area 
(Hectare) 
Capacity 
(TEUs) 
Capacity 
(TEUs) 
2015 
Annual 
Throughput 
(TEU) 
2015 
Utilization 
Rate 
(2015) 
Waalhaven 
300 6.5 10.1 200,000 
17,250,000 12,235,000 71% 
Botlek Terminal 
Short Sea Terminals 1800 11.65 46 1,440,000 
Uniport Multipurpose 
Terminals 
2400 11 to 14.5 54 1,200,000 
Barge Center Waalhaven  225 9.65 6.4 200,000 
ECT Delta Terminal 3600 16.65 272 
7,500,000 
Euromax Terminal 1500 16.8 84 
APM Terminals  1600 16.65 100 3,350,000 
Rotterdam Container 
Terminal 
400 10 17 500,000 
Delta Container Services  1500 
16.65 to 
19.65 
84 150,000 
Rotterdam World Gateway 
MV2 
(Total Capacity 4 Million 
TEU) 
1700 20 108 2,350,000 
APM Terminal, MV2 
(Capacity 4.5 Million TEU) 
1500 20 86 2,700,000 
Source: Compiled from (PoR, 2014b, RWG, 2014, APM, 2014, ECT, 2014) 
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In PoR, containerized traffic was prompted in late 1960s predominantly by trans-Atlantic 
liner services, and handling American cargo that comprised about 40% of total throughput. 
Fremont and Soppe (2008) described the position of PoR during 1970s and 1980s “the 
dominant player of Northern Europe”(p.113), a position that was sustained to a certain extent 
throughout 1990s. While PoR was benefiting from the excellent nautical access, PoA and 
PoH were gaining advantages from their inland location and proximity to the European 
market, leading to a drop in PoR’s market share by late 1990s. The volume of American 
cargo dramatically declined to the rate of 18% of PoR’s total throughput, and the Asian trade 
gradually took over. In 1999 PoR recorded handling nearly 40% of the Asian trade in the 
Hamburg – Le Havre range. During the same period, PoA and PoH experienced a continual 
growth of container traffic that progressively shaved off PoR’s container market share 
(Fremont and Soppe, 2008). The shift of the market shares in Hamburg – Le Havre range 
denotes that shipping lines and shippers were no longer dependent on services provided by a 
single port.  
Table 4.3.4: Big Five’s share of Container Traffic in Hamburg – Le Havre Range (1970-2010) 
  1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Rotterdam 33.7% 37.0% 37.4% 31.2% 30.0% 
Antwerp  17.5% 14.1% 15.8% 20.3% 22.7% 
Hamburg  7.6% 15.3% 20.1% 21.1% 21.2% 
Bremen  18.2% 13.7% 11.9% 13.5% 13.0% 
Le Havre  10% 9.9% 8.8% 7.3% 6.3% 
Total 87.0% 90.0% 94.0% 93.4% 93.2% 
Source: Compiled from (Notteboom, 2003, De Langen et al., 2012) 
Competitiveness of the “big five” seaports within the range is associated with their 
capabilities in dealing with container flows to the proximate and distant hinterland regions 
(Notteboom, 2007). A distribution of containerized cargo for the main seaports in the 
Hamburg – Le Havre range based on their locational hinterlands (Figure 4.3.5) shows that 
PoH’s throughput had been relying largely on German’s cargo and its strong manufacturing 
base (Notteboom, 2010). Besides, PoH’s geographical condition (draft of 14.5 meter) does 
not allow the port to accommodate the Ultra Large Vessels, thus limiting PoH’s role as a hub 
port.  
The situation of PoR and PoA are rather diverse. They not only served as distribution hubs 
and logistics centers within their borders but throughout Europe. PoR is blessed with a 
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location on deep waters and unrestricted nautical accessibility. PoA’s situation as a river port 
was less optimal till late 1990s compared with PoR. However, two major dredging projects in 
late 1990s, and in 2013 enhanced the capability of the PoA in handling larger sized ships (i.e., 
larger than 13,000 TEU) (PoA, 2013). PoR and PoA have been jointly serving European 
Distribution Centers which are mostly concentrated along the border of Belgium and the 
Netherlands. Consequent to the common region in their hinterland, PoR and PoA are 
considered as one port complex (Van Klink, 2003). Because of their functional interactions 
PoR and PoA do form a port cluster, serving the same logistics pole that is formed by 
logistics zones in the common hinterland (Notteboom, 2003).  
 
Figure 4.3.5: Hinterland Distribution of Containerized Cargo in Hamburg-Le Havre range  
Source: (Notteboom, 2010, p.576) 
By late 1980s, the competitive environment of ‘Hamburg – Le Havre’ range was transformed 
by a number of events in Europe. The collapse of Soviet Union in 1989, followed by the 
reunification of Germany in 1990, resulted in the opening of eastern and central Europe as 
new hinterlands for the seaport of the ‘Hamburg – Le Havre’ range (Thorez and Joly, 2006). 
In 1998, Kreukels and Wever (1998) counted a number of factors that influence competition 
in the ‘Hamburg – Le Havre’ range in the container sector: 1) productivity and costs in the 
various seaports, 2) International (main roads) bottlenecks, 3) limited capacity of the rail 
system, and 4) increasing number of restrictions, imposed by society on the transport sector, 
mainly of an environmental nature (e.g., noise, contamination).  
By late 1990s and early 2000s, the phenomenon of “globalization” occurred, changing the 
economic landscape of Europe. Consequently, flow of materials and goods were drastically 
increased through liberation of trade and finance, while advancements in information 
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technologies facilitated management of the constantly growing cargo volumes. The three 
major ports of Antwerp, Hamburg, and Rotterdam reacted to the changing market 
environment by looking for closer links to customers and inland distribution centers 
(Notteboom, 2008).  
Unification of Europe in early 2000’s led to disappearance of trade barriers and the opening 
of borders in Europe. Competition extended in the ‘Hamburg – Le Havre’ range to the 
‘Mediterranean’ range and territories served by five main seaports were further broadened to 
the non-EU members. The face of competition of ports in the Hamburg – Le Havre range was 
altered in a broader manner due to several other factors (Notteboom, 2003): 
1. Stronger presence of UK ports in handling transshipment cargos destined for the UK, 
Ireland, the Baltic and Southern Europe. 
2. Evolvement of Mediterranean Ports as transshipment hubs, due to changes in shipping 
lines networks. Further investments in Mediterranean hubs, had led to quality 
improvements.  
3. Developments of ports in proximity (e.g., Zeebrugge, Amsterdam, and Flushing)  
Development of ports in Hamburg – Le Havre range had not been built upon a single 
strategy. As stated by Thorez and Joly (2006) some ports have focused on specialization, 
while others were leaning more towards diversification. Some exemplary approaches are 
establishment of automated container terminals (PoR, PoH), introduction of storage and 
warehousing facilities as a compliment to fast transit (PoR, PoA), and developing and 
maintaining the distribution function by creating new container terminals (PoH, PoR, and 
PoA) (Thorez and Joly, 2006). Since the strategic plans of ports are essentially formulated by 
the port authorities, gaining an understanding on the port organization structure is the primary 
step to appreciate the developmental strategies that are designed and implemented.  
4.3.2 Port of Rotterdam Authority  
PoR authority is an unlisted public limited company with two shareholders: Municipality of 
Rotterdam (approx. 70%) and the Dutch government (approx. 30%). The core tasks of the 
PoR Authority are 1) enhancing sustainable development, management and operation of the 
port, maintaining safe and smooth handling of all cargoes, 2) ensuring that the port could be 
managed and operated in a professional manner – not necessarily the cheapest, but the best in 
reliability, service quality and competitiveness (PoR, 2017a).  
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The annual turnover of PoR authority reported for the financial year 2015 is €676 million 
(PoR, 2016e) which includes revenues on investments in public infrastructure (such as new 
port sites, quay walls, jetties, and road), traffic management systems, patrol vessels, and 
emergency controls, while the key revenue streams are:  
1. Rental income of port land to firms, including storage and transshipment companies, 
petrochemical and chemical industries, and energy producers. 
2. Port dues charged to vessels using the port facilities. 
PoR authority is not the owner of the land portfolio nor a trustee of it, but is a master tenant 
leasing the approximately 10,000 hectares of land from the Municipality of Rotterdam. As a 
landlord, PoR authority retains the autonomy of deciding how it allocates port land and deals 
with contract, while stimulates intra-port competition (Verhoeven, 2015).  
During 1995- 2005, the institutional position of PoR authority governance structure went 
through a major change, from a municipal department, called Rotterdam Municipal Port 
Management (RMPM), to a public corporation (De Langen and Van der Lugt, 2006). Two 
main motives prompted the restructure. The first was linked to increasing port competition 
and changes in the global economy during the mid-1990s (Ng and Liu, 2014). At that period 
PoR was experiencing a negative growth in traffic, particularly in the container sector. 
Privatization of the terminal operations could have been a short-term solution to boost the 
business. However, to sustain competitive advantage, PoR could not rely on private terminal 
operators handling tasks, such as planning and executing investment projects, commercial 
functions of the port, and enhancing port’s reputation (Ng and Liu, 2014). Those tasks were 
to be undertaken by RMPM, though functionality of the port authority was mainly on 
traditional landlord functions and less on commercial activities.  
Second, due to the integration of Europe the relationship between the PoR and national 
government was changed. Gradually the process of making decisions for the port became a 
challenge due to various effects of the European integration, which was derived by both the 
presence of a single European market as well as the increase in EU’s involvement in port 
issues (Chlomoudis and Pallis, 2002, Pallis, 2007). Considering the importance of the port to 
the national economy, the Dutch government became concerned about the lack of PoR’s 
involvement in any EU policies that could threaten its competitive position and possibly 
hinder national interests (Ng and Liu, 2014).  
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Under the new governing structure, level of independence of PoR authority was increased 
(De Langen et al., 2012), though the municipality remained the main shareholder (70%). In 
2007, the Dutch state became the minority shareholder of approximately 30%, for a value of 
€700 that was invested in the expansion project of Maasvlakte2 (De Langen and Heij, 2013). 
The investment of the national government in PoR implied that the Dutch state would have 
more explicit role in matters such as investments and appointment of board members. The 
national Dutch government also became a liaison between the PoR and the EU, particularly 
on issues concerning the role of the PoR in different transport EU policies e.g., Trans-
European Transport Network (TEN-T).  
At its early phase, corporatization of the PoR deemed to increase the risky undertakings due 
to the lack of monitoring decisions made by authorities (De Langen and Van der Lugt, 2006). 
Though corporatization provided the flexibility required for extending the traditional 
functionality, the role of PoR authority was extended beyond a profit maximizing landlord to 
a cluster manager (De Langen, 2004b). In a more recent study, Hollen et al. (2013) described 
the authority of the PoR as an entrepreneurial port developer, by predominantly focusing on 
developing the industrial ecosystems in the port area, and supporting inter-firm connectivity 
and collaboration (Hollen et al., 2015). This description corresponds with the typology of 
landlord port authorities given by Verhoeven (2010), confirming the role of an entrepreneur 
for PoR authority acting as a facilitator with an outspoken commercial attitude as a service 
provider, investor, and consultant (Verhoeven, 2015).  
4.3.3 Port Planning and Provisions  
Over the last five decades, the PoR has gone through phases of development. The bundle of 
strategies formulated by the PoR’s authority was presented to the public as “Port Plan”. Since 
1990’s, three Port Plans had been published by PoR authorities. The Port Plans, as stated by 
Kreukels and Wever (1996), are meant as a point of reference for fixing priorities for the 
investments required, and may not necessarily be a blueprint for the future. To better 
understand PoR’s competitiveness during the last three decades, a timeline of development in 
the PoR is presented (Figure 4.3.6), depicting major events affecting the port setting, along 
with major ventures by PoR in both local and international level. 
Starting with the period of 1967-1980s that coincides with the first and second wave of 
containerization, PoR was among the first seaports in Europe that successfully adapted to 
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containerization. During 1975-84 the main Dutch urban centers were hit by international and 
national recessions. Though PoR managed to maintain its position as the top port in Europe, 
it was experiencing an operational downturn (Kuipers, 2002). Formation of European Union, 
and development of European Distribution Centers within proximity of the port land, shaped 
new opportunities for Rotterdam area. During this period, PoR authority and city 
administrators jointly took steps to fortify the competitive strength of the port. The outcome 
of this attempt was a strategic development plan, called “Port Plan 2010”, which was 
officially approved in early 1990s (Kreukels, 2003). The main objectives of this plan were: 1) 
creating optimal accessibility, 2) strengthening the commercial and service sectors, and 3) 
reconstructing the existing sites and development of new premises (Kreukels and Wever, 
1996).  
The second port plan (Plan 2020) was issued in 2004 by the newly restructured authority of 
PoR, with a core vision of forming an industrial cluster. Infrastructural development, strategic 
land allocation and introduction of international ventures were the highlights of this period.  
The third port plan (Plan 2030) introduced in 2011, concentrated on the concept of Industrial 
Ecosystems in the port area, while bolstering the position of PoR as a Global Hub and the 
European Industrial cluster. Expansion in the international level was also on the agenda. 
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Figure 4.3.6: Development Path of PoR, Source: The Author
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4.3.3.1 Port Plan 2010: Rotterdam a Location for European Distribution 
Center 
The first draft of Port Plan 2010 was published in Oct 1991, and finalized in 1993 with three 
focal points: 
1. Promotion of activity: Increasing value added activities and employment by creating 
favorable trading conditions, optimization of the hinterland connections (railway line, 
and inland navigation in particular), paying more attention to the trade function and 
industrial activities in the port, and focusing on goods flows in growth sectors 
(chemical industry, food and fruits distribution, container transshipment) 
2. Space optimization: Clustering functions in the port area, restructuring the older port 
spaces, cooperating with other Dutch ports (e.g., Moerdijk, Flushing) 
3. Environment Improvement: Sustainable port development concept, and imposing 
environmental policies  
The final “Port Plan 2010” was published with the aim of “Strengthening Rotterdam as a 
mainport for containers, as a distriport, as a fruit port and a chemical port”. The concept of 
mainport was a national economic initiative, introduced by the Dutch government in 1980s 
with the notion of transforming the Netherlands into a “Distribution Country” (Kuipers, 
2002). As the earliest strategic scheme for PoR’s development in post-containerization era, 
mainport was prompted by the establishment of the European Union, and was staged to 
consolidate Netherlands’ position within Europe, and European distribution networks. With 
the creation of the European Union, many non-European large enterprises, which used to 
have a number of plants and distribution centers scattered across Europe, consolidated their 
activities in a single location, resulting in the rise of main distribution centers (Klapwijk, 
1996). Elements such as transportation, and total operating costs, subsidies, and living 
conditions, were involved in selecting a favorable location. PoR was identified as one of the 
main hub ports serving the northern Europe distribution centers (see Figure 4.3.7).  
Under the mainport strategic plan, “Rotterdam Seaport” and “Schiphol Airport” in 
Amsterdam were branded as “mainports”, a concept that had three main viewpoints of 
transport, policy, and marketing (Kuipers, 2002). The mainport policy was revised during 
1990s. In a memorandum published by the Ministry of Transport (Netelenbos, 2000) three 
key aims were listed for mainport Rotterdam:  
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“Strengthen the position of the Netherlands as an international trade and industry 
country, by taking the strong points of the Dutch economy as point of departure. 
Rotterdam mainport is an important component of that; 
Create the right conditions for new, opportunity-rich clusters, partly building on 
existing clusters; 
Opt for a sustainable development and constantly pay attention to the improvement 
of the living environment, especially in the Rijnmond-area” (Netelenbos, 2000, p.9). 
 
Figure 4.3.7: Changing distribution patterns in Northern Europe 
Source: Adapted from Klapwijk (1996) 
According to Merk and Notteboom (2013), the mainport strategy was the leading force in 
justifying and directing a number of major infrastructure investments, such as Betuweroute 
(dedicated freight rail from the PoR towards Germany and into Europe) and the high-speed 
rail connection between Schiphol-Amsterdam and Paris. The rise of European distribution 
centers and centralization of European distribution function was a major attraction for foreign 
investments. In 1990s, particularly American and Japanese companies were investing heavily 
in establishing plants across Europe (Buck and Wever, 1994). The Netherlands had the 
highest share (54%) with regard to Distribution Centers among the counties in Western 
Europe (Table 4.3.5). According to Kolk and Van der Veen (2002), the Dutch government 
policies led to a surge in re-exporting activities, and establishment of the European 
distribution centers in the Netherlands. 
These statistics reinforce the competitive advantage of PoR as the mainport, mostly in the 
provision of logistics services, in comparison with the other European locations. The Dutch 
policy makers also believed that investments in the European Distribution Centers would 
stimulate additional FDI within the Netherlands, whether in R&D or office facilities, or 
production (Kuipers, 2002). This assumption was based on providing a stable political 
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climate, a favorable fiscal policy on foreign investment, and the local population’s high level 
of education and knowledge of languages, and moderate trade unions, in addition to the 
favorable location of the Netherlands (Sluyterman, 2013). The anticipation of the policy 
makers was proven correct to a certain extent, when observing the rate of growth in receiving 
FDI flows into the Netherlands. With the steady increase of FDI, the Netherlands moved 
from seventh in the global ranking of countries receiving FDI in 1980 to sixth in 1999 
(Sluyterman, 2013), and became the top source of FDI globally as of end 2009 (Galeza, 
2011). Though only part of the total FDI affected the Dutch real economy (DNB, 2011), the 
flow of investment had provided a stable source of funding that contributed to advancing the 
competitive position of the Netherlands.  
Table 4.3.5: Manufacturing plants and distribution centers of American and Japanese companies in 
Western Europe 
 
High Tech 
Production 
Other 
Production 
R & D 
European 
Distribution 
Centre 
European 
Head 
Quarters 
The Netherlands 10% 12% 15% 54% 26% 
United Kingdom 36% 39% 28% 10% 29% 
France 16% 22% 28% 8% 10% 
Germany 9% 12% 23% 11% 10% 
Ireland 22% 7% 2% 5% 1% 
Belgium 6% 5% 4% 11% 23% 
Luxemburg 1% 3% nil 1% 1% 
Total number of 
Establishments 
115 318 60 104 237 
Source: Adapted from Buck and Wever (1994) 
During the two decades of 1980s and 1990s, the PoR went through two major phases of 
development within its port area, which were guided by Port Plan 2010: 1) Maasvlakte1, 2) 
Distriparks. 
 First Phase (Maasvlakte1, 1968-2008): The core concept of developing Maasvlakte 
1 was seaport industrialization, creating employment, and generating revenue for the 
port authority based on the added traffic port dues as well as rental fees. Investment in 
the industrial function of the port was strongly related to the political climate in the 
Major Port Development Projects:  
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PoR in late 1960’s, which followed the upcoming trend in Western Europe and 
supporting the growth of industrial clusters in the seaports. Prior to commencement of 
the construction in Maasvlakte 1, Rotterdam Municipal Port Management agreed to 
allocate the entire developing land space for the oil, chemical, and iron and steel 
industries. However, in 1970’s, the policy makers amended the objectives of the 
development, and focused on improving the environment, and the financial situation 
of the seaport. With the new policies, investments in chemical, iron and steel in 
Maasvlakte 1 were rejected, and land allotted to the large-scale container terminals, 
liquid and dry bulk terminals, which were producing modest levels of negative 
externalities compared to the oil and chemical industry. 
The first phase of Maasvlakte 1 was completed in 1972, extending the total area of the 
port from 3,000 to 10,000 hectares. The strategic decision made in 1970s by PoR 
authority reflects its awareness and responsiveness to the business cycles (e.g., ending 
of the industrial development in the port in early 1970s) and economic trends (e.g., 
boom in the throughput of containers), which made Maasvlakte 1 one of the largest 
container terminal locations in the world (Manshanden and Jonkhoff, 2011). In mid 
1980s the second phase in the development of Maasvlakte 1 was initiated, 
predominantly by the investment in ECT (Europe Container Terminals) setting 
Maasvlakte 1 as a large scale container terminal location. The final phase of 
development in 1998 was twofold, one on the investment of Arco Chemical in a large 
scale chemical plant, and the other, the settlement of Reebok European Distribution 
Center and Eurofrigo cold store in Maasvlakte 1. 
 Second Phase (Distriparks, 1989-1998): The concept of “Distriparks” was 
introduced by the PoR authority based on the notion of centralizing the European 
distribution, and following the integration of Europe in 1993 (Van der Lugt et al., 
2007). As of 2016, the port area encompasses three main distriparks in different 
districts (Figure 4.3.8), providing warehousing, distribution, and value adding 
activities (UNESCAP, 2013). 
One of the main advantages of these distribution centers is their location and 
proximity to the cargo and container terminals, which translates directly into 
operational benefit (e.g., easy positioning, and return of empty containers to 
terminals) and financial merit (lower transportation costs from warehouses to 
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terminals). A summary of characteristics of the three distriparks is presented in Table 
4.3.6.  
 
Figure 4.3.8: PoR's Distriparks: Eemhaaven, Botlek, and Maasvlakte 
Source: UNESCAP (2013) 
Besides the above-mentioned developments, upgrading the port rail connection was on the 
agenda of Port Plan 2010. The 160 km double track freight railway connecting PoR to 
Germany, called Betuweroute, was a project of aiming to allow free access for freight trains 
across the entire EU without having to stop at borders or make way for passenger trains 
(RailwayTechnology, 2007). Although the primary role considered for Betuweroute was 
shifting traffic from the parallel A15 highway, where there has been serious congestion from 
1990s (Zhang et al., 2009), the Betuweroute project was initially introduced in 1985 in a 
master plan for the future of PoR, which soon became a plan of national importance 
(Vrijland, 2004). The new hinterland port rail connection was essential for growth of 
container traffic in PoR. By investing in KeyRail, the company handling operation 
management of Betuweroute, PoR took a proactive action towards creating a more efficient 
intermodal transportation by shifting part of land transport from road to rail. KeyRail is a 
private company, owned by Prorail (50%), PoR (35%) and Port of Amsterdam (15%) 
(PortofAmsterdam, 2016a). The key responsibilities of KeyRail are: capacity allocation, 
scheduling and traffic control, management and maintenance, as well as promoting the use of 
rail transport.  
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Table 4.3.6: Distriparks in the PoR 
Distripark  
Year of 
Operation  
Land 
Space 
(ha) 
Distinctive Features 
Eemhaven  1989 65 
 Close to the city and home terminal of ECT 
(Europe Container Terminals).  
 Majority of the companies located in Eemhaaven 
are third party logistics providers (e.g., Barwil, 
Maersk Logistics), and have multiple modalities 
(Road, Rail, Inland waterways, and Sea- short sea 
terminals) for hinterland transportation though the 
predominant mode of transportation is by truck.  
Botlek  1990 86 
 Situated in the Botlek area where most of the 
Chemical companies (e.g., Vopak, LyondellBasell) 
are located.  
 A prime location for logistics providers engaged in 
storage and distribution of chemical products.  
Maasvlakte  1998 125 
 Located in Maasvlakte I, this distripark 
accommodated a number of manufacturing 
companies (e.g., Reebok,Epson) that had 
established their European DC, as well as mega-
carriers and distributers (e.g., DHL/Exel, Nippon 
Express, Eurofrigo) to centralise their physical 
distribution.  
 Connected to hinterland by rail, road, inland 
waterways, and sea.  
 Proximity to the North Sea allows easy transfer of a 
large share of containers from container terminals 
by truck to warehouses in the distripark.  
Source: Adapted from UNESCAP (2013) and Van der Lugt et al. (2007) 
The rapid growth of industrial clusters in Rotterdam, as well as other seaports of Western 
Europe, is dependent on four main factors: 1) strong growth of the petrochemical industry 
that enhanced the role of seaports in economic geography, 2) locating the basic and 
processing industries after World War II to benefit from economies of scale in transport 
sector, 3) large influx of FDI in Europe by US companies, and 4) supply of large-scale spaces 
in seaport areas (Manshanden and Jonkhoff, 2011). For PoR providing large-scale spaces has 
been a main challenge. In a SWOT analysis on the internal and external environment of the 
PoR, Zauner (2008) identified scarcity of space as the biggest challenge facing PoR. To 
overcome this challenge and maintain its leading role in Europe, PoR took proactive actions 
by reclaiming land in its harbor basins to create higher ground to progressive expand its port 
(Gijt and de Horst, 1993). In mid-1990s after the growth in demand for Maasvlakte 1, the 
port authorities initiated another ambitious project of land reclamation called Maasvlakte 2. 
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4.3.3.2 Port Plan 2020: Formation of Industrial Clusters  
Port Plan 2020 was published in 2004 by the newly reformed port authority with the main 
objectives of:  
1. Maasvlakte 2 Reclamation, Building and Exploitation  
2. Redevelopment of City ports  
3. Sustainable port industry cluster management  
4. Improvement of highway A15 (highway to the PoR)  
5. Port and city development in balance  
6. Rotterdam Climate initiative  
Edelenbos et al. (2008) described Port Plan 2020 “a manifesto of the privatized port 
authority to advocate the sustainable development of the mainport” (p.53). Traditionally the 
concerns over availability of port terminals and accessibility measures have been PoR’s 
dominant topics of development. Port Plan 2020 broadened the traditional focus by including 
IT plans for optimizing accessibility and initiatives for improving the living environment 
(Edelenbos et al., 2008). The plan also reflects an awareness of connectivity with many 
stakeholders (Edelenbos et al., 2008). Ng and Liu (2014) explained that Plan 2020 is 
reflective of the increasing freedom of PoR from political interference and exemplifies a 
move for the port to address its own future (and the city of Rotterdam), rather than be guided 
by the national political agenda. The PoR authority was more bent on strengthening the port’s 
competitive position, rather than how it could contribute to achieving the objectives of the 
national political agenda (Ng and Liu (2014).  
At the national level, there was also a shift in policies from a focus on hubs to metropolitan 
regions, and to empower the local states to deal with competition from foreign metropolitan 
regions (Van Gils et al., 2009). The regional perspective envisions a combination of 
infrastructural development in the main business sites, the mainports, and connection 
between these nodes and hinterlands as well as the forelands. At this phase, the local policy 
makers stressed the need to provide a high quality of life as a fundamental element of 
attracting foreign investments into the region, which should go hand in hand with factors of 
accessibility and connectivity.  
The Dutch national policy makers introduced a broader view for countrywide development in 
2005. This plan, presented by the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB), 
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offered four plausible scenarios for the future development of Netherlands until 2040 
(Huizinga and Smid, 2005). Adaptation of the four long-term scenarios of the CPB for PoR 
and city of Rotterdam, as elaborated by Kuipers et al. (2015), is presented in Table 4.3.7.  
The role of PoR was significantly important in all four scenarios, and proposed national 
agendas were mostly supporting and aligned with all the objectives of Port Plan 2020, in 
addition to introducing a number of new growth avenues. Strategies, such as extending the 
mainport policy by reinforcing existing container terminals and the chemical cluster under 
“Global Economy scenario”, were already projected in Massvlakte 2. 
The emphasis put on Rotterdam city, and parallel growth of port and metropolitan area, under 
“Transatlantic Market scenario”, were included in Port Plan 2020 as a redevelopment plan of 
city ports, and balanced development of port and city schemes. The focus on sustainability 
schemes (e.g., utilization of bio-based materials, renewable energy resources), rather than 
traditional growth strategies under “Regional Communities scenario”, were envisioned in 
Port Plan 2020 as sustainable port industry cluster management. 
The attention drawn on 3D technology under the “Strong Europe” scenario, a relatively new 
concept, created fresh opportunities for PoR which were not anticipated, hence not projected. 
Developing Rotterdam as a global 3D and hub city would enable PoR to provide raw material 
for 3D printing through its petrochemical cluster, and offer value-added, storage and 
distribution of 3D printing commodities. Moreover, printing spare parts for shipping industry 
would strengthen the position of PoR as a maritime service location. These prospects were 
considered in the next development plan for PoR (Plan 2030) and had led to opening of the 
first 3D lab in PoR called RAMLAB in 2016 (PoR, 2016d), which is described by PoR’s 
Business Developer in Energy and Industry sector as: 
“RAMLAB is not some outlandish plan dreamt up the Port Authority, but is end-user 
driven. It has a direct link to our core business and the potential to provide 
significant value-added services to some of our major customers in the form of on-
demand, large, metal 3D-printed parts" (Todd, 2016).  
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Table 4.3.7: Four Plausible Scenarios for Future Development of Rotterdam until 2040 
Scenario Impact on PoR  
Global Economy  
(Based on assumption of 
progressive intensification of 
globalization, resulting in 
strong economic growth and 
a high level of global trade) 
 Extending the position of Rotterdam’s mainport for the 
container sector, and Europe’s Industrial Center for the 
process industry  
 Structure of PoR remaining intact, and PoR continues to 
grow strongly in the traditional sense, empowered by 
MV2 (a location for chemical industries connected to 
biochemical companies, as well as container terminals)  
 Container logistics and industrial cluster remain key 
features of PoR 
The Transatlantic Market 
(Based on regional 
orientation, and value 
creation of Rotterdam as a 
region)  
 Priority of formation of a high-quality maritime port-
related service center in PoR, as an attractive location for 
advanced producer services and firms conducting 
activities in supply chain management. An ongoing 
progress in physical activities of PoR (cargo handling, 
manufacturing), are important criterion.  
 Parallel development of city and port  
The Regional Communities  
(Based on China retaining its 
dominant position as the 
global factory, and the notion 
of increasing transport 
volumes by rail from China 
to Europe, lessening total 
volume of deep-sea traffic in 
Europe in long-run) 
 Trend of recycling easily degradable products and reuse 
of raw material production would surge  
 PoR’s position remain strong as a global hub in Europe, 
though growth of traffic might decline 
 Port policy makers need to focus on sustainability 
strategies (transition towards bio-based materials and 
decentralizing energy using renewable energy resources) 
rather than conventional growth schemes  
The Strong Europe  
(Based on an urban vision for 
banking Rotterdam City a 
global 3D & Hub City)  
 The 3D technology would be core subject in the 
economic strategy of the city and port, forming a global 
cluster of 3D technology by 2040. Rotterdam would 
concentrate on providing logistics services for imported 
printers, storage, as well as input and output. PoR would 
benefit from the demand for (bio) chemicals needed as 
raw materials for 3D printing (PoR Petrochemical cluster 
is producing chemicals for 3D printing)  
 PoR would provide value-added services, storage and 
distribution for commodities related to 3D printing 
 3D printing will create another opportunity for PoR to 
print spare parts for shipping industry, positioning 
Rotterdam as a location for high quality maritime 
services  
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1. (Maasvlakte2, 2008-2030): The Second Maasvlakte is part of the Project Mainport 
Development (PMD), which had three main components. One is the Second 
Maasvlakte. The second component is a nature development project in which 750 
hectares of nature reserves will be created in the Rotterdam region as a compensation 
for the loss of natural habitat as a result of the second Maasvlakte. The third element 
of the PMD is the redevelopment of the older harbors in the existing city-area, such as 
the Waalharbor and Eemsharbor, into mixed-land use areas with housing, (water) 
recreation and small businesses. With combination of the three components, the 
project became an initiator of employment and value added in the region, as well as 
an incentive for formation of nature reserves and improvement of livability 
(Koppenol, 2014). 
Maasvlakte 2 was projected in 1997, as the existing port was expected to run out of 
space by 2014. Aiming to create additional land for port activities, expansion plan of 
Maasvlakte 2 would extend the terminal area by 1000-hectares of which 600 hectares 
would be dedicated to container handling, 200 hectares for distribution facilities, and 
200 hectares for the chemical industry (PoR, 2015a). Situated directly on the deep 
water, at a depth of 20 meters, Maasvlakte 2 would be able to accommodate the 
upcoming generation of deep-draught container vessels, which might be unable to 
dock in many other European ports (PoR, 2015a). 
For this project, the PoR authority has set up an organization responsible not only for 
master plan reclamation, development and construction, but also communication with 
stakeholders throughout the project (De Langen et al., 2012). The bidding process for 
awarding terminal concessions in Maasvlakte 2 started two years prior to the actual 
construction, and has served as an important developmental tool. At the first phase of 
the process, interested terminal operators were prequalified by PoR authority based on 
volume handled in the previous year, which had to be over 2 million TEUs. This was 
done to indicate capability of the candidates for attracting new container volumes to 
PoR rather than shifting volume from already existing container terminals. Further 
assessments were conducted on candidate’s proposals with regard to four criteria 
(financial, technical, strategy, and sustainability) to reveal the agenda and priorities of 
terminal operators. After rounds of discussions with short listed candidates, 
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particularly on their hinterland strategy and emphasis on minimizing the share of road 
transport, the final agreement was signed in 2007. This process, called “Competitive 
Bidding Process” for granting container terminal concessions, illustrates the frequent 
and productive interactions between the PoR authority and the stakeholders, which 
had contributed to decisions on the terminal lay-out, and the modal split requirements 
prior to developing terminals (De Langen et al., 2012). The process of construction in 
Maasvlakte 2, as described by its project director, aims to strike a compromise 
between market needs and legislative requirements: 
‘Maasvlakte 2 is a complex project because it is business-case driven. We are 
expressly making allowances for clients’ wishes. We will not start building 
until we actually do have clients. The contractor we appoint will have to take 
their wishes and requirements into account, which calls for flexibility. What’s 
more, we want to be able to build faster if clients say they are in a hurry. But 
at the same time, we have to go through the prescribed licensing procedures. 
So we have to achieve the optimum between what the market wants and what 
the government prescribes. In addition, we have to deal with the incumbent 
business community and the shipping industry. We don’t want to obstruct their 
operations while construction is in progress.’ (Kippenberger, 2012, p.8).  
A number of other ventures were inducted from 2001 to 2009 by PoR authority to 
align with the objectives of Port Plan 2020, including: 
 PortInfoLink: PortInfoLink was an extensive logistics ICT system, owned by PoR (est 
2002). In 2009, PortInfoLink joined with Amsterdam PortNET (est 2000) and formed 
another ICT system called “Portbase”. Portbase participates in projects to improve the 
interface between the terminals and hinterland modes (De Langen and Chouly, 2004). 
PoR owns 75% of shares in Portbase.  
 Deltalinqs: Deltalinqs is the Port Cluster association representing both the port and 
industrial companies on matters of common interest. Deltalinqs conducts negotiations 
with the PoR authority for annual port tariffs, and deals with public authorities for a 
favorable tax climate, and improvement in the entrepreneurial climate of the port area 
(OECD, 2014), as well as lobbying for increased hinterland connection (De Langen 
and Chouly, 2004).  
156 
 Multicore: Multicore is an underground distribution system of pipeline – a joint 
venture with Vopak. The MultiCore pipeline bundle ran past the main chemical and 
petrochemical industrial areas in the PoR and provides an underground distribution 
system (total 80 kilometers of pipes laid in 20-km route) for the chemical and gas 
industry. Businesses in the port area could lease sections of this pipeline infrastructure 
for specific periods and distances to transport their chemical products (PoR, 2016b). 
Multiport served as an alternative to trucks and inland shipping.  
 RC2: RC2 operated a common carrier pipeline system for ethylene between PoA and 
PoR, the two largest port and industrial complexes in Europe. The 117-km route ran 
from the Maasvlakte, Europoort and Botlek via Pernis and Moerdijk to Antwerp. RC2 
is a joint venture with ARG, a company operating approximately 495 km of pipeline 
in Germany, Belgium and Netherlands, and jointly owned by chemical companies 
BASF, Bayer, BP, Degussa, Sabic and Sasol (PoR, 2016b).  
 RCDC: Rotterdam City Ports Development Corporation (RCDC) established in 2003 
incorporating PoR (50%) and the city of Rotterdam (50%), with the task of "directing 
and realising the transformation of city ports into a sustainable combination of city 
functions, port functions and living functions", in addition to "inter-relating the actors 
such as private firms, knowledge institutes and inhabitants, and not only the city and 
the ports" (Desfor et al., 2010). The foundation of the RCDC was motivated by 
construction of the Maasvlakte 2 as a new location for container terminals, and shift 
of stevedoring companies to MV2 deeper water wharfs. RCDC is focused on 
transformation of the city ports to areas of urban use in the next 25 to 50 years 
(Daamen, 2007). 
 RCI: The Rotterdam Climate Initiative (RCI) is a joint venture of the City of 
Rotterdam, PoR, Deltalinqs, and DCMR Environmental Protection Agency Rijnmond. 
The main aim of the RCI is to achieve a 50 per cent reduction of CO2 emissions in the 
city, the port, and the industrial complex by 2025 as compared with 1990. 
 Verkeersonderneming: Verkeersonderneming is the traffic enterprise founded by the 
municipality of Rotterdam, Rotterdam Metropolitan Region, Ministry of 
Infrastructure and the Environment and, the PoR Authority to keep the PoR and the 
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A15-corridor accessible during the widening of the A15 highway and the construction 
work on the Maasvlakte.  
The continuous investments in infrastructure and superstructure projects created an advanced 
seaport cluster in terms of size, technology and productivity in the PoR, where multiple 
logistics service providers and logistics department of companies congregated to benefit from 
the strategic location but also the agglomeration economies arising from their mutually 
complementary effects. In addition to the logistics service providers, the port area also hosted 
large industrial complexes of mainly chemical and petrochemical firms. These firms have 
shaped an Industrial Ecosystem as a network of legally independent companies that use one 
another’s residual energy and chemical waste as an input for their own production process 
(Hollen et al., 2015), i.e., waste products of one company would serve as a raw material for 
another. Hollen et al. (2015) outlines two generic policies of the PoR authorities that had 
been instrumental in fostering the industrial ecosystem development: i) Infrastructure 
development (e.g., land, pipelines, etc), and ii) Strategic land allocation.  
4.3.3.3 Port Plan 2030: Establishment of Industrial Ecosystems  
The Port Vision 2030 was designed and published in 2011 based on nine upcoming trends 
that were considered to be relevant to the development of port and shipping industry in the 
upcoming decades. These trends and their significant implications for the PoR are listed in 
Table 4.3.8. In response to the trends stated, Port Plan 2030 was designed with two primary 
objectives: to establish Rotterdam as a Global Hub, and to position the PoR as Europe’s 
Industrial Cluster:  
 Global Hub: The global Hub aimed to enhance supply chain efficiency by i) 
improving global, intra-European cargo flows, ii) introducing high-end activities in 
the region, iii) increasing throughput capacity and extending the hub function of the 
port and v) minimizing the ecological footprint of logistics chains.  
 European Industrial Cluster: The establishment of the European Industrial Cluster was 
to start a transition towards bio-based industry and formation of an Energy port 
(generate energy with more renewable resources). The European Industrial Cluster 
would be integrated with Antwerp Chemical Cluster and local ports of Moerdijk, 
Flushing and Terneuzen. 
158 
Prior to publishing Port Plan 2030, an independent research conducted by Institute for the 
CDA in The Hague, The Netherlands reassessed the economic position of the Netherlands 
based on the global development trends, and suggested that a “bio-based economy” is the 
path to attain a sustainable growth. The rationale of CDA researchers, Sanders and Van der 
Hoeven (2008), was the upcoming trend of moving traditionally strong sectors of the Dutch 
economy like chemical industry, agro-food, and logistics to low wage countries with 
considerable effect on employment. It was argued that all these sectors will be affected by 
high oil and gas prices. Sanders and Van der Hoeven (2008) also elaborated that the 
petrochemical industries based in Europe will begin to move towards Asia and the Middle 
Eastern countries for two main reasons: i) to access lower cost of raw material (due to their 
dependence on fossil fuels) that would reduce their overall production cost, and ii) a higher 
demand for petrochemical products in those regions. 
Table 4.3.8: Trends relevant to the development of port and shipping industry 
Trends  Implications for the PoR 
Shift in balance of the 
world economy  
Further globalization to trigger growth in global freight transport and 
cargo shipments via Rotterdam are expected to increase, as PoR 
links Europe with the fast emerging economies in the other parts of 
the world.  
Scarcity of raw 
materials and its 
impact on geopolitics  
Opportunities for PoR would be created in activities involving reuse 
of raw materials to generate new cargo flows  
Development of the 
labor market and the 
knowledge economy  
Knowledge and innovation would increase through importance in 
warranting the strengthening of relationships between business, 
government, and educational institutions to produce a dynamic 
labour market. 
Increase in the scale 
of transport  
Opportunities to further strengthen the PoR’s European hub function 
would grow. 
Integration of supply 
chains  
Close cooperation and data exchange between all parties in supply 
chain would help PoR to develop an efficient, sustainable and 
competitive port processes. 
Climate change and 
Sustainability  
PoR needs to distinguish itself as a sustainable port and also develop 
a hinterland transport system and intermodal hub. 
ICT applications  
Opportunities to increase the use of infrastructure and means of 
transport by focusing on active ICT-driven, all-round traffic 
management.  
Changing energy and 
fuel mix in Europe  
Opportunities for new cargo flows (biomass, bio fuel) and the threat 
of declining mineral oil products could challenge PoR’s position as a 
bunkering port.  
Made in Europe  
Decrease of the raw materials flows but increase in semi-finished 
products, could position PoR as the most vital chemical cluster in 
Europe along with Antwerp. 
Source: (PoR, 2011) 
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In 2009 a report by KPMG for the European Commission also confirmed the vulnerability of 
the European chemical industry facing a new competition from the Middle East, China and 
India (Harnick, 2010). The reports warned new circumstances would pose a major threat to 
PoR, which housed the largest petrochemical industrial complex in Europe. In order to 
safeguard its position, PoR introduced the strategy of substituting petrochemical industries 
with a bio-based chemical industry, and forming a trading hub in the port for bio-mass and 
bio-commodities.  
The first steps toward building a European bio-economy were taken in 2002, setting out 
actions for developing biotechnology. Many other initiatives to enforce the bio-economy in 
Europe followed, leading eventually to an overarching policy and strategic action plan in 
2012 (Scarlat et al., 2015) as highlighted by the following statement of the EU commission:  
“Bio-based industries will increase the competitiveness of the European economy 
through re-industrialization and sustainable growth. New value chains will be 
created between often unconnected sectors, ranging from primary production and 
processing industries to consumer brands” (EU, 2013). 
The “bio-based economy” relies on green, renewable resources, such as wood, grass and feed 
stocks (called biomass) as its engine, instead of oil, natural gas and coal (RCI, 2016). 
Increasingly, Biomass appears to be an economical substitute for fossil raw materials, 
offering major energy savings, particularity for petrochemical industries. The Netherlands has 
an advantage over other European countries with a density of biomass throughput of 13 tons 
per hectare, compared with the global average of 1.5 tons per hectare, and 5 tons per hectare 
for Germany and France (Sanders and Van der Hoeven, 2008).  
Rotterdam’s location and its aligned and integrated infrastructure in the harbor that was 
serving traditional imports of feedstock for the food and feed industry makes it an attractive 
spot for developing a bio-based economy, though its available infrastructure would have to be 
expanded and attuned to meet market demands for energy and chemical production from 
biomass. Considering that biomass could possibly substitute the traditional feedstock in the 
petrochemical industry, the investment in infrastructure would ensure a continuation of 
imports of feedstock for the chemical industry, hence allowing for on ongoing deployment of 
chemical industry in the PoR. The infrastructural development would also generate capacity 
for producing high-value bio-based products, which are ingredients for numerous 
manufacturing sectors, such as food, nutraceutical, and advanced material (CSIRO, 2016).  
160 
To take advantage of the bio-economy potentials, and regain its popularity with investors 
which had been declining, PoR set new strategies for infrastructural development in 2008 
with the ambition of becoming the bio-port for North-western Europe (Sanders and Van der 
Hoeven, 2008). The new strategies, as stated by Rotterdam Climate Initiative (RCI) focused 
on three main applications: “biomass for energy, biomass for transport fuels, and biomass as 
a feedstock for the chemical industry”(RCI, 2016). All three applications offer major 
economic opportunities for PoR. As per Port Plan 2030, PoR has also an ambitious agenda in 
utilizing gas, clean coal technology, biomass, wind and sun to promote use of sustainable 
energy resources to replace the traditional mix of coal and oil. 
In addition to the ongoing development in Maasvlakte 2, PoR had also launched a number of 
other ventures within the port area:  
 Alpherium: Alpherium is an inland transshipment terminal that uses a combination of 
trucks and freight barges to transport cargo to and from the PoR, serving Heineken's 
brewery and Zeeman. The launch of the Alpherium barge terminal in 2010 stimulated 
modal shift in PoR. In 2011, Alpherium increased its export cargo handling from 100 
TEUs to 2,000 TEUs per week, by connecting to PoR deep sea terminals with five 
sailings a day (GreenPort, 2011).  
 Plant One: Plant One is an open test facility designed to cater to the sustainable 
process innovation needs of firms located in the port area. The presence of Plant One 
is beneficial for the development of industrial ecosystems. It enables firms in the PoR 
to test and develop new sustainable process technologies required for advancing eco-
industrial collaboration without disrupting their existing processes.  
 Container Transferium: Container Transferium (CT) is situated in the direct hinterland 
of PoR. It is a new logistics concept allowing the transfer of large number of 
containers by inland vessels in a single movement from the terminals in MV2 to the 
Transferium and vice versa (Van Schuylenburg and Borsodi, 2010). PoR served as a 
landlord, investing in land and infrastructure in exchange for a competitive rent.  
 Plug & Play: Plug & play in Maasvlakte 2 would offer bundled services to companies, 
such as energy, water, pipelines, and tank storage in MV2. An initiative to create a 
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bio-based cluster in the port area (bio-port), the Plug & Play project would no longer 
require investing in supply of power networks, tank storage, waste processes, and 
drinking water. It would also integrate with existing businesses in the PoR industrial 
cluster. Plug & Play is a joint investment of energy supplier E.ON, water solution 
supplier Evides, regional grid operator Stedin, tank terminal operator Vopak, and 
PoR. All five parties, including the PoR Authority, would invest in the required basic 
infrastructure (such as pipelines).  
 Steam Grid: The PoR Authority also became involved in the construction of a high-
quality steam grid in the Botlek area. The steam grid, which has been put into use as 
of mid-2013, was built with the objective to distribute steam from one plant, where it 
is a residual energy, to surrounding plants that use this steam for production. The 
development started officially at the end of 2009, and the extension of this project 
would be partly financed through a deal with RCI, which is co-founded by the PoR 
Authority. 
 University initiatives: PoR established a collaborative project with Erasmus 
University (Smart Port Center) for training, research and consultancy services linked 
to activities in the port. A similar co-operation was founded with the University of 
Delft for transportation analysis and security and safety of port by computer 
modeling. Rotterdam University also developed a new campus in the old port area to 
engage in research, design and manufacturing (OECD, 2014).  
 Management of the Port of Dordrecht: PoR Authority took over a project to exploit, 
develop and nautically manage (as a landlord) Dordrecht, the most landward seaport 
in the Netherlands.  
 Nextlogic: PoR joined forces with a number of stakeholders in the entire container 
handling chain in inland shipping (e.g., shipping companies, barge, terminal and depot 
operators, and the Dutch Ministry of infrastructure) to form an organization to 
improve operational efficiency, reliability and predictability in inland shipping. 
Nextlogic offers an information platform that plans rotations based on real-time 
information relayed by stakeholders. Its objectives were to improve integrated 
planning, call optimization, and performance measurement (Nextlogic, 2015). 
Nextlogic would also contribute to modal shift, from road traffic to barge and rail.  
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 PortXL: PortXL is a start-up accelerator program focused on four sectors of transport 
and logistics, energy, chemical and refinery, and maritime. PoR joined with a number 
of internationally recognized companies (e.g., Vopak, and Van Oord, Uniper) to 
promote sustainable growth of PoR economy through port-related start-ups 
(Zonneveld, 2015).  
 RAMLAB: RAMLAB is the world’s first additive manufacturing lab for the maritime 
industry and a location for shaping the 3D printing industry in PoR. RAMLAB was 
set up after the successful completion of a pilot project for 3D printing by PoR.  
PoR’s strategic planning, followed by continuous investments in a range of projects, appears 
to fit well with the influential variables of hinterland access regimes that was defined by De 
Langen and Chouly (2004) as: 1) infrastructure presence, 2) involvement of leader firms, 3) 
sense of community, 4) voice of the community, and 5) role of public organizations.  
4.3.4 Expansion in International Level 
Apart from investments in asset developments and in building competencies that contribute to 
performance of the port, PoR authority also undertook a number of ventures in an 
international scale as a strategy to expand their revenue-base beyond the land rate and port 
dues (Van der Lugt et al., 2013).  
Dooms et al. (2013) viewed PoR’s international strategy as comprising four motives: 1) 
leveraging its port management knowledge to establish a commercial presence abroad, 
transferring a port specific knowhow, and equity partnership in port development aboard, 2) 
reinforcing the relationship of PoR with leading firms in various sectors (transport, logistics, 
and energy), 3) generating business opportunities for PoR authority and the PoR port business 
community, and 4) growing the volume and efficiency of the trade flows through Rotterdam. 
Other motivations, as suggested by Dooms et al. (2013), include limited growth due to 
physical limits of expansion in port infrastructure, as well as attractiveness of growth 
potential of emerging economies. A list of international ventures undertaken by the PoR since 
2002 is presented in Table 4.3.9, which reveals consistency in the international strategy of the 
PoR, as well as a geographical diversity of the ventures.  
The PoR Authority also signed a number of memorandums of understanding (MoU) with 
other port authorities around the world with a view of offering management service 
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agreements or joint ventures with other port authorities. The global strategic partnerships and 
acquiring participations as stated in the annual report 2012 of the PoR, is a long-term process 
partly influenced by political developments (p.43). 
Table 4.3.9: International Ventures of the PoR  
Project  Country  Year Venture  
Sohar Oman 2002-2007 
 Concession agreement with the Oman 
government until 2025. 50/50 joint venture in 
Sohar Industrial Port Company (Port and 
Freezone) 
 Extension of the concession agreement to 
2045. Agreement for expansion of the port 
area from 2100 hectare to 4500 hectare 
Suape Brazil 2008-2010 
 Agreement to develop a master plan for the 
port of Suape, 3000 hectare 
 Establishment of a joint venture and new 
organization 
Nangang China 2011 
 Service agreement with Nangang Industrial 
Port Complex in Beijing 
Porto Central Brazil 2014 
 Joint venture agreement with TPK (Terminal 
Presidente Kennedy) for developing a new 
seaport 
Kuala Tanjung Indonesia 2015 
 Partnership agreement with Indonesian Port 
Corporation for construction, development 
and management of a new seaport 
Source: Compiled from (Dooms et al., 2013) and (PoR, 2014a) and (PoR, 2015b) 
4.3.5 Strategic Developmental Path  
According to De Langen (2005), the strategic developments of the PoR, have been following 
nine general trends:  
 Uncertain growth prospects for freight transport; 
 Commoditization of transport services; 
 Production on manufacturing and logistics platforms; 
 New quality levels in “industrial ecology”, sustainability and safety; 
 Higher land efficiency in manufacturing (particularly chemical manufacturing), storage 
and terminal handling services; 
 Mixed land use in the port complex;  
 Increased need for an overall vision and organizing capacity;  
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 The need for an effective “regional innovation system”, an attractive climate for the 
“creative class”, and space for experiments; and  
 Growth opportunities for port complexes: especially chemicals, recycling, manufacturing 
and logistics platforms 
A list of main developmental projects in PoR during the last three decades are presented in 
Table 4.3.10. The nature of each venture coupled with the relevant trends, reveal that PoR’s 
key developments in 1980s and 1990s were limited to generating capacity and mixing of land 
use. Though the same trend was steadily followed throughout 2000s, a number of innovative 
projects were introduced to enhance the manufacturing and logistics platforms, and to shape 
an Industrial Cluster in the port. The further growth of the industrial cluster, and diversity of 
the cluster population - in terms of existence of suppliers and customers as well as the 
presence of knowledge spill over – created a strength which cannot be easily imitated by 
competing ports (Van den Bosch et al., 2011). The distinctive position of PoR is described by 
Haralambides (2017) as:  
“the port’s value added is not created simply by the port itself, but by its port 
cluster, encompassing 50% of Europe’s Asian and North American European 
Distribution Centers (EDC); a city 50% of whose inhabitants are holders of a 
foreign passport, just because of the port. But not all ports can realistically aspire to 
such an enviable situation, developed not today but over a period of 70 years of hard 
work (p.16).  
From 2010 onwards, further development on transportation systems, as well as investments 
on physical and knowledge infrastructure, became PoR’s main strategies of fostering an 
industrial ecosystem in the port complex. The diversity of developments in the PoR during 
the last few decades reflects a multifocal perspective of the authority. The perspective can 
also be tracked through the PoR statement of vision;  
"We continually improve the port of Rotterdam to make it the safest, most efficient 
and most sustainable port in the world. We create value for our customers by 
developing logistics chains, networks and clusters, in both Europe and growth 
markets worldwide. As an enterprising port developer, the Port Authority is the 
partner for world-class clients. In this way, we are also strengthening the 
competitive position of the Netherlands." (PoR, 2017b).  
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Further interpretation can be derived from PoR’s development path, which can be broadly 
divided into in four areas:  
1. Industry: Industries located at the PoR gradually shifted from oil and petrochemical 
industries to bio-based chemicals. This path began as early decision of allocating 
containers rather than oil and chemicals to Maasvlakte 1 in 1980s, and continued with 
transformation towards bio-based economy and formation of a trading hub in the port 
for bio-mass and bio-commodities in the last decade. 
2. Transport and Distribution: Connection and coordination of distribution systems of 
PoR were expanded from adjacent connections to hinterland accessibility and global 
connectivity. PoR’s transport operations evolved from unimodal to multimodal and 
intermodal (initiatives such as Nextlogic, inlandlinks) and lately exploring 
possibilities of synchro-modal operation (e.g., synchronization of operations in 
different networks, and shift of cargo from one mode to another, without making pre-
arrangements) (Tavasszy et al., 2015, Van Riessen et al., 2015, Zhang and Pel, 2016).  
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Table 4.3.10: PoR Local Participations 
Period Project  Focus  Trend 
1980- 
1990 
Maasvlakte1 
(MV1) 
 Spatial & Territorial 
Development 
 Overall vision and organizing capacity  
Distriparks 
 Promotion of Port 
Activities 
 Mixed land use in the port complex 
 Growth opportunities in the port complex 
KeyRail 
 Intermodal Connection 
 Hinterland Connectivity 
 Commoditization of transport services  
2000 
PortInfoLink  Port Efficiency 
 New quality levels in Industrial Ecology, 
Sustainability & Safety  
Deltalinqs  Port Efficiency 
 New quality levels in Industrial Ecology, 
Sustainability & Safety  
 Overall vision and organizing capacity  
Multicore  Port Cluster connectivity 
 Higher land efficiency  
 Production on manufacturing & logistics 
platform 
RC2  Port Cluster connectivity 
 Higher land efficiency 
 Growth opportunities for port complex  
 Production on manufacturing & logistics 
platform 
Maasvlakte2 
(MV2) 
 Spatial & Territorial 
Development 
 Overall vision and organizing capacity  
 Higher land efficiency  
Rotterdam City 
Ports 
Development 
(RCDC) 
 Balanced City & Port 
Development 
 New quality levels in Industrial Ecology, 
Sustainability & Safety 
 Regional innovation system  
Rtm Climate 
Initiative (RCI) 
 Environment 
Improvement 
 New quality levels in Industrial Ecology, 
Sustainability & Safety  
PortInfoLink  
- Portbase 
 Port Efficiency 
 New quality levels in Industrial Ecology, 
Sustainability & Safety  
Verkeersonder-
neming 
 Intermodal Connection 
 Hinterland Connectivity 
 Uncertain growth prospects for freight 
transport  
2010 
Alpherium 
 Intermodal Connection 
 Hinterland Connectivity 
 Commoditization of transport services  
 Production on manufacturing & logistics 
Platform  
University 
Initiatives  
 Research & Development  Regional innovation system  
Plant One  Research & Development  Regional innovation system  
Container 
Transferium 
(CT) 
 Intermodal Connection 
 Hinterland Connectivity 
 Commoditization of transport services 
 Production on manufacturing & logistics 
Platform  
Plug & Play 
(MV2) 
 Port Cluster Connectivity 
 Growth opportunities for Port Complex  
 Production on manufacturing & logistics 
platforms  
Steam Grid 
(Botlek Area) 
 Port Cluster Connectivity 
 New quality levels in Industrial ecology  
 Production on Manufacturing and 
Logistics platforms  
Dordrecht  Strengthen port network  Overall vision and organizing capacity  
 NextLogic   Port Cluster Connectivity  Commoditization of transport services 
 PortXL  Research & Development  Regional innovation system 
 RAMLAB  Research & Development  Regional innovation system 
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1. Performance: The PoR shifted its performance focus from throughput volume to 
added value created in the port, and subsequently altered to the number of firms 
established in the port and their profitability. The emergence of new performance 
indicators in the PoR (Table 4.3.11) supports its dramatic shift from the primary 
functionality during the last few decades. More recently, PoR has focused on strategic 
value creation, through international and national strategic connectivity, as well as 
generating demand for port land and maintaining its economic importance.  
Table 4.3.11: KPIs in the PoR 
Period Key Performance Indicators 
1960s to 1980s  
- Number of Ships  
- Throughput volume  
1990s  
- Port related employment  
- Value added  
- Port value added as a percentage of regional GDP 
2000s  
- Development in turnover  
- Profitability in firms in port  
- Establishment of new companies in port area  
2010s 
- Improvement of modal split  
- Average journey time A15 corridor  
- Larger market share of the Hamburg-Le Havre range  
- MV2 realization  
- Increase revenue per sqm of the port land  
- Increase percentage of transshipment containers 
- Realization of International milestones  
- Profitability of project investments  
Source: Compiled from (De Langen et al., 2007, Dooms, 2014) 
2. Role in the Cluster: PoR’s role has evolved from being a landlord to that of a 
developer and entrepreneur (PortXL, Verkeersonderneming, KeyRail). PoR initiates 
new ventures, ties in with private sector, and eventually withdraws from the ventures 
once a newly established business thrives.  
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4.4 Chapter Summary  
This chapter presents the within case findings of the three case seaports, focusing on the 
strategic developmental paths they had taken since the advent of containerization. The 
findings reveal that each case seaport had been embarking on a unique program of physical 
asset building, many of which were not destined for the primary function of cargo loading 
and unloading. Among the three case seaports, the scale and pace of development differed 
considerably. PoD’s asset building program had been most intensive as well as extensive, 
especially in the last three decades. By comparison, PoK’s physical development program 
was relatively modest, while that of PoR was seated in between. PoK placed a strong focus 
on developing its intangible resources by devising policy measures to optimize the use of its 
physical facilities. PoR, in turn, directed its attention to building a complementary set of 
tangible physical infrastructure as well as intangible capabilities to expand and enhance the 
range of its port product offerings. The approaches taken by the three case seaports also vary 
significantly across time-periods. Notably, these distinctive differences were related to the 
regional market dynamics each of the case seaports faced, reflecting a contingent dynamic 
capability building process that will be the focus of the cross-case analysis in the next 
chapter. 
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From a resource development and management perspective, the three case studies have 
revealed different means of structuring, bundling and leveraging resources, both tangible and 
intangible, in Sirmon et al.’s (2007) terminology, over 50 years. PoD (Dubai) concentrated 
heavily on building tangible assets and embarking on parallel developments to host mutually 
supportive logistics infrastructure services. PoR (Rotterdam) also defeated the main challenge 
of land scarcity by developing mega-projects of Maasvlakte 1 and Maasvlakte 2, and 
engaging in parallel investments in redeveloping city ports, and facilitating inter-modality. 
The case of PoK (Kaohsiung) was rather different: at a very early phase of its development in 
the 1970s, it invested intensively in port infrastructure, but later directed its strategy to 
concentrate on formulating policy measures centered on developing capabilities to capitalize 
on the economic and other opportunities that impacted its maritime environment. 
To understand the contrasting approaches used by the three seaports to achieve 
competitiveness, this chapter will review the findings of the three, using a cross-case 
comparative analysis to identify similar and contrasting means of resource building and 
utilization. The cross-case analysis will also examine the competitive strategies of the three 
seaports by integrating two perspectives based on a model proposed by Spanos and Lioukas 
(2001). The first perspective is based on the resource-based view of bundling resources 
(assets, processes, and knowledge) in seaports. The second perspective is in bundling market-
driven strategies (industry, environment and regional dynamics) that drive seaports to adapt 
in order to achieve sustainable competitive advantages.  
This chapter is organized into four main sections. The first identifies both the common and 
unique development approaches adopted by the three case seaports in response to the global 
maritime changes in different eras (1960s-1980s, 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s). The second 
section presents the eight resource development and management constructs identified from a 
comparative analysis of the strategic intent on which the three case seaports built and utilized 
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their maritime resources over the last five decades. The third section reviews the strategic 
resource building and development paths taken by the three case seaports from the 
perspectives of the resource development and management constructs identified. The fourth 
section maps the resource developmental paths of the three case seaports onto a theoretical 
framework formed by the intensity of competition as one dimension and the size of the 
hinterland and foreland as the other, based on the contextual circumstances surrounding their 
regional operating environments at different times. 
5.1 Strategic Development Factors in Seaports 
Findings from the three case studies suggested that PoD, PoK, and PoR have each built their 
competitive capabilities through development and exploitation of their respective port-related 
resources. The investments of resources, whether tangible (developing physical 
infrastructure, e.g. investment in port basin and quays, land, road, and railways, terminals, 
yards, warehouses, pipelines, as well as informational technology systems - Appendix 3) or 
intangible (developing capabilities and extending the know-how, e.g. mergers, acquisitions, 
and utilization programs - Appendix 4), reflect the strategic focus of the respective authorities 
on particular means of achieving competitiveness. 
The major resource investments, revealing strategic development in the three case seaports, 
are next presented in separate timeframes – 1960s-1980s, 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, - to reveal 
the focus of the three port authorities over the last five decades.  
5.1.1 1960s – 1980s  
In the early 1960s, containerization was introduced and within a few years proved its prowess 
as an efficient form of handling freight at ports (Baird, 1996). As a promising means of cargo 
transport, containerization was quickly adopted by a number of pioneer ports in US, Western 
Europe, Japan and Australia, and regular transatlantic and transpacific services were 
established (Guerrero and Rodrigue, 2014). Adoption of containerization in seaports 
essentially required a shift from conventional break-bulk terminals to container terminals, 
which affected the layout and function of seaports: container terminals’ operations demand a 
large terminal surface, advanced automation, planning and organization when compared with 
conventional terminals (Notteboom and Rodrigue, 2009). The gradual infrastructural shift 
occurred in the 1970s in a number of ports across the globe, and early adopter ports, 
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including PoR and PoK, joined the regular container services, which were on a point-to-point 
basis then. Although the modern development of PoD began in the same era, its traffic had 
minimal growth until the 1980s when transshipment services as a new function in seaports 
was introduced (Guerrero and Rodrigue, 2014). The transshipment function was concurrent 
with inter-modality, which resulted in expansion of hinterlands and forelands of seaports, 
when a global containerized transportation system was already in place (Rodrigue and 
Notteboom, 2010). Another factor that significantly pushed the global diffusion of 
containerization in the 1980s was construction of larger container ships, Panamax (3,000–
3,400 TEU) and Panamax Max (3,400-4,500 TEU), that benefited shipping lines through 
economies of scale (Rodrigue, 2013a). 
The within case analysis reveals that the three case seaports went through a complex process 
of resource building at the dawn of containerization (in the late 1960s) to build capacities 
(Table 5.1.). In all three cases, the building of port infrastructure was accompanied by the 
creation of supporting facilities (e.g. dry-docks in the case of PoD, export-free zones in the 
case of PoK, and distriparks in PoR’s case) to increase the usage of the super-structure and 
infrastructure developed for container handling. Their aim was to ensure the usage of the 
developed container infrastructure by generating multiplier effects. While there were 
similarities in creating supporting facilities, there were also attempts to adapt to the external 
environment in which they operated. 
In PoR, infrastructure was developed to expand the port land (MV1, to stimulate 
industrialization at the port) and its maritime accessibility. MV1 diverted from its original 
blueprint and, by following the containerization trend, became a location for container 
terminal operations. A new distripark (Eemhaven) was introduced, followed by the 
centralization of European and Asian distribution centers in the Rotterdam region. This 
strategy brought the container terminals closer to its main cargo source. 
In PoK, maritime access infrastructure (e.g. opening a second harbor entrance and 
construction of a cross-harbor tunnel) was built, in addition to developing four container 
terminals. Launching the first Export Free Zone of Taiwan (Kaohsiung EPZ) in the port was 
an action to re-orientate industries from import substitution to export promotion, reinforced 
by prohibiting products manufactured in the EPZ from being sold domestically. The EPZ 
provided a prime source of cargo traffic for PoK, which also offered dedicated terminals to 
shipping lines. Dedicated terminals offer greater flexibility, reliability and shorter turnaround 
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times to terminal operators, enlisting their commitment and boosting their logistics 
efficiency.  
In PoD, substantial investments in twin ports (Port Rashid and Jebel Ali) provided maritime 
access infrastructure in two locations to attract cargoes to and from the Middle East region. In 
addition to the port infrastructure and superstructure, port ancillary services (e.g. ship 
building, repair and maintenance) were introduced to build a bundle of maritime services, 
providing a unique offering in the region.  
Due to the high price of seaport infrastructure, capacity creation becomes a necessity. The 
need to generate sufficient returns on investments has been a constant challenge for port 
authorities. According to Haralambides et al. (2002), due to intense competition, seaports 
have a tendency to build excess capacity. Haralambides (2002) called the excess capacity in 
container seaports an “operational necessity” and an inevitable cost of providing rapid 
turnaround times demanded by shipping lines and maintaining or increasing patronage in a 
region. Haralambides (2002) further argued that when seaports reach a utilization rate of 
70%, chances of congestion arise due to short waiting times demanded by shipping lines. 
This argument rationalizes the ongoing capacity creation projects in PoD, PoK and PoR as 
early adopters of containerization in their respective regions.   
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Table 5.1: Strategic Developments between the 1960s to 1980s in PoD, PoK and PoR 
Dubai (PoD) Kaohsiung (PoK) Rotterdam (PoR) 
 In 1972, Port Rashid was established. By the late 
1970s its container handling capacity was increased 
from 100,000 TEUs in 11 berths to 1,500,000 
TEUs in 35 berths. 
 
 A range of port ancillary services, shipbuilding, 
repair and maintenance services was introduced in 
Dubai Drydocks (1979) located south of Port 
Rashid to build a bundle of maritime services.  
 
 The 2nd port in the Jebel Ali area (largest man-
made harbor in the world at the time) commenced 
construction in 1976 and became operational with 5 
berths in 1979. First phase of Jebel Ali construction 
completed by 1983, increasing handling capacity of 
Dubai Ports from 1,500,000 TEUs to about 
10,000,000 TEUs. 
 PoK’s container operation commenced with the 
building of Terminals 1, 2, 3, and 4 to produce a 
combined handling capacity of about 9,000,000 
TEUs.  
 
 An Export Free Zone (Kaohsiung EPZ) was 
launched with the assistance of foreign investment 
in the port to re-orientate industries from import 
substitution to export promotion. Products 
manufactured in EPZs were not permitted to be 
sold domestically. 
 
 2nd harbor entrance opened to overcome national 
defense concerns on a single entrance port and to 
improve operational capabilities by making the 
inner harbor accessible to larger vessels. Opening 
the 2nd entrance and constructing several piers 
around it also facilitated utilization of Qijin district, 
raising PoK’s overall handling capacity.  
 
 Cross-harbor tunnel opened (1984) to connect Qijin 
district to the opposite bank to streamline cargo 
traffic and to increase capacity growth of the port.  
 
 PoK offered dedicated terminals to shipping lines 
to ensure their commitment, reduce public 
investment in the port and generate new traffic. 
Dedicated terminals offer greater flexibility, 
reliability and shorter turnaround times to terminal 
operators, boosting their logistics efficiency. 
 PoR commenced a land reclamation project in 
Maasvlakte1 (MV1) based on seaport 
industrialization to create employment and to 
generate revenue by allocating land to oil, 
chemical, iron and steel industries. 
 
 Environmental concerns and containerization 
resulted in changing development objectives for 
MV1. Allocation of port land to container terminals 
helped MV1 to become one of the world’s largest 
container terminal locations.  
 
 Centralization of European distribution centers in 
Rotterdam area led to formation of first distripark 
(Eemhaven) in PoR, bringing container terminals 
closer to its main cargo source.  
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5.1.2 1990s  
In the 1990s, maritime transport became one of the key drivers of globalism, and 
containerization provided the dominant support of world trade (Bernhofen et al., 2016). With 
a higher level of global consumption, the capacity of seaports as a core element of maritime 
transport had to increase to cope with increasing cargo flow. Transshipment operations also 
expanded and shipping lines began to utilize the hub-and-spoke networks rather than the 
point-to-point services (Nam and Song, 2011). Functionality of the hub-and-spoke networks 
further expanded with the evolution of container ships. In the 1990s, the new generation of 
Post Panamax I (4,000-6,000 TEU), and Post Panamax II (6,000-8,500 TEU) container 
vessels became operative, which triggered new challenges for seaports around the globe, such 
as their infrastructural capabilities, draft limitations, and integration within the configuration 
of shipping networks (Rodrigue, 2013a). Coinciding with the introduction of Post Panamax 
vessels, the first strategic shipping alliances took shape, which saw vessel-sharing co-
operation between shipping lines on multiple trade routes (Notteboom, 2016b). Ports had to 
confront the integration of shipping lines in their various forms of mergers, alliances, joint 
ventures and cartel agreements (Heaver et al., 2000). Moreover, the shipping lines’ role in 
ports became increasingly influential due to two other factors: i) their evolvement in terminal 
management operation, and ii) their service extension to door-door operation and gaining 
control over hinterlands transportation (Guerrero and Rodrigue, 2014). 
During this period, the three case seaports began a transition phase from traditional ports to 
regional maritime hubs. Providing infrastructure and superstructure to handle ship-to-shore 
operations was no longer adequate, and resource building expanded towards facilitation of 
distribution networks (Hesse and Rodrigue, 2004). Creating conditions for transforming to a 
hub port became increasingly challenging with the emergence of shipping alliances with 
extended network coverage and scheduled frequency.  
The three case seaports took diverse approaches in this transition phase to build a stronger 
link with their regional supply chains (Table 5.2). In PoR, value-added and logistics services 
in the port, which had already begun in the late 1980s, were expanded with the introduction 
of two new distriparks (Botlek and Maasvlakte). These accommodated chemical companies, 
logistics providers and a number of manufacturing companies that established their European 
Distribution Centers. Furthermore, PoR enhanced its land access infrastructure by investing 
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in KeyRail (a company managing dedicated freight rail to the European hinterland) with the 
aim of upgrading intermodal connectivity and strengthening its distribution networks.  
In PoK, capacity creation projects continued with the anticipation of growing throughput. 
Offshore shipping centers were introduced to overcome the prohibition of direct shipping 
with China and to attract transshipment cargos that were destined to/from China via Hong 
Kong or Japan. Privatization of container terminal operation and lifting restrictions on 
dedicated container terminals were other measures taken to make PoK more appealing to a 
wider range of shipping lines.  
PoD’s approach was rather different. The unification of port authorities (Port Rashid and 
Jebel Ali) balanced utilization of capacities in the two ports that had been hindered by the 
competition of two separate port authorities. This unification was also directed towards the 
twin ports co-functioning rather than competing for the same traffic. Moreover, PoD 
established a self-governing terminal operator, DPI, which initially took charge of operations 
in the twin ports and within a short time expanded substantially throughout the wider region.  
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Table 5.2: Strategic Developments in the1990s in PoD, PoK and PoR 
Dubai (PoD) Kaohsiung (PoK) Rotterdam (PoR) 
 “Dubai Port Authority” (DPA) formed by merging 
Port Authorities of Rashid and Jebel Ali to increase 
overall throughput while balancing volume in the 
two ports.  
 
 A division of DPA - Dubai Ports International 
(DPI) - started operating the twin ports of Port 
Rashid and Jebel Ali, removing foreign contractors 
(terminal operators) from ports’ operations.  
 
 Port Rashid was operated by a company owned by 
Gray Mackenzie (part of UK’s Inchcape group). 
Jebel Ali’s port operator was an American shipping 
company (Sealand). Other shipping lines were 
reluctant to use Jebel Ali as it was managed by a 
competitor. Also, the two port operators were 
competing for the same business, making it hard to 
optimize the use of facilities and capabilities on 
offer. 
 Offshore shipping center established to receive 
transshipment cargos from mainland China without 
the need for such cargos to anchor at a third port 
(such as Japan or Hong Kong) to overcome the 
prohibition of direct shipping with China, thus 
removing operational inefficiency, extra handling 
costs, loss of time and risk of transporting cross-
strait trade cargo. 
 
 Container terminal operations in Kaohsiung fully 
privatized (1998). 
 
 PoK lifted service restriction on dedicated 
container terminals to extend services to more 
shipping lines.  
 MV1’s final phase of development commenced 
with the construction of a large scale chemical 
plant and two European distribution centers 
(Reebok and Eurofrigo). 
 
 Botlek and Maasvlakte, two new distriparks, were 
created in PoR to accommodate chemical 
companies, logistics providers and a number of 
manufacturing companies that established their 
European Distribution Centers there.  
 
 PoR invested in KeyRail (company managing 
dedicated freight rail to the European hinterland) as 
part of Port Plan 2010 to upgrade intermodal 
connectivity to the hinterland. KeyRail is charged 
to ensure optimal use of the line through capacity 
allocation, scheduling and traffic control, 
management and maintenance as well as promoting 
use of rail transport.  
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5.1.3 2000s 
During the 2000s, the new Post Panamax (Panamax III, 11,000-15,000 TEU) vessels were 
introduced which placed extra pressure on ports to overcome their draft constraints while 
expanding their infrastructural capacity (Rodrigue, 2013a). Besides, ports had to face the 
challenge of ongoing alliances of shipping lines (e.g. New World, Grand Alliance, CKYH), 
which were aiming to expand their global coverage to reduce operating costs (Notteboom, 
2004). In addition to horizontal integration, shipping lines created a powerful position for 
themselves through vertical integration with stevedoring entities and third party logistics 
service providers (3PL) (Altunas and Gocer, 2014). For shipping lines, landside logistics 
became a source of differentiation, as well as a cost control center and revenue base, since the 
shipping industry was running competitively at the lowest margins (Notteboom, 2004). These 
changes demanded a higher level of flexibility in seaports in distributing goods and in 
providing value-adding logistics services, giving rise to port-centric logistics (Mangan et al., 
2008, Pettit and Beresford, 2009).  
Moreover, the globalization of trade that had begun a decade earlier was burgeoning. The 
container transportation system became progressively linked with complex logistics chains, 
supporting global production networks (Henderson et al., 2002, Coe et al., 2004). Seaports 
integration with supply chains intensified competition among adjacent ports due to their 
overlapping hinterlands (Zhang, 2008). Further integration of seaports with global supply 
chain networks required a higher level of participation by port authorities that extended their 
traditional roles of managing land use, developing concession policies and ensuring 
operations safety. 
During this period, traditional operation performance measures in seaports were replaced 
with other determinants, such as product differentiation and adaptability to changing market 
environments (Tongzon and Heng, 2005) (e.g. an emerging trend of ultra large container 
vessels, the introduction of new trade lanes with the advent of China’s industrialization and 
development of Chinese ports, as well as more complicated networks of maritime services). 
The three case seaports reacted to market variations in a number of ways (Table 5.3). Most 
notably, formation or reinvigoration of port clusters was on the agenda, and capacity creation 
projects were either continued or newly commenced. In PoD, the merger of DPA, Jafza and 
Dubai Customs into a single entity called Ports, Customs, Free Zone Corporation (PCFC) 
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created a one-stop platform for port users to interact with public authorities. The operation of 
this platform, as Dubai’s trade and logistics cluster, was streamlined by developing a number 
of e-services (e.g. Dubai Trade, e-token, and e-payment). In light of a sharp rise in the 
number of Jafza companies, PoD ended cargo operations at Port Rashid, making Jebel Ali the 
single location for port cargo services. During this period Dubai’s terminal operating firm, 
DP World, lifted its status from a regional operator to a global operator through two major 
acquisitions (CSX World, and P&O Ports). For PoD, the global participation of DP World 
was a means of integrating with global logistics chains, while extending the traditional roles 
of its port authority.  
When comparing it with PoD, the PoR’s attention to developing its port cluster is reflected in 
a number of similar and contrasting approaches. The similar methods of resource building 
were infrastructural developments, such as a dedicated ICT system (PortInfolink), and a land 
reclamation project (MV2). The distinctive resource building schemes in PoR were 
developing underground distribution systems (e.g. Multicore and RC2) that fortified the port 
cluster connectivity and the establishment of a traffic enterprise (Verkeersonderneming) 
aimed at promoting PoR’s hinterland accessibility. Corporatization of PoR in 2003 provided 
the flexibility required for extending its traditional functions, transforming its authority to a 
cluster manager. This resulted in substantial improvement of port performance (e.g. reducing 
operating costs and increasing capital investment, market share and overall profits) 
(Saragiotis and De Langen, 2016). Other attempts were made through PoR’s participation in 
a number of ventures to stimulate the growth of the port cluster in a number of ways. This 
was done either by enhancing the relationship between PoR and industries located inside the 
port land (Deltalinqs) or collaborating with the City of Rotterdam for transforming the city 
harbors (RCDC), and combatting CO2 emissions in the city, port and industrial complex 
(RCI). 
Moreover, PoR took an initial step towards embarking on an international venture in a project 
of exploitation and management of port and freezone in Sohar – Oman. Although this project 
was on an ad-hoc basis, it was an attempt by PoR to explore opportunities beyond its 
traditional functions, by integrating its operations into an extended global supply chain 
network. 
In comparison, PoK’s cluster activity was augmented with the launch of Free Trade Zones in 
the port area, aiming to expand volume of re-export trade to generate revenue from trade 
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service fees, and to increase income in foreign currencies. Other developments were made to 
improve the navigation operation in PoK (VTC and VTS), and to increase port security 
against terrorist attacks (ISPS). PoK’s quality certification (ISO9002 and 14001) were steps 
taken to raise the port’s image as a quality service port operator.  
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Table 5.3: Strategic Developments in the 2000s in PoD, PoK and PoR 
Dubai (PoD) Kaohsiung (PoK) Rotterdam (PoR) 
 DPA, Jafza and Customs merged to form Ports, Customs Free Zone 
Corporation (PCFC) to create a “one-stop” platform for port users to 
interact with public authorities and port operators and to provide a 
mechanism for a direct flow of custom duties to PCFC, rather than the 
state treasury. 
 DPA Invested in e-services (port community, Dubai Trade, e-token, 
e-payment, and Asara) to streamline operations throughout Dubai’s 
trade and logistics cluster, comprising seaport operations, air cargo 
operations, Jafza, and Customs. 
 DPI acquired CSX Terminals, transferring management of nine 
container terminals worldwide (total capacity of 14.6 million TEUs) 
to strengthened its position in South-East Asia, China, Australia, 
Europe and America  
 DPA and DPI merged to form DP World.  
 DP World acquired P&O (one of world’s major stevedoring 
companies) to expand its network into India, East Asia and Europe. 
The two acquisitions strengthened DP World and lifted its status from 
a regional port operator to a global port operator  
 Capacity expansion in Jebel Ali Terminal 2 commenced in 2007, as 
Dubai’s twin ports (Port Rashid and Jebel Ali) were operating close to 
their maximum capacity of 10,000,000 TEUs. 
 Port Rashid ended its cargo operations and became a cruise ship 
terminal (2008). All Dubai’s cargo operation became concentrated at 
Jebel Ali port.  
 Jebel Ali port participated in the Container Security Initiative (CSI) 
(launched by the U.S. Customs Bureau of Customs and Border 
Protection in 2002) as the first Middle Eastern port to join the 
initiative for handling cargoes directly bound for USA. 
 A navigating center, called 
Vessel Traffic Centre (VTC), 
and a Vessel Traffic Service 
(VTS) were introduced to 
provide a faster and safer service 
for shipping lines. 
 Free Trade Zones in the port area 
were launched to expand the 
volume of re-export trade to 
generate revenue from trade 
service fees, and to increase 
income from foreign currencies.  
 Construction of Container 
Terminal 5 began, expanding 
PoK’s capacity to 10,000,000 
TEUs. 
 International Ship & Port 
Security (ISPS) systems were 
implemented to improve port 
and vessel security against 
terrorist threats.  
 PoK obtained ISO 9002 and 
14001 quality certifications, 
raising the port’s image as a 
quality service port operator. 
 PoR invested in a dedicated logistics ICT system (PortInfoLink / 
PortBase) to improve ICT’s interface between terminals and the 
hinterland. 
 PoR undertook an international venture in Sohar - Oman to expand 
its revenue base beyond land rent and port dues. Agreement was 
made for exploitation and management of the port and freezone 
(initially until 2025, extended in 2007 until 2045).  
 PoR founded a port cluster association (Deltalinqs) to enhance the 
relationship between the port and the industries located within the 
port land to promote an entrepreneurial climate in the port area and 
to lobby for hinterland connections.  
 PoR built an underground distribution system for the chemical and 
gas industries (Multicore & RC2) to improve port to-cluster 
connectivity. 
 PoR launched 2nd land reclamation project (Maasvlakte 2 – MV2) to 
overcome the threat of space shortage by 2014.  
 PoR formed Rotterdam City Ports Development Corporation 
(RCDC) with City of Rotterdam to transform the city harbours into a 
sustainable combination of balanced port, city and living functions 
development.  
 PoR formed a joint venture with City of Rotterdam, Deltalinqs, and 
the local environmental protection agency - Rotterdam Climate 
Initiative (RCI) to combat CO2 emissions in the city, port, and 
industrial complex. 
 PoR established a traffic enterprise (Verkeersonderneming) to 
promote hinterland accessibility by widening A15 (the only highway 
from MV2 to the hinterland). 
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5.1.4 2010s – The Current Decade 
Since 2010, new strategic shipping alliances have taken shape. As a result, in 2017 the world 
container shipping fleet became dominated by three main alliances (i.e. The Alliance, Ocean 
Alliance, and 2M), which in combination, handles about 77% of the global container traffic 
(Sanchez and Mouftier, 2017). The alliance reshufflings had an impact on seaports as some 
locations (e.g. Singapore, and Rotterdam) managed to maintain the number of weekly calls at 
the expense of their neighboring ports (iContainers, 2017). Another challenge that ports had 
to encounter was the service of New-Panamax (12,500 TEU), and Tripe E (18,000 TEU) 
container vessels. The introduction of larger vessels posed a number of problems for ports 
including: i) availability of port infrastructure and equipment to accommodate mega-vessels, 
ii) availability of inland transportation systems to distribute gateway cargos, and iii) 
availability of substantial amount of cargo to be considered commercially feasible as a port of 
call for shipping lines (Rodrigue, 2013a). 
An additional factor that had impacted seaports, particularly in the Asian region, was the 
massive development of Chinese ports to the extent of dominating the global list of top 10 
container ports. In 2010, Shanghai became the top port in the global ranking, a status that has 
since been maintained. The rise of Chinese ports adversely affected the market share of many 
other Asian ports (e.g. Kaohsiung, Busan, Keelung) despite the continuous growth of 
throughput in those ports during the last few decades (Tongzon and Yang, 2016). 
Most recently, port cluster activities became an integral part of the port operation, as the 
concept of port-centric logistics became more significant (Mangan et al., 2008, Monios and 
Wilmsmeier, 2012). When compared to the last few decades, the success of seaports is 
influenced even more by their ability to exploit synergies within the port community, 
transport nodes, as well as other players in the logistics networks (Notteboom, 2010). This is 
amply demonstrated by the three case seaports, which embarked on a number of developing 
schemes with a rather diverse approach, apart from their ongoing capacity creation programs, 
as Table 5.4 reveals. 
In PoD, the acquisition of Jebel Ali Free Zone (Jafza) by DP World was an important step 
towards strengthening the Dubai port cluster. Although the port and free zone authorities 
were already operating under the same group (PCFC), the acquisition was taken to boost the 
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throughput of the port by combining the two assets, port and free zone. As stated by the 
Chairman of DP World, Sultan Ahmed Bin Sulayem: 
“Acquiring a strategically located asset integral to Jebel Ali’s continued success 
enhances our competitive advantage and aligns with our strategy of providing port-
centric integrated logistics solutions at key gateway locations” 
(WorldMaritimeNews, 2015). 
Another development that would enhance the clustering effect of PoD was finalizing 
construction plan for an intermodal rail terminal adjacent to Jebel Ali Terminal 1 to promote 
the port intermodal connectivity. Expansion of DP World, currently one of the largest 
terminal operators in the world, continued. DP World operates with a portfolio of tangible 
assets (property, plant and equipment) and intangible assets, including human capital (an 
international experienced and professional team of 37,000 people), structural capital 
(technical and professional knowledge, culture and databases), relational capital (established 
relationship with customers overtime), and brand reputation (customer recognition on the 
global scale). 
In PoK, the port reform process was finalized with the aim of creating efficiency. The focus 
of PoK authority was largely on land reclamation and capacity creation. Phase 2 of container 
Terminal 6, and projection of Terminal 7 were two large-scale construction plans for 
accommodating mega-vessels, as well as dredging along the waterline in Terminal 4 for 
deepening wharfs to provide access for larger vessels. Moreover, an Eco-port certification 
verified PoK’s environmental-friendly infrastructure and operation as the first seaport in the 
Asia-Pacific region being certified. PoK initiated an aggressive promotion of free trade zones 
that were introduced in 2004, although its efforts only had a marginal impact on container 
throughput (see Figure 4.2.3).  
In PoR, a wider range of developments were staged to strengthen the port cluster. Port 
infrastructural developments continued, although in an unconventional way as they were 
aligned with the requirement of transforming the port industrial cluster to a bio-based cluster 
(e.g. Plug and Play, Steam Grid). Intermodal connectivity of the port cluster was further 
enhanced by launching an inland transshipment terminal (Alpherium), and introducing a new 
logistics concept to bulk transfer containers via inland vessels in a single movement 
(Container Transferium). Setting up an information platform based on the concept of 
synchro-modality (NextLogic) as a means of optimizing operation of the inland container 
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shipping was another method to improve its cargo distribution networks. A number of other 
schemes were introduced by PoR to encourage and enrich innovative practices (e.g. 
collaborative project with universities, launching an open test facility in the port, and a field 
lab to promote 3D printing, and forming a start-up accelerator program). 
PoR expanded its participation in management and exploitation of other ports (both local and 
international). At the local level, PoR took over the development of the port of Dordrecht to 
connect with other Dutch ports as one network. The international participation of PoR, which 
had already began in the early 2000s in Oman, was expanded to a wider region (e.g. Brazil, 
China, and Indonesia) to strengthen the relationship of PoR authority with leading firms in 
different sectors. By leveraging on port management and knowhow, PoR is aiming to 
generate financially attractive business opportunities, and to increase volume and trade flows 
through Rotterdam. 
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Table 5.4. Strategic Development 2010s in PoD, PoK and PoR 
Dubai (PoD) Kaohsiung (PoK) Rotterdam (PoR) 
 Container handling capacity in Jebel 
Ali was expanded to 19,000,000 
TEUs through expansion of 
Terminal 2 and development of 
Container Terminal 3.  
 Construction contracts for Container 
Terminal 4 signed (2016), adding 
3,100,000 TEUs to the handling 
capacity of Jebel Ali port. 
 DP World acquired Jafza to 
strengthen the port industrial cluster 
(2015).  
 Construction plan for an intermodal 
rail terminal adjacent to Jebel Ali 
Terminal 1 to promote Intermodal 
connectivity commenced. 
 Port land expanded through land 
reclamation to construct deep water 
wharfs, giving PoK the ability to handle 
vessels up to 22,000 TEUs 
 Phase 1 construction of Terminal 6 
commenced, adding 2,800,000 TEUs to 
capacity. Terminal 6 is expected to 
increase capacity by another 4,000,000 
TEUs when Phase II construction is 
completed. 
 Planning to construct a new Container 
Terminal (Terminal 7) is finalized.  
 Kaohsiung became the first Asian 
commercial port certified as an Eco-port 
verifying its environmental friendly 
infrastructure and operations, boosting the 
port’s social image, and increasing its 
international visibility and recognition.  
 PoR launched an inland transshipment terminal (Alpherium) to enable the combined use of 
trucks and freight barges, to facilitate modal shift.  
 PoR invested in a new logistics concept (Container Transferium, CT) to bulk transfer 
containers via inland vessels in a single movement, thus promoting intermodal transport and 
hinterland connectivity. 
 PoR established collaborative projects with universities (e.g.,Smart Port, Generation R, 
RCIP) to offer training, research, and consultancy services linked to port activities.  
 PoR launched an open test facility within the port (Plant One) to enable firms in the port to 
test and develop new sustainable process technologies without disrupting their existing 
operations. 
 PoR invested with four other parties to promote a bio-based port cluster within the port by 
offering bundled services of energy, water, pipelines and tank storage in MV2 (Plug&Play), 
and distributing steam as residual energy between plants for industrial usage (Steam Grid). 
 PoR took over management and development of the Port of Dordrecht to strategically 
connect with other Dutch ports as one network. 
 PoR undertook a number of other international ventures (e.g. Brazil, China and Indonesia). 
The international strategy of PoR is to strengthen relationships of the port authority with 
leading firms in various sectors, to leverage the port management and knowhow, to generate 
financially- attractive business opportunities for PoR and port business community, and to 
increase volume and trade flows through Rotterdam.  
 PoR set up NextLogic, an information platform based on concept of synchro-modality using 
real-time information relayed by stakeholders, to optimize operations of inland container 
shipping.  
 PoR set up a field lab within the port as a location for 3D printing of marine parts to shape 
the growth of 3D printing industry in port. 
 PoR formed a start-up accelerator program centered on sectors of transportation, energy, 
chemical and refinery, to promote sustainable growth of port economy through port-related 
start-ups (PORTXL).  
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5.2 Resource Management Constructs  
The varying paths that the three case seaports have traversed over the last five decades 
suggest that eight different strategic resource-based strategies had been used. These strategies 
are presented as eight resource-based constructs below: resource agglomeration, resource 
agility, resource supplementarity, resource differentiation, resource fortification, resource 
adaptation, resource connectivity and resource alignment. Illustrative evidences on the use of 
the eight constructs for each case seaport are summarized in Table 5.5. 
5.2.1 Resource Agglomeration  
One of the most prominent resource-based strategies that all three case seaports have 
employed is resource agglomeration. This strategy focuses on locating related (both 
competing and complementary) resources (e.g. free trade zones, economic processing zones 
and logistics parks) near one another to create both economies of scale and economies of 
scope with the aim of generating strong multiplier effects to increase resource usage. As 
pointed out in Chapter 2, bundling resources that complement one another present 
opportunities for developing new capabilities and enhance learning (Harrison et al., 2001), 
leading to the generation of value beyond the sum of those created individually (Dyer and 
Singh, 1998, Lippman and Rumelt, 2003, Adegbesan, 2009). Further, resource agglomeration 
could create a “clustering effect”, where activities placed near a particular facility (e.g. 
container terminals and logistics parks) could benefit from its spill-over effects (Rodrigue, 
2017).  
There are many examples of resource agglomeration in the case of PoD, one of which is its 
investments in two seaports (Port Rashid, and Jebel Ali) with a vision of developing an 
entrepôt port in the Middle East. While the two ports did compete with each other, their 
resources were paired to complement each other. PoD’s capacity expansion programs 
(Terminal 4) in Jebel Ali port, which became the single location for cargo freight services, 
and the projection of an inter-modal rail terminal adjacent to Jebel Ali Terminal 1 to augment 
PoD’s regional accessibility are also examples of resource agglomeration. 
In the case of PoK, resource agglomeration was evident in its construction of four container 
terminals in the 1960s-1980s period, which created a combined capacity of about 9,000,000 
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TEUs, complemented by the launch of Taiwan’s first export processing zone in the port land 
(KEPZ). The introduction of Free Trade Zones, an addition to the bundle of port services to 
provide an impetus to stimulate container traffic growth at the port, was also an act of 
resource agglomeration. Likewise, the construction of the 5th terminal (completion) and the 
6th terminal (commencement) to expand PoK’s handling capacity were also instances of 
resource agglomeration. 
In the case of PoR, the combination of two reclamation projects (MV1 and MV2), and three 
distriparks to accommodate European Distribution Centers and house a range of industries is 
a clear case of locating related resources to take advantage of “clustering effect” (Rodrigue, 
2017) of common infrastructure and accessibility to transportation systems, and exhibits a 
situation of resource agglomeration. 
5.2.2 Resource Agility  
As a strategy, resource agility was only found in the experience of PoR among the three case 
seaports. As a construct, resource agility has been variously defined in the literature. In 
general, agility has been equated to responsiveness that requires specific capability (Van 
Hoek et al., 2001), visibility of demand, flexible changes, and synchronized operation 
(Aitken et al., 2002). Paixao and Marlow (2003), who viewed agility as a knowledge-based 
strategy that helps organizations to navigate quickly in a new setting, argued that developing 
agility requires: i) creating value for customers; ii) cooperating to improve competitiveness; 
iii) organizing change in a manner to adapt, and iv) leveraging people and the impact of 
information.  
This strategy was evident in PoR during the MV1 development, which initially was aimed at 
generating revenue in the port by allocating land for oil, chemical, iron and steel industries in 
the 1960s. Following the growing trend in containerization, PoR amended the development 
objectives of MV1, which became the largest container terminal location in the world. The 
shift in utilization of MV1 was a rapid response to external circumstances that exhibits PoR’s 
specific capability to respond flexibility to changing external circumstances based on 
visibility of demand to strengthen its operations.  
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5.2.3 Resource Supplementarity 
The third resource-based strategy identified in the cross-case analysis is resource 
supplementarity. Studies that gave reference to resource supplementarity commonly attribute 
the concept to value creation in strategic alliances (Das and Teng, 2000, Lin et al., 2008, 
Wassmer and Dussauge, 2011, Huang et al., 2013). This study views resource 
supplementarity as a strategic move to build peripheral resources to supplement existing core 
resource bases in seaports (Baltazar and Brooks, 2007) with the aim of creating new, valuable 
capabilities.  
In PoD, the introduction of a range of port ancillary services (Dubai Drydocks offering ship 
building, repair, and maintenance services) in proximity to Port Rashid is an illustration of 
using resource supplementarity to create a new capability.  
In PoK, opening the second harbour entrance as a means of improving its operational 
capabilities, and raising its overall handling capacity, is an example of building a peripheral 
resource to supplement an existing core resource.  
5.2.4 Resource Differentiation  
In organization studies, a differentiation strategy refers to the way in which firms make their 
products different from that of their competitors (Mosakowski, 1993) to create extra value in 
the eyes of customers (Baltazar and Brooks, 2007) and is considered a mean of providing 
competitive advantage (Aragón-Correa and Sharma, 2003). Akio (2005) identified two 
methods of resource differentiation: i) creating differentiation of resource value, and ii) 
adjusting the differentiation of resource value. In the context of seaports, Baltazar and Brooks 
(2007) described a differentiation strategy as having: 
“… an effectiveness focus … seeking to create a sustainable, differentiated set of 
product offerings in a particular part of the market that sets it apart from the others 
against which it competes”(p.389). 
In this light, this study defines resource differentiation as a strategic approach to differentiate 
the conditions relating to the use of available resources from those of competitors to optimize 
their rate of utilization. 
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Among the three case seaports, PoK is the only case that displays the strategy of resource 
differentiation. By developing the policy of leasing out terminals to a few selected shipping 
lines for their dedicated use, PoK managed to make its port products different from those of 
their competitors as a mean of gaining competitive advantage. By granting several selected 
shipping lines exclusive use of a terminal, PoK adopted differentiated its terminal resource to 
“exploit the factor markets disequilibrium” (Akio, 2005, p.141). Through this strategy, PoK 
was able to create extra value in the eyes of its customers (i.e., the shipping lines) “that set it 
apart from others against which it competes” (Baltazar and Brooks, 2007, p.389) and gained 
their commitment for the period of lease. In addition to optimizing the utilization rate of 
container terminals, PoK, a landlord port authority, also managed to rely on investments from 
shipping lines in container terminals and reduce the public investments in port 
superstructures. 
5.2.5 Resource Fortification  
Another resource-based strategy that all three case seaports have been engaged in is resource 
fortification. The main characteristics of this strategy are the introduction of features with the 
aim of refining and bolstering the utilization of available resources. In PoD, DP World was 
formed (through the merger of DPA and DPI) which unified the port governance and its 
operational division. Later, PoD strengthened the port industrial cluster by acquiring Jafza, 
which anticipated further utilization of port resources as a process of resource fortification. In 
PoK, building the cross-harbor tunnel that connected Qijin Island to the opposite bank to 
boost the utilization of the port land was a case of fortifying PoK’s existing resources. 
PoR also introduced a number of innovative schemes to fortify its resources. It set up 
collaborative projects with universities (e.g Smart Port, Generation R, RCIP) to promote 
innovation. PoR also launched an open test facility (Plant One) for firms in the port to 
facilitate development of new sustainable process technologies. In addition, PoR formed a 
start-up accelerator program (PORTXL) to promote sustainable growth of the port economy 
through port-related start-ups to further increase the use of its port infrastructure.  
5.2.6 Resource Adaptation 
Resource adaptation is another resource-based strategy employed by all three case seaports. 
A distinctive feature of the strategy is quick and flexible adaptation to dynamic market 
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changes, which require firms to have the capability and capacity to modify processes and 
resources in a way to create competitive advantage for themselves (Szymaniec-Mlicka, 
2014). The ability to learn and to modify resource configuration rapidly is a crucial element 
in a firm’s performance in dynamic situations (Chun and Montealegre, 2007). This study thus 
views resource adaption as a strategy to respond flexibly to external circumstances to add 
value to customer needs in a dynamic market. 
Illustrative evidence of PoD’s resource adaptation strategy can be discerned from its 
participation in the container security initiative (CSI) launched by the U.S. Bureau of 
Customs and Border Protection, allowing Dubai (as the first Middle Eastern port in the early 
2000s) to handle cargos directly bound for U.S. PoD’s capability to reconfigure its operation 
processes and reorganize its resources within a short time according to the requirements of 
CSI exemplifies the distinctive feature of the resource adaptation strategy. 
Likewise, PoK’s establishment of an offshore shipping center, a case of modifying resource 
configuration (Chun and Montealegre, 2007), to overcome the restrictions imposed on cross-
strait traffic between Taiwan and Mainland China is an instance of resource adaptation. 
PoK’s success in obtaining a number of quality certifications (e.g. ISO9002, and ISO14001) 
during 2000s to raise its image as a quality service port operator also reflects PoK’s 
capability in reconfiguring its resources to meet the quality management standards demanded 
by the maritime industry then.  
PoR practiced different methods of reviewing its resources and competences, depending on 
the situations encountered, and reconfigured those resources to create competitive advantage. 
A case in point is PoR’s second land reclamation project (MV2), which was proposed to 
overcome space shortage. The actual planning, however, was made through communication 
with stakeholders. Since development choices of MV2 (managing uncertainties about growth 
of the container industry, transport, surrounding policy and urgency) were made according to 
the requirements of stakeholders, this process reflects a case of resource adaptation. In fact, 
PoR had been adapting its resources and developing capabilities to meet stakeholder 
requirements, respond to market trends and blend in with technological advancements. This 
included: 1) forming a joint venture with the City of Rotterdam to combat CO2 emissions in 
the port, city, and industrial complex as well as transforming the city’s harbors by merging 
the port, city, and their living functions; 2) adapting to the trend of bio-based economies and 
investing in bundled services (e.g. Plug&Play, Steam Grid) to strengthen the port bio-based 
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cluster; and 3) introducing a field lab to shape the growth of a 3D printing industry within the 
port area. 
5.2.7 Resource Connectivity  
In the maritime industry, connectivity is a core capability and a key intangible asset. It 
reflects the ability of a seaport to connect with targeted customers, whether nautical 
(Cullinane and Wang, 2009, Lam, 2011), intermodal (De Langen and Sharypova, 2013) or 
even industry communal where independent firms cluster together in port regions (De Langen 
and Haezendonck, 2012). Port connectivity affects the transport and distribution of both port 
logistics products and port manufacturing products. This study defines resource connectivity 
as a strategic capability of seaports to develop resources (tangible and intangible) and their 
corresponding coordination capabilities to improve port connectivity. This strategy was 
visibly present in the case of PoD and PoR. 
In PoD, merging authorities through the creation of a one-stop platform, including the Dubai 
Ports, Free Zone and Customs Authorities (PCFC), as a cluster of independent firms (De 
Langen and Haezendonck, 2012), was a method of connecting resources. This strategy also 
served a second purpose of providing a system of direct flow of custom duties to PCFC rather 
than to the state treasury. PCFC per se became the initiator of a number of IT systems (e.g. 
Port Community, Dubai Trade, e-token, e-payment) that were instrumental in enhancing 
connectivity, streamlining Dubai’s trade and logistics cluster operations. DP World’s 
extensive internationalization program, which connects PoD with container terminals under 
the DP World umbrella, is also an integral part of PoD’s resource connectivity strategy. 
Similarly, PoR invested in a dedicated logistics ICT system to improve connectivity between 
port terminals and its hinterlands. Also by founding a port cluster association (Deltalinqs), 
PoR managed to enhance the relationship between the port and its industrial cluster, each 
owning a unique set of resources and capabilities, which influences their territory (Hervás-
Oliver and Albors-Garrigós, 2007). As distribution channels connecting PoR to the European 
hinterland were an essential element in attracting container traffic, PoR’s investment in 
KeyRail, the company managing the dedicated freight rail, and the traffic enterprise 
(Verkeersonderneming) reinforced its accessibility to hinterlands and its intermodal 
connectivity (De Langen and Sharypova, 2013). Most recently, PoR commenced another 
project (NextLogic) to promote connectivity based on the newly introduced concept of 
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synchro-modality. In addition, PoR took various approaches towards elevating physical 
connectivity of the port industrial cluster by investing in pipeline distribution systems 
(MultiCore & RC2). It also facilitated inter-modality in the port through other connectivity 
projects (i.e. Alpherium, Container Transferium).  
In a rather different approach to resource connectivity, PoR participated in international 
ventures (e.g. with Oman, Brazil, China and Indonesia) to develop a “World Port Network” 
by leveraging its port management capability and knowhow (PoR, 2017c). According to 
Meyer et al. (2009b) in a foreign entry context, resource development involves applying the 
existing knowledge of a firm by transferring and utilizing its specific advantages in foreign 
operations. By shaping the foreign entry network, PoR aimed to expand its revenue base 
beyond the local land rent and port dues, while generating financially attractive business 
opportunities for itself, and its port business community, as well as boosting volume and 
trade flows through Rotterdam. 
PoR implemented the same strategy in the local context by connecting to Dordrecht seaport 
(the most landward seaport in the Netherlands) through an agreement of port exploitation, 
development, and management. 
5.2.8 Resource Alignment 
Understandably, not all resources are perfectly tradable, as they are either blended with other 
resources or deeply rooted in other organizations (Chi, 1994). Thus, to access non-tradable 
resources owned by partner organizations and to create the most value for one’s existing 
resources, firms develop resource alignment schemes by aggregating, sharing or exchanging 
valuable resources with others, which come in different forms of partnerships (e.g. mergers, 
acquisitions and strategic alliances) (Das and Teng, 2000). From the resource-based view, the 
rationale of these partnerships is “value creation potential of resources that are pooled 
together” (Das and Teng, 2000, p.31). 
Both PoD and PoK exhibited evidence of using resource alignment strategy to merge their 
tangible and intangible resources with those of others to create value and spur growth. 
In PoD, the build-up of a resource bundle was realized through a process of “accumulation 
and trade” (Das and Teng, 2000). Thus, in order to access those resources, PoD established 
resource alignment schemes with its partners to create value. For instance, PoD tackled the 
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challenge of balancing the deployment of two pool of resources in the dual locations (Port 
Rashid and Jebel Ali) by two mechanisms: the merger of two separate port authorities (DPA), 
and the formation of an entity to operate the two ports (DPI). Integration of the twin ports in 
terms of their governance and operation was an instance of aligning resources, which 
accommodated and stimulated the overall throughput of PoD. Shortly afterwards, the 
decision to end Port Rashid’s cargo operation and to concentrate on Jebel Ali port as the 
single location for freight shipping activities represents another instance of aligning resources 
in PoD. 
Another example of resource alignment in PoD is its acquisitions of two major stevedoring 
companies (CSX Terminals and P&O Ports) to upgrade the status of its operating division 
(DPI, later called DP World) from a regional participant to a global operator. Acquiring new 
assets became instrumental for DP World as a global terminal operator and helped PoD to 
gain value from its strategic global participations and partnerships. DP World’s global 
participation as a form of foreign entry is a way of providing access to complementary 
resources (Anand and Delios, 1997, Meyer et al., 2009a). The foreign entry, as stated by 
Meyer et al. (2009b), is a means of augmenting a firm’s resource-base in two ways: i) 
exploring its existing knowledge through organizational learning (internal), and ii) accessing 
complementary knowledge (external).  
In PoK the full privatization of container terminal operations was a step taken towards 
improving its operational efficiency. Port operation efficiency can be maximized with the 
injection of private finance, operation and management knowledge, and the regulatory 
control of port authorities (Tongzon and Heng, 2005). Privatization thus exemplifies PoK’s 
strategy to align its available resources with the deeply rooted capabilities of the private 
sector to increase operations efficiency and spur growth.  
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Table 5.5: Competitive Resource Building, Usage and Deployment Strategies of PoD, PoK, and PoR 
Resource Building and 
Utilization Constructs 
Illustrative Evidence 
Dubai (PoD) Kaohsiung (PoK) Rotterdam (PoR) 
Resource Agglomeration  
 
Locating related (both 
competing and 
complementary) resources 
(e.g. free trade zones, 
economic processing zones 
and logistics parks) near one 
another to create both 
economies of scale and 
economies of scope with the 
aim of generating strong 
multiplier effects to increase 
resource usage.  
 In 1972 Port Rashid was established. By 
the late 1970s its container handling 
capacity had increased from 100,000 
TEUs in 11 berths to 1,500,000 TEUs in 
35 berths.  
 The 2nd port in the Jebel Ali area (largest 
man-made harbour in the world at the 
time) commenced construction in 1976 
and became operational with 5 berths in 
1979. First phase of Jebel Ali 
construction was completed by 1983, 
increasing handling capacity of Dubai 
Ports from 1,500,000 TEUs to about 
10,000,000 TEUs.  
 Container handling capacity in Jebel Ali 
was expanded to 19,000,000 TEUs 
through expansion of Terminal 2 and 
development of Container Terminal 3.  
 Construction contracts for Container 
Terminal 4 signed (2016), adding 
3,100,000 TEUs to the handling 
capacity of Jebel Ali port. 
 Construction plan for an intermodal rail 
terminal adjacent to Jebel Ali Terminal 
1 to promote Intermodal connectivity 
 
 PoK’s container operation commenced 
with the building of Terminals 1, 2, 3 and 
4 to produce a combined handling 
capacity of about 9,000,000 TEUs.  
 An Export Free Zone (Kaohsiung EPZ) 
was launched with assistance of foreign 
investment in the port to re-orientate 
industries from import substitution to 
export promotion. Products manufactured 
in EPZs were not permitted to be sold 
domestically. 
 Free Trade Zones in the port area were 
launched to expand volume of re-export 
trade to generate revenue from trade 
service fees, and to increase income from 
foreign currencies.  
 Construction of Container Terminal 5 
began, expanding PoK’s capacity to 
10,000,000 TEUs. 
 Phase 1 construction of Terminal 6 
commenced adding 2,800,000 TEUs to 
capacity of PoK. Terminal 6 is expected 
to increase port capacity by another 
4,000,000 TEUs when Phase II 
construction is completed. 
 Planning to construct a new Container 
Terminal (Terminal 7) is finalized  
 PoR commenced land reclamation 
project in Maasvlakte1 (MV1) based 
on seaport industrialization to create 
employment and to generate revenue 
by allocating land for oil, chemical, 
iron and steel industries. 
 Formation of first distripark 
(Eemhaven) in PoR, bringing 
container terminals closer to its main 
cargo source.  
 MV1 final phase of development 
commenced with construction of a 
large-scale chemical plant and two 
European distribution centers 
(Reebok, and Eurofrigo).  
 Botlek and Maasvlakte, two new 
distriparks were introduced in PoR to 
accommodate chemical companies, 
logistics providers and a number of 
manufacturing companies that 
established their European 
Distribution Centers.  
 PoR launched 2nd land reclamation 
project (Maasvlakte 2 – MV2) to 
overcome threat of space shortage by 
2014.  
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Resource Building and 
Utilization Constructs 
Illustrative Evidence 
Dubai (PoD) Kaohsiung (PoK) Rotterdam (PoR) 
Resource Agility  
 
Utilizing existing resources to 
respond quickly to external 
circumstances  
Not evident Not evident 
 Environmental concerns and 
containerization resulted in amendment of 
development objectives for MV1. 
Allocation of port land to container 
terminals helped MV1 to become one of 
the world’s largest container terminal 
locations.  
Resource Supplementarity  
 
Building additional port-related 
infrastructure in close proximity 
as a supplement to port products 
to create new capabilities in port  
 A range of port ancillary services, 
shipbuilding, repair and maintenance 
services were introduced in Dubai Drydocks, 
located south of Port Rashid to build a 
bundle of maritime services. 
 2nd harbor entrance opened to overcome 
national defense concerns about a single 
entrance port and to improve operational 
capabilities by making the inner harbor 
accessible to larger vessels. Opening 2nd 
entrance and constructing several piers around 
it also facilitated utilization of Qijin district, 
raising PoK’s overall handling capacity.  
Not evident 
Resource Fortification  
 
Introducing features to refine and 
enhance utilization of available 
resources  
 DPA and DPI merged to form DP World. 
 DP World acquired Jafza to strengthen the 
port industrial cluster.  
 Cross-harbor tunnel opened to connect Qijin 
district to opposite bank to streamline cargo 
traffic and increasing capacity growth of port. 
 A navigating center, called Vessel Traffic 
Centre (VTC), and Vessel Traffic Service 
(VTS) were introduced to provide a faster and 
safer service for shipping lines. 
 International Ship & Port Security (ISPS) 
systems were implemented to improve port 
and vessel security against terrorist threats.  
 PoR established collaborative projects with 
universities (e.g. Smart Port, Generation R, 
RCIP) to offer training, research, and 
consultancy services linked to port 
activities.  
 PoR launched an open test facility within 
the port (Plant One) to enable firms in the 
port to test and develop new sustainable 
process technologies without disrupting 
their existing operations. 
 PoR formed a start-up accelerator program 
(PORTXL) centered on sectors of 
transportation, energy, chemical, and 
refinery, to promote sustainable growth of 
port economy through port-related start-
ups.  
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Resource Building and 
Utilization Constructs 
Illustrative Evidence 
Dubai (PoD) Kaohsiung (PoK) Rotterdam (PoR) 
Resource Differentiation  
 
Differentiating the conditions 
relating to the use of available 
resources to optimize their rate of 
utilization  
Not evident 
 PoK offered dedicated terminals to shipping lines to 
ensure their commitment, to reduce public 
investment in port and to generate new traffic. 
Dedicated terminals offer greater flexibility, 
reliability and shorter turnaround times to terminal 
operators, boosting their logistics efficiency.  
Not evident 
Resource Adaptation  
 
Exploiting existing resources to 
respond flexibly to external 
circumstances and add value to 
customer needs 
Jebel Ali port 
participated in the 
Container Security 
Initiative (CSI) 
(launched by the U.S. 
Bureau of Customs and 
Border Protection in 
2002) as the first 
Middle East port to join 
the initiative for 
handling cargos directly 
bound for USA. 
 Offshore shipping center established to receive 
transshipment cargos from mainland China without 
the need for transshipment cargos to anchor at a 
third place (such as Japan or Hong Kong) to 
overcome the prohibition of direct shipping with 
China, thus removing operations inefficiency, extra 
handling costs, downtime and risk of transporting 
cross-strait trade cargo. 
 PoK obtained ISO 9002 and 14001 quality 
certification, raising the port’s image as a quality 
service port operator. 
 PoK became the first Asian commercial port 
certified as an Eco-port, verifying its environmental 
friendly infrastructure and operations, boosting the 
port’s social image, and increasing its international 
visibility and recognition.  
 Port land expanded through land reclamation 
(International Container Terminal - ICT Project 
Phase II) to construct 5 new deep water wharves 
(serviceable depth of 18m) giving PoK the ability to 
handle vessels up to 22,000 TEUs  
 PoK lifted service restriction on dedicated container 
terminals to extend services to more shipping lines.  
 Development of MV2 project; MV2 was an uncertain project 
in terms of growth of container transport, surrounding policy, 
and its urgency. PoR managed to explain the uncertainty to 
stakeholders and made choices accordingly.  
 PoR formed a joint venture with City of Rotterdam, Deltalinqs, 
and local environmental protection agency - Rotterdam 
Climate Initiative (RCI) to combat CO2 emissions in the city, 
port, and industrial complex. 
 PoR formed Rotterdam City Ports Development Corporation 
(RCDC) with City of Rotterdam to transform the city harbors 
into a sustainable combination of balanced port, city and living 
functions development.  
 PoR invested with four other parties to promote a bio-based 
cluster within the port by offering bundled services of energy, 
water, pipelines and tank storage in MV2 (Plug&Play) and 
distributing steam as residual energy between plants for 
industrial usage (Steam Grid).  
 PoR set up a field lab within the port as a location for 3D 
printing of marine parts to shape the growth of a 3D printing 
industry in port. 
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Resource Building and 
Utilization Constructs 
Illustrative Evidence 
Dubai (PoD) Kaohsiung (PoK) Rotterdam (PoR) 
Resource Connectivity  
 
Developing resources 
(tangible and intangible) and 
their coordination to improve 
port connectivity  
 DPA, Jafza and Customs 
merged to form Ports, 
Customs Free Zone 
Corporation (PCFC) to 
create a “one-stop” 
platform for port users to 
interact with public 
authorities and port 
operators and to provide a 
mechanism for a direct 
flow of custom duties to 
PCFC, rather than to the 
state treasury. 
 DPA Invested in e-
services (port community, 
Dubai Trade, e-token, e-
payment, and Asara) to 
streamline operations 
throughout Dubai’s trade 
and logistics cluster, 
comprising seaport 
operations, air cargo 
operations, Jebel Ali Free 
Zone, and Customs. 
 DP World developed 
from a local port operator 
to a regional port operator 
and further to a global 
port operator. 
Not evident 
 PoR invested in KeyRail (company managing dedicated freight rail to 
European hinterland) as part of Port Plan 2010 to upgrade intermodal 
connectivity to PoR’s hinterland. KeyRail is responsible to ensure optimal use 
of the line through capacity allocation, scheduling and traffic control, 
management and maintenance as well as promoting use of rail transport  
 PoR invested in a dedicated logistics ICT system (PortInfoLink / PortBase) to 
improve ICT interface between terminals and the hinterland. 
 PoR founded a port cluster association (Deltalinqs) to enhance relationships 
between port and industries within the port land to promote an entrepreneurial 
climate in the port area and to lobby for hinterland connections.  
 PoR built an underground distribution system for chemical and gas industries 
(Multicore & RC2) to improve port- to-cluster connectivity. 
 PoR established a traffic enterprise (Verkeersonderneming) to promote 
hinterland accessibility by widening A15 (the only highway from MV2 to the 
hinterland). 
 PoR launched an inland transshipment terminal (Alpherium) to enable the 
combined use of trucks and freight barge, to facilitate modal shift.  
 PoR invested in a new logistics concept (Container Transferium, CT) to bulk 
transfer containers via inland vessels in a single movement, thus promoting 
intermodal transport and hinterland connectivity. 
 PoR took over management and development of port of Dordrecht to 
strategically connect with other Dutch ports as one network. 
 PoR set up NextLogic, an information platform based on the concept of 
synchro-modality using real-time information relayed by stakeholders, to 
optimize operations of inland container shipping.  
 PoR undertook its first international venture in Oman (Sohar) (2002) 
 A number of other ventures in international scale (e.g. Brazil, China, 
Indonesia) to expand its revenue base beyond land rent and port dues. The 
international strategy of PoR is to strengthen relationship of the port authority 
with leading firms in various sectors, leverage the port management and 
knowhow, generate financially attractive business opportunities for PoR and 
port business community, and increase volume and trade flows through 
Rotterdam.  
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Resource Building and 
Utilization Constructs 
Illustrative Evidence 
Dubai (PoD) Kaohsiung (PoK) 
Rotterdam 
(PoR) 
Resource Alignment  
 
Alignment of tangible and 
intangible resources to 
accommodate, and spur 
anticipated growth 
 “Dubai Port Authority” (DPA) formed by merging Port Authorities of Rashid and 
Jebel Ali to increase overall throughput while balancing volume in the two ports.  
 A division of DPA - Dubai Ports International (DPI) - started operating the twin ports 
of Port Rashid and Jebel Ali, removing foreign contractors (terminal operators) from 
ports' operations.  
 Port Rashid was operated by a company owned by Gray Mackenzie (part of UK’s 
Inchcape group). Jebel Ali port operator was an American shipping company 
(Sealand). Other shipping lines were reluctant to use Jebel Ali as it was managed by a 
competitor. Also the two port operators were competing for the same business, 
making it hard to optimize use of facilities and capabilities on offer.  
 Capacity expansion in Jebel Ali Terminal 2 commenced in 2007, as Dubai twin ports 
(Port Rashid and Jebel Ali) were operating close to their maximum capacity of 
10,000,000 TEUs. 
 Port Rashid ended its cargo operations and became a cruise ship terminal (2008). All 
Dubai’s cargo operations became concentrated at Jebel Ali port. 
 DPI acquired CSX Terminals, transferring management of nine container terminals 
worldwide (total capacity of 14.6 million TEUs) to strengthen its position in South 
East Asia, China, Australia, Europe and America  
 DP World acquired P&O (one of the world’s major stevedoring companies) to expand 
its network to India, East Asia and Europe. The two acquisitions strengthened DP 
World and lifted its status from a regional port operator to a global port operator.  
Container terminal 
operations in Kaohsiung 
fully privatized (1998). 
Not evident 
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 5.3 Strategic Development Paths: A Resource-Based Perspective  
The developmental paths undertaken by Dubai, Kaohsiung and Rotterdam Ports in relation to 
their competitive resource building, usage and deployment strategies are next examined with 
a view to understanding their impetus to resource development and management at different 
times. The rationale for this analysis is inspired by Akio (2005), who argued that:  
“… the ultimate attribute of the competitive advantage of the firm is the firm’s skill 
(accuracy) at perceiving the future value of resources” (p.139). 
5.3.1 Dubai  
The 1960s was a period of extensive oil exploration and production in the Middle East. UAE 
became a member of OPEC in 1967 and Dubai started to export oil in 1969, sparking the 
need to develop an entrepôt port in the Middle East. PoD’s strategy of building resources was 
centered on resource agglomeration and resource supplementarity. The fortune generated 
from export of oil allowed Dubai to make ample and simultaneous resource investments in 
two seaports (Port Rashid and Jebel Ali) and to build an international airport. As the two 
seaports complemented each other in terms of handling capacity, while competing to attract 
the same traffic, their development illustrates PoD’s strategy of resource agglomeration. 
In the mid 1980s, during a major regional conflict (Iran-Iraq War), Dubai introduced two 
other important elements to its development plan, which complemented the rich port-related 
resources of PoD, anchoring it as the distribution hub of the region. First, a Free Trade Zone 
(Jafza) adjacent to Jebel Ali port hosting regional production and distribution centers of 
global and multinational corporations stimulated Dubai’s economic growth. Second, an 
airline (Emirates Airline) air-linking the economy to the wider (Middle East) region and to 
the rest of the world, contributed to building intermodal capabilities in Dubai. PoD 
introduced a range of port ancillary services (e.g. ship building, repair and maintenance) in 
Dubai Drydocks that were supplementary to its primary maritime services, thus exhibiting the 
use of a resource supplementarity strategy.  
In the 1990s and 2000s as the Middle-East region became engulfed in a series of conflicts 
(e.g. 1st Gulf War and economic sanctions imposed on Iran), PoD was fortunate to be 
immune from the turmoil, and developed to be the regional transshipment and distribution 
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hub through opportunities created from those regional tensions. To ensure the utilization of 
its available resources, PoD embarked on a strategy of aligning its port and maritime 
resources. PoD integrated the governance and operation in the two ports of Jebel Ali and Port 
Rashid to stimulate their overall throughput. Since that time, the growth of PoD has been 
fully orchestrated by the DPA, with full control and decisions over all aspects of the port 
development and operations, from pricing of custom duties and setting of terminal tariffs to 
the imposition of restriction on dedicated terminals for shipping lines (Jacobs and Hall, 
2007). As Jacobs (2007) observed, the DPA institutional arrangement provides strategic 
financial incentives to attract container traffic.  
“It can engage in strategic pricing through considerable discounts on the terminal 
tariffs and the custom duties that, in combination with efficient procedures and 
operations, allow the shipping lines and their clients to capture value” (p.137). 
In the early 2000s, PoD was driven by aspirations of operating as a regional main port, while 
exploring opportunities created by the 2nd Gulf War. PoD extended the strategy of resource 
agglomeration by constructing a new container terminal at Jebel Ali port, and the strategy of 
resource re-alignment by ending the cargo operation in Port Rashid, concentrating all Dubai’s 
cargo operation at Jebel Ali. A number of new strategic decisions were made by PoD for 
alleviating its operations: resource connectivity, resource fortification and resource 
adaptation. PoD merged with Dubai Customs and Free Zone authorities (PCFC) as a one-
stop platform, and launched IT systems (e.g. Port Community, Dubai Trade, e-token, e-
payment) to improve connectivity in the port industrial cluster. The PCFC merger became a 
key strength in positioning PoD as a main port of entry for the Middle Eastern and African 
cargos, when UAE joined the Customs Union of Gulf Co-operation Council in 2003. PoD 
underwent another merger, this time between its port authority (DPA) and its operating entity 
(DPI), which realized the strategy of resource fortification to strengthen the capabilities of 
both organizations through the newly-formed company, DP World. Furthermore, PoD 
participated in the Container Security Initiative (CSI), as the first port in the Middle-East to 
introduce the initiative after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, thus creating a competitive advantage 
by adapting its resources to the external circumstances. In mid 2000s, PoD developed the 
strategy of resource alignment, when its terminal operating division (DPI, later called DP 
World) was thriving. Two major acquisitions (CSX Terminals and P&O) aligned its resource 
base beyond international borders and upgraded the operating entity of PoD to a global 
operator. 
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Dubai’s logistics enclave began a transition towards a new era in 2005 with the introduction 
of an integrated multimodal transport platform (Dubai Logistics Corridor) connecting sea, 
land and air as a single bonded free zone. The platform, which was launched in 2010, became 
a new engine for further industrial transformation in Jebel Ali, with the construction of a new 
airport (Al Maktoum Airport) at its core, supported by a logistics district and a free zone 
(DLC) designed to provide value-added services and to facilitate fast-cycle businesses. The 
new logistics platform brought strategic prospects for further developments in PoD, which 
can be identified as resource agglomeration and resource fortification. The PoD’s capacity 
expansion plan (Terminal 4) and an inter-modal rail terminal to be established adjacent to 
Jebel Ali Terminal 1 are further enhancements and incremental to PoD’s resource usage, 
which are also a strategy of resource agglomeration. The launch of Mirsal 2 (comprehensive 
e-customs declaration system) and formation of a logistics cluster platform as a permanent 
network fostering collaboration between stakeholders, were other means of increasing growth 
and competitiveness in Dubai’s logistics cluster. In a similar attempt to further strengthen the 
port industrial cluster, PoD took over Jafza in 2015, which augmented a strategically located 
asset, to fortify its resources. PoD’s global terminal operating company (DP World) has 
continued its global expansion since 2010 with new concession agreements (e.g. London 
Gateway - UK, Canada, India, Egypt and Turkey), indicating the extension of PoD’s 
international strategy. 
For most of the last 50 years, Dubai’s entire mega-project development, comprising port 
planning, physical expansion and further advancement, was coordinated. The infrastructural 
investments were not limited to ports, maritime, free zones and road transport facilities. The 
aviation industry and information technology systems were equally fundamental, as Saidi et 
al. (2010) put it. 
“Dubai is entering and creating a new geography where infrastructure and logistics 
with institutional trade facilities will multiply opportunities for trade and provide 
international connectedness for a region that has been, so far, on the periphery of 
global supply chains” (p.24). 
PoD’s investment to expand its port-related physical infrastructure underscores a far-sighted 
vision of resource agglomeration, which spans the decades. Equally, its development path 
also suggests a continuous resource alignment: developing parallel tangible and intangible 
resources to spur, and accommodate, anticipated growth throughout the 1990s and 2000s. 
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Another recurrent strategy of PoD in building resources since 2000 is resource fortification, 
either by mergers and acquisitions, or participation in programs (e.g. CSI) to ensure the 
optimal utilization of its expanding physical resources. The resource-based strategies of PoD 
in relation to its major regional drivers are presented in Figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5.1: PoD Resource Based Strategies in relation to the Major Regional Drivers
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5.3.2 Kaohsiung 
Between the mid-1960s and late 1980s, PoK’s development was driven by the national 
economic agenda to transition from an agricultural and fishery economy to an industrialized 
economy with a focus on manufacturing, processing and assembly, driven by an export-
oriented policy that formed a trade triangle partnership with Japan, and U.S. (and Western 
Europe). The earliest strategies deployed by PoK for developing resources are recognized as 
resource agglomeration, resource fortification and resource complementarity, as well as 
resource differentiation. PoK created ample handling capacity of about 9,000,000 TEUs that 
equipped the port with facilities in line with services used by Taiwan’s main trade partners 
(Japan and U.S.). This was effected in combination with hosting the first export processing 
zone of Taiwan (KEPZ) that initiated a custom-free manufacturing zone in the port area. 
That, in turn, provided an impetus to container traffic growth. These moves are all in line 
with the strategy of resource agglomeration. By leasing out terminals to a few strategically-
selected shipping lines for their dedicated use, PoK managed to reduce the financial burden 
of investments and optimized the container terminals utilization rate, which exhibited a 
strategy of resource differentiation. Meanwhile, the rapid growth of Taiwan’s manufacturing 
industries reinforced the position of the Kaohsiung region as an industrial cluster, 
encompassing manufacturing, petrochemicals, oil and steel, and ship-building industries. 
Hence, other strategies of streamlining cargo traffic were in place in PoK as Taiwan’s main 
trade gateway. The first construction project of PoK was to open a second harbor entrance, 
which supplemented its resources by improving the port operational capabilities and raised 
the overall handling capacity. In the second project, PoK built the cross-harbor tunnel that 
connects Qijin Island. That enhanced utilization of port land and illustrates the strategy of 
resource fortification. 
In the 1990s when PoK’s capacity was deemed sufficient, it implemented two other resource-
based strategies: resource alignment and resource adaptation. Following the nationwide 
process of liberalization and introduction of BOT scheme for overcoming the financial 
burden of infrastructural developments which had previously been financed by the State, PoK 
aligned its resources by: i) privatizing its container terminal operation as a strategy to 
improve operational efficiency and to maximize the growth of container traffic, and ii) 
implementing the BOT scheme when developing the new container terminals in PoK, 
offering long term exclusive leases (e.g. 10 years) of container berths to persuade shipping 
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lines of its BOT scheme. Since container terminal investment is a major strategic decision 
based on cost-benefit analysis, not many deep-sea container carriers were financially capable 
and interested in participating (Wiegmans et al., 2008). PoK also managed to adapt to the 
changing market demand by reviewing its policy about dedicated terminals that had 
prevented PoK from extending services to other shipping lines. In addition, PoK adapted to 
the new political circumstances following an easing of Taiwan’s political enmity with China, 
by establishing an offshore shipping center to overcome the restrictions imposed on cross-
strait traffic between Taiwan and Mainland China. As explained in Chapter Four, the 
initiative did have an effect in boosting the transshipment traffic at PoK, which was vital for a 
seaport that did not have a sizeable physical hinterland. Eventually, the direct trade ban was 
lifted and direct shipping services between Taiwan and China started in 2009.  
In the 2000s, PoK extended three strategies that had been implemented in earlier phases of 
development: resource agglomeration, resource adaptation and resource fortification. 
Following the policy of “free ports” presented by the Taiwanese government offering port 
users the benefit of operating through a single window administration and facilitating free 
flow of goods within free ports, PoK launched a free trade zone to create value for enterprises 
through their integration with supply chains, and proximity to seaport and airport. In addition 
to expanding the notion of Free Trade Zones throughout the port area, PoK commenced 
projects to expand its handling capacity (completion of the 5th terminal, and commencement 
of the 6th terminal), which created a new bundle of port services. These demonstrate the 
strategy of resource agglomeration. PoK introduced other features (e.g. a navigating center 
and vessel traffic service to provide a faster and safer service for shipping, implementing 
ISPS systems to improve port and vessel security against terrorist threats). These enhanced 
usage of its facilities, portraying a strategy of resource fortification. PoK also managed to 
raise its image as a quality service port operator by acquiring quality certifications (e.g., 
ISO9002 and ISO 14001), which was a case of adapting its resources to meet the needs of 
new industrial trends. 
In 2011, Taiwan’s major ports were merged through the establishment of a state-owned 
company (TIPC) with the object of promoting collaboration, coordination and decreasing 
inter-port competition. In PoK, the new port governance initiated construction of the 2nd 
phase of Container Terminal 6 in 2011, a large scale land reclamation project. Upon its 
completion in 2019, this project would enable PoK to serve the latest generation of mega-
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vessels (resource adaptation). On TIPC’s agenda, another scheme was called “Greening the 
Ports Action Plan”, which prompted EcoPort certification in PoK in 2014 as the first Eco-
Port in Asia-Pacific. By obtaining this certification, PoK adapted its resources to the call for 
environmentally friendly infrastructure and operation procedures, which is expected to attract 
port users (shipping lines, shippers and logistic providers) to expand their operations in PoK, 
thus boosting PoK’s overall business performance. 
The development path taken by PoK over the last 50 years reveals continuous 
implementation of resource agglomeration, by locating tangible and intangible resources 
(terminals, EPZ, Free Trade zone) within close proximity to each other to enhance the usage 
of its physical assets. Further development of available resources in PoK was made through 
resource fortification schemes across the decades. As processes of responding to external 
circumstances and adapting to new competitive environment, PoK began to use methods of 
resource adaptation in the 1990s. The resource-based strategies of PoK in relation to its 
major regional drivers over the last five decades is shown in Figure 5.2. 
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Figure 5.2: PoK Resource Based Strategies in relation to the Major Regional Drivers
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5.3.3 Rotterdam  
In the 1960s, seaport industrialization in PoR began with the first land reclamation project 
(MV1) from the North Sea, aiming to generate revenue in the port by allocating land for oil, 
chemical, iron and steel industries. Following the trend of containerization, PoR swiftly 
amended the objectives of MV1 by allotting the developed land to container terminal 
operations. The shift in utilization of MV1, which made PoR one of the largest container 
terminal locations in the world, was a rapid response to external circumstances and can be 
identified as a strategy of resource agility. 
In the 1980s, concurrent with the growth of container terminals, PoR developed its first 
distribution park (Eemhaven), bringing container terminals closer to its main cargo source as 
a strategic choice of locating related resources with the aim of generating a strong multiplier 
effect. This was a strategy of agglomerating resources following the Dutch national strategic 
plan: it branded PoR as a main-port and a location to stimulate foreign direct investments and 
proved to be a success. The Netherlands’ net inflows of FDI increased significantly (3.5 times 
in the 1970s and1980s, and more than 4.5 times over the next decade) with a significant surge 
in re-exports. 
In the 1990s, the era of European Union integration, more than half the European distribution 
centers were located in the Netherlands. During this period, PoR extended its strategy of 
resource agglomeration by introducing two new distribution parks (Botlek and Maasvlakte) 
which were capable of offering comprehensive facilities (e.g. warehousing, forwarding, 
documentation, packing, labeling, assembling, sampling and providing quality control) (Van 
der Lugt et al., 2007) in three different districts of the port. For PoR, distribution channels 
connecting it to the European hinterland was an essential element in attracting container 
traffic. Consequently, PoR made the decision of investing in the company (KeyRail) that 
managed the dedicated freight railway (Betuweroute), which links Rotterdam to the European 
hinterland via Germany. This reinforces the connectivity of its distribution channels. 
In the 2000s, PoR extended both strategies of resource connectivity and resource 
agglomeration. The resource connectivity strategy was motived by the Dutch national 
development policies (promoting connections between nodes, hinterlands, and forelands) and 
was realized by the newly reformed authority of PoR. This broadened the traditional focus of 
development through strengthening the port industrial cluster and applying sustainable 
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practices. PoR used various approaches to meet the new objectives of elevating physical 
connectivity of the port industrial cluster by investing in pipeline distribution systems 
(MultiCore & RC2), reinforcing road accessibility to the hinterlands by founding a traffic 
enterprise (Verkeersonderneming), improving ICT interface between terminals and 
hinterlands (PortInfoLink) and enhancing the relationship between the PoR authority and 
industries located within the port area with the formation of the port cluster association 
(Deltalinqs). In addition, PoR established a commercial presence abroad by entering into a 
partnership of seaport development project, as a reaction to the intense regional competition 
between seaports in Northern Europe. PoR sought options for expanding business beyond 
national boundaries, particularly in high-growth areas, as an entrance strategy into 
sustainable, and difficult-to-imitate partnerships. By capitalizing on its knowhow, PoR’s 
finalized its first ad hoc concession agreement for construction and management of Port of 
Sohar (a free zone) in Oman until 2045. PoR has since further extended its resource base by 
developing a “World Port Network” (PoR, 2017c) by participating in collaborative initiatives 
with other countries (e.g. Brazil, China and Indonesia). The main objectives of these 
participations, as revealed by Dooms et al (2013), were to attract overseas customers, to 
improve the position of the port by bolstering the physical transport network (both inland and 
maritime), and to develop and improve competencies by building long-term strategic 
relationships. In this regard, Jansen (2013) also elaborated that a stronger network is created 
when more companies are strategically connected to port authorities at both ends of the 
supply chain. 
By taking advantage of these objectives, PoR further connected its resource base through 
international participation with a geographical spread since the 2000s (see Table 4.1.8), and 
has created advantages such as:  
o Unparalleled business opportunities in growth markets; 
o A transparent, competitive and safe business environment; 
o Acclaimed and proven port management system based on the landlord principle; 
o Good hinterland connections, sufficient scale, and diversification in terms of 
activities, including a mix of container logistics, petrochemical industry and 
energy industry, and  
o Consistent application of world class standards in contracts and rules & 
regulations (PoR, 2017c) 
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With regard to resource agglomeration, PoR launched the second land reclamation project 
(MV2) to overcome space shortage in the port area that had been anticipated to occur by 
2014, while the final phase of development on MV1 was on track. However, MV2 was an 
uncertain project in terms of growth of container traffic, and its urgency. PoR managed to 
overcome that uncertainty through effecting good communications with its stakeholders, and 
making development choices according to their requirements. This process reflects a strategy 
of resource adaptation. Furthermore, PoR commenced sustainable practices in the form of a 
partnership with the City of Rotterdam (RCDC), which is also considered a strategy of 
resource adaptation, aiming to balance the port, city and living functions by transforming the 
city harbors. 
Since 2010, PoR has extended its resource agglomeration, resource adaptation, and resource 
connectivity strategies. The ongoing development of MV2 was a case of resource 
agglomeration strategy. PoR began a transition towards utilizing bio-based materials and 
renewable energy resources by adapting to the Dutch national future development scenarios. 
The offering of bundled services of energy, water, pipelines, and tank storage in MV2 (Plug 
& Play), and a stream distribution system between plants for industrial usage (Steam Grid), 
promoted a bio-based cluster in the port. PoR also started a field lab in the port for 3D 
printing of marine parts, shaping the growth of 3D printing industry. This is another instance 
of means of resource adaptation to the Dutch national agenda of forming a 3D technology 
global cluster in the Rotterdam area as a core element of future economic strategy. PoR’s 
innovative developments did not put its traditional growth mechanisms on hold. While the 
ongoing expansion of MV2 was on track, PoR re-emphasized its position as a main-port 
through investments in hinterland connectivity projects (Alpherium, Container Transferium) 
to facilitate inter-modality. More recently, PoR has commenced another project (NextLogic) 
to promote connectivity based on the newly-introduced concept of synchro-modality. In 
addition, PoR has initiated innovative features aimed to provide firms in the port with 
applicable knowledge, including the following examples: launching collaborative projects 
with universities; opening a test facility (Plant One), and forming a start-up accelerator 
program (PortXL) to fortify the use of its resources. The resource-based strategies of PoR in 
relation to its key regional drivers over the last five decades are depicted in Figure 5.3. 
The development path of PoR over the last 50 years consists of large scale and ongoing 
spatial expansion programs for creating excess capacity: Maasvlakte1 (1968-2008) and 
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Maasvlakte2 (2008-2030) in parallel with restoration of the city terminals to increase 
efficiency, and the launch of three distriparks. This is an obvious case of resource 
agglomeration. The spatial developments are based on the business model approach, with the 
PoR bearing all the costs and risks of reclaiming, building, and exploitation. In order to 
minimize the risk of developing these mega-projects, the PoR authorities have deployed a 
number of strategies to align the expansion projects with market trends and requirement of 
stakeholders. In MV1, the quick shift in allocation of land from oil, chemical and steel 
industries to container, bulk and liquid terminals illustrates resource agility. In MV2, the 
continual engagement with stakeholders to minimize uncertainties reflects a process of 
resource adaptation. Connectivity of the port cluster to the hinterlands has also been a matter 
of great significance for PoR, and which has been promoted through numerous initiatives 
uninterruptedly since the 1990s. Lastly, PoR has continued its resource adaptation schemes 
by investing in bio-based industries in line with the growing trend of developing a bio-based 
economy in the Netherlands. These are also depicted in Figure 5.3. 
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Figure 5.3: PoR Resource Based Strategies in relation to the Major Regional Drivers 
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5.4 Generating Competitive Advantages through Resource 
Development Strategies: An Interpretive Discussion  
This study examines how seaports plan, build, organize and utilize their capital-intensive 
resources to grow their gateway, and to capture transshipment, container traffic. As discussed 
in the previous sections, the resource development and management paths undertaken by the 
three ports represent a situation of strategically and agily adapting, agglomerating, aligning, 
connecting, differentiating, fortifying and supplementing resources to expand their 
hinterlands and forelands in a dynamically competitive environment. In the context of seaport 
competition, the foregoing findings suggest that interpreting them in the two contingent 
dimensions of “regional competition” and “sizes of hinterlands and forelands” seem 
appropriate in terms of making sense of the shift in strategic intent by the three ports over 
five decades. 
Regional competition is an indicator of the intensity of rival pressure among seaports 
operating within a market where their services could extend. Size of hinterland and foreland 
is the captive market of a focal seaport. It is a prerequisite to growth in seaport traffic and a 
core element in the formulation of competitive strategies, as Rodrigue and Guan (2009) 
contended:  
“the future of a gateway port is increasingly decided over what takes place over its 
hinterland” (p.4).  
Mapping the resource development and management paths of the three ports over four 
periods (1960s-1980s, 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s) into these two dimensions based on their 
operating environment characteristics and the intensity of their regional competition and 
extent of hinterlands and forelands thus offers an opportunity to develop a theoretical 
framework for interpreting how resource-based strategies could be staged to increase seaport 
competitiveness. Figure 5.4 shows the outcome of this mapping exercise. 
Quadrant 1 of Figure 5.4 illustrates a situation of limited regional competition and limited 
hinterland and foreland. PoK and PoR were in such a situation during the 1960-1980 period. 
Both seaports were among the pioneer seaports in embracing containerization within their 
zones of operations (i.e. Hamburg-Le Havre range in the case of PoR and East Asia in the 
case of PoK) and faced very limited competition. This situation also applied to PoK between 
1990 and 2000.  
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Figure 5.4: Schematic comparison of resource-development strategies of PoD, PoK and PoR based on their operating environment characteristics
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Quadrant 2 characterizes a situation of limited regional competition but extensive hinterland 
and foreland. PoD essentially fell into this category from 1960 until 2010, being the busiest 
port in the Middle-East. During the period 1990-2000, PoR could also be grouped in this 
quadrant, given its position as a dominant player in Northern Europe. 
Quadrant 3 depicts the case of seaports with limited hinterland and foreland operating in an 
environment of intense competition. PoK has been in such a position since 2000. 
The last quadrant (Quadrant 4) is applicable to seaports with extensive hinterland and 
foreland operating in an intensely competitive environment. The case of PoD in the recent 
decade and the situation facing PoR since the turn of the century fit these characteristics. 
Figure 5.4 shows that of the eight resource-based constructs identified from the cross-case 
analysis, three - resource agglomeration, resource adaptation, and resource fortification - are 
present in all four quadrants. This suggests that they are the basic building blocks of resource 
development and management strategies. 
First, container terminal facilities are basic infrastructural resources required of seaport 
developments (Baird, 2002). However, providing basic seaport infrastructure means that a 
seaport would only be offering the basic port product (i.e. cargo transfer product). To offer a 
range of logistics and manufacturing products, a seaport needs to develop other resources to 
complement its basic port product and augment its cargo handling capabilities. This process 
of creating synergies by combining resources that can complement each other is evident in 
PoD, PoK, and PoR throughout the five decades. In all three seaports, building container 
terminals had gone hand-in-hand with ongoing developments of free trade zones (PoD), 
export free zones (PoK) and distriparks (PoR) in close proximity to create the resource 
agglomeration effect. 
Second, because seaport development involves building mega-infrastructure, which is 
exceedingly capital intensive, seaport organizations, expectedly, would tend to be vigilant in 
establishing processes, policies and means to bolster the utilization of these high-cost 
facilities. By introducing processes, features or policies to increase the utilization of available 
infrastructural resources, port authorities fortify their resource base. PoK, for instance, 
fortified the utilization of its resource base by embarking upon a construction project of a 
cross-harbor tunnel in the period 1960-1980, and by introducing a navigating center as well 
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as implementing the ISPS system between 2000 and 2010. PoD has also fortified its 
resources since 2000: it has unified the port governance and its operating division (2000-
2010) and strengthened the port industrial cluster by acquiring Jafza (2010s). PoR, likewise, 
utilized this strategy recently by adopting an innovative approach (e.g. collaborative projects 
with universities, PlantOne, and PortXL) as a means to increase the utilization rate of its 
terminal facilities. 
Like all business organizations, seaports are required to constantly adapt to environmental 
and industrial dynamics. Adaptation is a strategic posture that helps organizations to respond 
flexibly to changes in external conditions, which is a sign of organizational readiness. While 
none of the three ports utilized resource adaptation as a strategy during the period 1960-1980, 
this strategy has featured prominently in the case of PoK since the 1990s and the PoR since 
the turn of the century. PoD also utilized this strategy in the 2000-2010 period when it 
participated in the Container Security Initiative (CSI). 
Taking note of the strategic dominance of the three resource-based constructs in the four 
quadrants of the “regional-competition - size of hinterland-foreland” framework, the 
following first working proposition is offered. 
Proposition 1: Resource agglomeration, resource fortification and resource 
adaptation are the three basic building blocks of a resource-based strategy for 
seaport development.  
Seaports are composed of a bundle of assets and resources that are geographically bound. 
When these resources are in close proximity, they create an agglomeration effect. When they 
are far apart, they require efficient systems of transport infrastructure to link them so that 
their complementary effects can be harnessed to advantage. This suggests that resource 
connectivity, as a resource-based strategy, is only useful when resources that are 
geographically separated from a seaport have the potential to augment the utilization of 
seaport infrastructure. In this sense, resource connectivity can also be viewed as a specific 
form of resource adaptation, which requires existing resources be re-configured, e.g. through 
policy or process change, in response to external changes to increase their rate of utilization. 
Resource connectivity is, to a certain extent, also a strategy to respond to the presence of 
external opportunities. The difference is that such opportunities are present in geographically 
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separated locations away from a seaport and requires, not re-configuration of existing 
resources, but the construction of transport infrastructure to access them. 
Reviewing the resource development paths of the three ports, it was observed that PoK, with 
a limited hinterland and a politically inaccessible foreland, never invoked a strategy of 
resource connectivity. PoD, however, did use it during the period 2000-2010 to streamline its 
logistics and trade cluster operations. PoR, on the other hand, has been employing resource 
connectivity as a strategy to extend its hinterland since 1990. These observations lead to the 
second proposition.  
Proposition 2: Resource connectivity offers a means to connect a seaport to 
geographically distant resources to extend its hinterland and foreland and to augment 
the utilization of its capital infrastructure.  
Bundling seaport products can go beyond conventional product offerings (cargo transfer, 
logistics and manufacturing). Introducing additional port-related resources generates fresh 
opportunities for seaports to develop new capabilities. These supplementary resources are 
typically developed in close proximity to ports to expand the range of their port product 
offerings. Resource supplementarity was deployed by PoD and PoK at the earliest phase of 
their development (1960s -1980) when their regional competition was rather limited. Both 
ports invested heavily during this period (DryDocks for ship-building, repair and 
maintenance services in the case of PoD, and opening the second harbor entrance in the case 
of PoK) to expand their port-related product offerings in anticipation of growing competition 
in their respective regions.  
Proposition 3: Resource supplementarity can help seaports to expand their range of 
port-related product offerings and to develop new capabilities to meet anticipated 
growth in competition. 
To build up a resource bundle, ports occasionally require non-tradable resources embedded in 
other organizations. To gain access to those resources, seaports join in strategic alliances, 
mergers or acquisitions and create value for themselves by pooling resources. PoD embarked 
on such a strategy during the 1990s by integrating the twin ports of Port Rashid and Port 
Jebel Ali, both in terms of their governance and operation to stimulate throughput growth. It 
again resorted to such a strategy in the 2000s by acquiring two major stevedoring companies 
(CSX Terminals and P&O Ports) to upgrade the status of its operating division (DPI, later 
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called DP World) from a regional participant to a global operator. PoK likewise employed 
this strategy when it fully privatized its container terminal operations during the 1990s to 
improve operational efficiency. 
Both PoD and PoK utilized this strategy at a time when their regional competition was 
relatively limited. In both instances, the strategic intent was to streamline operations and to 
increase efficiency. The combination of circumstances suggests the following.  
Proposition 4: Resource alignment helps to strengthen a seaport’s operations and 
increases its efficiency, thus bolstering its resilience to face greater competition in 
future. 
Seaports' infrastructural resources are essentially built in a similar manner worldwide. 
Physically, these resources cannot be readily differentiated. But conditions of use could alter 
their functions. Among the three ports, PoK, which had a limited hinterland and foreland 
compared with the other two ports, was the only one to utilize resource differentiation as a 
strategy. PoK leased its container terminals to a few selected shipping lines for their 
dedicated use to guarantee utilization during the 1960-1980 period, when it faced limited 
regional competition. As that competition intensified almost two decades later, PoK found 
itself in a disadvantageous, locked-in position and removed the policy. The experience of 
PoK suggests that resource differentiation, as a competitive seaport strategy, has limited 
value. Using resource differentiation to attract some particular groups of clientele to the 
exclusion of others creates the risk of alienating the majority of customers, especially when 
competition is rife. The strategy, in short, could be counter-productive in the face of 
increasing competition. Accordingly, the following proposition is put forward. 
Proposition 5: Resource differentiation, while offering privileges for some high-value 
clients, could unintentionally exclude seaports from opportunities to service the 
majority of customers, especially in times of intense competition. 
Infrastructural development in seaports requires a huge investment, and a relatively long 
period of planning and building. Once completed, changes are almost irreversible. Port 
authorities require foresight and vision to modify their infrastructure programs to respond 
rapidly and flexibly to external changes. The experiences of the three ports show that PoR 
was the only seaport to have adopted such a strategy of resource agility once in the last five 
decades. PoR amended the development objectives for MV1, initially intended for oil, 
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chemical, iron and steel industries, to become a location for container terminals following the 
prevailing trend of containerization during the 1960-1980 period. In organizing change to 
adapt, PoR had leveraged awareness of business cycles and economic trends to respond, 
giving rise to the next proposition. 
Proposition 6: Resource agility requires foresight, vision and information to modify 
seaport infrastructure rapidly to match external demands. 
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This study was motivated by an attempt to understand how global seaports plan to optimize 
the use of their capital-intensive superstructures and infrastructures, given that these 
resources are, once developed, use-specific and irreversible. Despite the growing importance 
of seaports, and hence their infrastructures, in facilitating global trade in the last five decades 
since containerization (Notteboom and Rodrigue, 2013, Guerrero and Rodrigue, 2014), the 
review of literature on seaport competitiveness (in Chapter 2) suggests that only a limited 
number of studies have examined seaport competitiveness from a resource-based perspective. 
These studies focus largely on identifying the role of resources in contributing to competitive 
advantages for the seaports studied, such as Antwerp (Haezendonck et al., 2001), Singapore 
(Gordon et al., 2005), and Sines (Azevedo and Ferreira, 2008). Being single cases, their 
findings remain fragmentary. As no attempts have been made to carry out a longitudinal 
analysis of the developmental path of seaports, the manner in which global seaports have 
structured, bundled and leveraged their resources to gain competitiveness remains largely 
unexplored. This study was designed to fill that void. 
Using a multiple case study approach, this research examined the developmental paths of 
three case seaports – PoD, PoK and PoR - located in three geopolitically contrasting regions 
to understand how they planned, developed, utilized and leveraged their physical resources to 
gain strategic advantage. The research questions posed was: 
How do global container seaports manage their resource base to achieve competitiveness? 
Within the broad confine of the above research question, this study assessed seaport 
competitiveness from two perspectives. The first perspective is based on the resource 
management process model of Sirmon et al. (2007), concentrating on the structuring, 
bundling and leveraging of resources. The second perspective is on the dynamic capabilities 
displayed by the case seaports to confront the operating environment and regional market 
220 
dynamics to achieve sustainable competitive advantages. These two perspectives resulted in 
extending the above research question into the following two sub-questions: 
1. Do global seaports engage in a parallel program of complementary activities when 
they plan and develop their superstructure and infrastructure? If so, what are the 
characteristics of these parallel programs of complementary activities? 
2. How do global seaports adapt their developed superstructure and infrastructure to 
continually align their functions to fit evolving market dynamics and industry trends 
overtime? 
The literature on RBV (reviewed in Chapter 2) argues that firms capable of utilizing and 
leveraging their VRIN resources to create value can obtain competitive advantages (Barney, 
1991, Sirmon et al., 2007, Andersén, 2011). The processes which could lead to such an 
occurrence require the development of dynamic capabilities that fit the environmental 
contingencies confronting the organizations through a process of organizational learning 
(Sirmon et al., 2007). Drawing on the tenets of RBV, Dynamic Capability, Organization 
Learning and Contingency theories, this thesis examined the strategic development paths of 
three selected seaports (PoD, PoK, and PoR) since the introduction of containerization to 
seek answers to the research questions.  
This chapter concludes the thesis by highlighting the major contributions flowing from its 
salient findings in Section 6.1. It is followed by a discussion on the implications of these 
findings in Section 6.2, both theoretical and practical. Limitations of the study and 
suggestions for further research are identified in Section 6.3. 
6.1 Major Contributions 
Examining the developmental paths of the three case seaports from the perspective of 
resource management, this study found that eight resource-based strategies (referred to as 
“resource constructs”) were used in various combination, depending on the intensity of the 
competition within the region of operations and the size of the hinterland and foreland of the 
seaport. The resource constructs include resource agglomeration, resource agility, resource 
supplementarity, resource fortification, resource differentiation, resource adaptation, resource 
connectivity, and resource alignment. From the strategic actions taken by the three case 
seaports, the different combinations of the eight resource-based constructs can be viewed as 
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couching within four basic dynamic capability building blocks that were instrumental in 
helping them to achieve, and maintain, their global competitiveness: a capital-intensive 
regime of developing logistics support infrastructure (CIR Capability); a parallel program of 
utilizing resources in a complementary manner (PP Capability); a dynamically agile 
capability of coupling, de-coupling, and recoupling to renew resource utilization efficiency in 
response to external changes (regional dynamics, industry trends) (CDR Capability); and a 
capability of re-orienting the use of tangible assets as an exit strategy for intangible assets to 
adapt to unfolding events (E Capability). In this context, E Capability can be regarded as the 
decoupling and re-coupling components of CDR Capability. 
Two main features flowing from the findings are noteworthy as a contribution, both to the 
literature of resource management and maritime operations. 
First, of the eight resource-based strategies identified, three were found to prevail in all four 
settings defined by the two contingent factors of regional competition and size of hinterland 
and foreland. Namely, resource agglomeration, resource fortification and resource adaptation. 
The dominant use of resource agglomeration as a strategy suggests that global seaports make 
deliberate attempts to engage in a parallel program of developing complementary activities 
(e.g. free trade zones, economic processing zones and logistics parks) while planning and 
building their superstructure and infrastructure. Resource agglomeration encompasses both 
the CIR and PP Capabilities. It enables seaports to create both economies of scale and 
economies of scope to generate strong multiplier or clustering effects in order to optimize the 
usage of their capital-intensive resources. These effects have been amply demonstrated in the 
developmental paths of three case seaports. PoD’s pairing the functions of Port Rashid and 
Jebel Ali to complement each other in terms of resource usage and its capacity expansion 
programs (Terminal 4) in Jebel Ali port to became the single location for cargo freight 
services; PoK’s developing Taiwan’s first export processing zone in the port land (KEPZ) 
when it commenced construction of four container terminals in the 1960s-1980s period; and 
PoR’s move to combine two reclamation projects (MV1 and MV2), and three distriparks to 
accommodate European Distribution Centers and house a range of industries are evidences of 
resource agglomeration. 
The use of resource fortification, a reflection of CDR Capability, points to the importance of 
introducing features to reinforce the utilization of available seaport resources. This is 
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exemplified by PoD’s acquisition of Jafza to strengthen its industrial cluster; PoK’s building 
the cross-harbor tunnel to connect Qijin Island to boost the utilization of the port land; and 
PoR’s introduction of various innovative schemes (e.g., Plant One and PORTXL) to promote 
sustainable economic growth within the port precinct to further increase the use of its port 
infrastructure. Resource fortification illustrates the development of dynamic CDR capability 
to extend the use of seaport infrastructures beyond its core function of loading and unloading. 
Resource adaptation represents another instance of CDR dynamic capability development. 
Focusing on responding quickly and flexibly to external circumstances to add value to 
customers in a dynamic market, resource adaptation requires that seaport develop the 
capacity to reconfigure its operation processes and reorganize its resources. Illustrative 
evidences of exercising resource adaptation dynamic capabilities to gain competitiveness in a 
fast-changing operating environment include PoD’s participation in the container security 
initiative (CSI) of the U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection in the early 2000s, 
which allowed Dubai to become the first Middle Eastern port to handle cargos bound directly 
for the U.S.; PoK’s establishment of an offshore shipping center to overcome the restrictions 
imposed on cross-strait traffic between Taiwan and Mainland China in 1990’s; and PoR’s 
investing in bundled services (e.g. Plug & Play, Steam Grid) to strengthen the port bio-based 
cluster and introducing a field lab to shape the growth of a 3D printing industry within the 
port area. 
To a significant extent, all three constructs (i.e., resource agglomeration, resource 
fortification and resource adaptation) encompass the three sequentially linked components – 
namely, structuring, bundling and leveraging – in Sirmon et al.‘s (2007) resource 
management process model. In other words, this study has found is that it is essential to 
simultaneously consider all three sequentially linked processes in formulating resource-based 
strategies to gain competitive advantage. Although the three steps form distinct sequential 
stages in the management process, the strategic use of resources to build dynamic capabilities 
to meet environmental contingencies requires that a long-term vision on the utilization and 
deployment of complementary resources be formed even at the stage of building and 
development. This is a major contribution of the findings from the perspective of augmenting 
Sirmon et al.’s (2007) resource process management model. 
The second noteworthy finding relates to the use of resource agility and resource 
differentiation as a strategy to gain competitive advantages. PoR used resource agility (i.e. 
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another CDR Capability) to amend its development objectives for MV1, which was initially 
intended for oil, chemical, iron and steel industries, to become a location for container 
terminals following the prevailing trend of containerization during the 1960-1980 period. As 
seaport infrastructural development is a capital intensive venture requiring a relatively long 
period of planning and building, and almost irreversible once complete, port authorities need 
to have the foresights to modify their seaport infrastructure programs to respond rapidly and 
flexibly to external changes. PoR had the vision and capacity to decisively alter MV1’s 
development objectives. Its agility in modifying the intended use of a major physical asset 
reaffirms the notion that using tangible resources to build dynamic capabilities to fit market 
contingencies demands appreciation of the possibilities of reconfiguring the physical 
resources at the stage of planning and development. 
With regard to the use of resource differentiation (i.e. another CDR Capability) as a strategy, 
this study found that PoK’s policy of leasing out container terminals to a few selected 
shipping lines for their dedicated use during the 1960-1980 period became a competitive 
disadvantage in the following decades. While PoK was able to increase the utilization rate of 
its container terminals, including securing container terminal investments from customer 
shipping lines during the period of lease, PoK found itself in a disadvantageous and locked-in 
position two decades later when competition intensified. Consequently, a significantly less 
restrictive policy was employed in the following decades. The experience of PoK suggests 
that resource differentiation, as a competitive seaport strategy, could be counter-productive. 
Resource differentiation could attract some specific groups of clientele to the exclusion of the 
majority of customers, creating a major resource disadvantage. This is another significant 
contribution to the resource management and strategy literature, which hails differentiation as 
one of the corner stones (together with cost reduction) of competitive advantage. 
Lastly, because of its resource-based focus, this study also contributes to a re-interpretation of 
seaport competitiveness strategy. The implications stemming from this re-interpretation are 
discussed in the next section. 
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6.2 Implications 
While some of the eight resource-based constructs identified in this study have been 
discussed in general management and resource-based literature within the context of 
organizational performance, their role and significance in maritime transport and logistics 
have not been unearthed in the way this research has managed to unfold. The approach used 
by this research and the findings resulting from the case investigation carry significant 
implications for theory development and practice in seaport operations. 
6.2.1 Implications for Theory  
Exploring the strategic developmental paths of the three case seaports from the resource-
based view is a departure from the conventional approach to studying seaport 
competitiveness based on locational advantages (Song and Yeo, 2004, Guy and Urli, 2006, 
De Langen, 2007, Yuen et al., 2012), operational efficiencies (Peters, 2001, Tongzon and 
Heng, 2005, Ugboma et al., 2006, Saeed, 2009), price of services and tariff (Lirn et al., 2004, 
Ng, 2006, Wang et al., 2014, Yeo et al., 2014), and connectivity and hinterland access 
(Tongzon and Heng, 2005, Low et al., 2009), among others. While examining seaport 
competition from the RBV perspective has been attempted (e.g., (Haezendonck et al., 2001, 
Gordon et al., 2005, Azevedo and Ferreira, 2008), using a multiple case study that allows for 
logic replication, analyzing the findings through the joint lens of four organization theories, 
and exploring the strategic developmental paths of the case seaports via a longitudinal 
perspective, this research has opened a new horizon to studying seaport competitiveness. The 
approach adopted and the ensuing findings have major implications for theory development 
in seaport competition. 
First, this study relates the resource-based strategies of the three case seaports to changes in 
the maritime industry. It differentiates the common and unique resource development and 
utilization approaches of the case seaports based on the market dynamics and intensity of the 
competition of their regional hinterlands and forelands that formed the contextual 
circumstances surrounding their distinctive operations. This analytic framework presents a 
fresh perspective not only on how seaports compete from the resource-based view but also 
how resource-based strategies are continuously re-formulated in accordance with the dynamic 
complexities of the regional operating environments at different time periods. 
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Second, this study examines the resource development paths of the three case seaports, 
commencing from the introduction of containerization. A longitudinal view allows the flow-
on effects of strategic resource building programs to be followed through to their utilization 
and management. This approach goes beyond strategy identification and development 
intention mapping, allowing the evolution, extension, alteration and discontinuation of 
strategies to be tracked and understood. 
Third, the eight resource-based constructs generated from the interpretation of the cross-case 
findings suggest that there are considerable variations in the way seaport resources could be 
developed, fortified, re-configured, adapted to suit market changes or aligned with external 
environmental conditions. Insights into these variations help provide a deep understanding of 
how intangible resources could be dynamically sourced, speedily built or progressively 
modified to support the optimal use of the immobile, capital intensive physical resources. 
They also highlight the significance of intangible resources as an agent of resource adaptation 
(e.g., offshore shipping center in PoK, distriparks in PoR), a facilitator of resource 
reconfiguration (e.g., merger of DPA and DPI in PoD, industrial eco system in PoR) and a 
catalyst of change (e.g., export processing zone in PoK, bio-based cluster in PoR). 
Lastly, this study has demonstrated the complementary roles of RBV, organization learning, 
dynamic capability and contingency theories in studying seaport competitiveness. Tenets 
from RBV of the firm, organization learning and dynamic capabilities theories were used to 
explain how seaports combine tangible and intangible resources to develop, bundle and 
leverage capabilities and competencies to gain competitive advantage. Contingency theory 
was then employed to inject an element of context-specificity into the analysis, 
complementing RBV and DC theories by relating the resource strategies used to the evolving 
nuances of contrasting socioeconomic and geopolitical settings. This research thus offers a 
precedence where combination of organizational theories could be used to enrich the 
phenomenon of seaport competitiveness. The six working propositions developed from the 
interpretation of the within and cross-case findings from such a joint theoretical lens offer a 
starting point for building theories on seaport competition. 
6.2.2 Implications for Practice 
Maximizing the utility of their capital-intensive seaport superstructure and infrastructure is 
one of the main preoccupations of global seaport authorities. Through the developmental 
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paths of three global seaports, this research has uncovered some valuable insights on how 
these capital assets had been optimally utilized, capturing them in eight resource-based 
constructs. The operational features underpinning the eight constructs contain insightful 
information on how the utilities, and competitive values, of capital-intensive seaport 
infrastructure could be increased.  
First, this study has found that in all the three case seaports, a program of complementary 
resource developments was always staged, either in parallel or through a minor time-
differential (i.e., lead or lag), with the planned development of new terminal facilities to 
increase capacities. These complementary resources could take various forms, the most 
common of which is the implementation of Free Trade (or Free Economic) Zones or 
Distripark. Locating these zones in close proximity to seaports creates an agglomeration 
effect that enable the seaport and the Free Trade Zone to complement one another – the 
former providing a gateway for enterprises located in the latter to import their raw materials 
and component parts as well as export their finished goods, while the latter feeds the former 
with cargo flows. 
Second, all three case seaports had been in constant pursuit of various forms of “soft" 
approaches to build their dynamic capabilities, such as tapping into resources of allied 
services or formulating new policy measures, to augment the attractiveness of their physical 
resources. Examples of such soft dynamic approaches include the merger of DPA, Jafza and 
Dubai Customs in PoD, which created a one-stop platform for port users to interact with 
authorities; the introduction of dedicated container terminals in PoK to shipping lines as 
means of boosting their operational efficiency; and investment in Keyrail, the company that 
manages the double track dedicated freight rail towards Germany and Europe by PoR to 
promote the use of rail transport. 
Third, this study has found that the regional context within which a seaport operates has a 
profound impact on their development strategies. PoD capitalized on the geopolitical 
unsettling situations in the Middle-East region to establish itself as the seaport of choice by 
engaging in a massive program of resource building, both within the port area as well as in its 
vicinity. On the other hand, PoK, which had been facing high level of regional competition, 
focused on resource consolidation by devising policies centered on developing capabilities to 
boost utilization of the built resources. PoR, by contrast, diversified its resource bases in 
various fronts, from developing mega-infrastructural projects, to parallel investments in 
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redeveloping city-ports, facilitating inter-modality as well as forming an industrial eco-
system in the port area. Facing increasing regional competition from rival ports in the 
Hamburg-Le Havre triangle, PoR implemented a strategy of expanding port products by 
developing ancillary tangible seaport assets (e.g., inland transshipment terminals, bundled 
services of pipelines, water and energy within the port) to build dynamic capabilities (e.g., 
promoting inter-modality, bio-based cluster). 
These examples underscore the need to view a seaport as an operating unit within its region, 
offering a useful pointer for seaport planners to reflect beyond the port internalities when 
planning a development agenda. They suggest that seaports executives should plan 
infrastructure development schemes with provision to adjust their capacities to accommodate 
changing market demands for port products as well as capabilities to adapt strategically and 
flexibly to their regional economic, social, and political dynamics. 
Fourth, the review of historical resource developments in the three case seaports suggests that 
creating competitive capabilities through resource investments (and divestments) contains 
phases of coupling, decoupling and re-coupling. Knowing when to couple, decouple and re-
couple with entities within the overall regional seaport system based on an understanding of 
the seaport value chain dynamics had enabled the three global seaports to constantly renew 
their resource utilization efficiency. The process of introducing, modifying and re-packaging 
port product offerings by PoR (e.g., amendment of development objectives of MV1, 
adaptation of MV2 development project, shaping port industrial cluster and bio-based 
cluster), PoK (e.g., opening 2nd harbor entrance, building cross harbor tunnel, launching 
offshore shipping center), and PoD (e.g., merging DPA and DPI, merging DPA, Jafza and 
Dubai Customs, and acquisition of Jafza) reflect such an understanding. These coupling, 
decoupling and re-coupling processes underpinned the resource fortification, agility, 
differentiation, adaptation, connectivity and alignment postures of the three case seaports as 
described in Chapter 5. They offer a guide for seaport managers to continually readjust the 
attractiveness of the seaport infrastructure to optimize their utilization in accordance with 
industry trends and market competition.  
Lastly, findings of this study also reveal the importance of having an “exit” strategy 
predicated on abandoning intangible resources. An exit strategy for seaports intangible assets 
offers a pragmatic solution towards re-orienting the use of tangible resources in line with 
market changes. PoK’s removal of dedicated terminals is an exemplary case of an exit 
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strategy that rejuvenated the non-optimal utilization of available container terminals. Having 
in place an exit strategy thus means that seaport infrastructure would not be locked into 
positions that would hinder their transformation in response to evolving market needs. 
6.3 Limitations and Directions for future studies 
This research relied heavily on the use of secondary data based on published information. As 
with all studies based on the use of published data, there is always the chance of having 
omitted vital information that could have affected the interpretation of historical events and 
actions. While considerable efforts had been expended to identify appropriate stakeholders to 
seek their advice on key data sources, there is no guarantee that all relevant information had 
been accessed and reviewed, despite the very lengthy search process conducted over three 
years. Further, the knowledge of port informants and industrial stakeholders consulted was 
also limited to their engagement period with the case seaports. This limitation could have 
affected the validation and authentication of some of the secondary data collected. 
As all historical studies are necessarily incomplete in terms of information (Danto, 2008), 
there seems to be little else that could be done, except to conduct further search and increase 
the number of stakeholder consultation. Given that limitation, this study suggests extending 
the same research to include more global seaports operating under either similar or different 
geopolitical contexts to further explore the role of resource-based strategies in bolstering 
seaport competitiveness to validate the present findings. This study is grounded on the 
experience of three seaports selected from the major trade and shipping routes, and are 
confined geographically to Northern Europe, Middle-East and Asia. Extending the case study 
to a wider range of contexts, such as Americas and Africa, would augment the present 
findings, enhancing our understanding of how global seaports build their competitive strength 
through resource management: selection, development, utilization, bundling, deployment and 
leveraging. Extending this present study to other contexts would also be opportune with the 
rapid changes looming in the maritime industry, including the One-Belt, One-Road (OBOR) 
initiative, a long-term development plan of the government of China for expanding land and 
maritime transport links between China and Europe (Ferdinand, 2016). 
A second limitation of this study is its predominant focus on developments relevant to 
containerized traffic. Freight operation in global seaports contains both the bulk and container 
sector services. Competitive strategies of seaports are determined by actions taken to attract 
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the highest possible level of freight carried by container and bulk carriers. Seaports as 
gateways of trade are increasingly developing towards formation of port complexes, where 
bundle of cargo products are on offer. In an increasingly competitive maritime environment, 
a port complex could no longer thrive without offering the two core cargo transfer products. 
Developing resources and capabilities for providing logistics services in both bulk and 
container sector are equally essential (Notteboom and Rodrigue, 2005). Further research 
along this vein would benefit by extending the investigation to include non-containerized 
traffic to reflect the entire spectrum of port operation. 
Third, this research has grounded its interpretation on the resource-based strategies of the 
three case seaports primarily on qualitative information. While this focus is justified on 
grounds of ensuring richness to developing a historiography profile of their developmental 
path, the analysis and interpretation could be further enhanced by also exploring quantitative 
historical information linked to the utilization of seaport resources. Future studies on the 
resource-based strategies of global seaports would therefore benefit from including pertinent 
quantitative information to supplement the analysis, and hence enrich interpretation. 
Fourth, while this research has identified the resource building and utilization strategies in the 
three case seaports, the decision making process in terms of who decided the policy, and how 
the decisions were made, had not been examined in this study. Including the decision making 
processes in future studies would enhance our understanding of the dynamics of resource 
development from a power perspective. 
Resource selection, planning, development, utilization, bundling and deployment are 
important processes in seaport management. Issues relating to these processes would continue 
to confront seaport authorities as seaport competition intensifies when new trading blocks 
emerge, new institutional constraints surface, new maritime technologies are developed and 
new stakeholders enter into the maritime industry. This study has opened an avenue to study 
the resource-based approaches of high-performing global seaports to advance our 
understanding of the role of resources in aiding seaport competitiveness. 
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Name of Organization:      Date of Interview:  
Position of Person Interviewed:     Interviewer:  
Time interview Commenced:     Time Interview Completed:  
Competitiveness of Global Seaports  
Global Seaports have been achieving competitiveness over the last five decades by taking 
advantage of opportunities and making their locational disadvantages irrelevant. The role of 
your organization in the process of capability building for Port of …. in competing with other 
seaports around the world to attract cargo traffic is being viewed to gain an overall 
understanding of its developmental path. 
 Can you please outline how the organizational structure of your port has changed 
over the last five decades?  
 How many phases of change in the organizational structure can be highlighted? 
What generated those phases of change? What were the key features and outcomes 
of the change in each phase? How long did each phase last?  
 Is your port management particularly concerned with the ranking of your port in 
terms of container traffic handled? Please indicate the concerns and the reasons for 
such concerns.  
 In your opinion what have been the predominant causes of variation in your port’s 
position on the world ranking since mid -1980s?  
 What are the main strategic and operational measures adopted to attract container 
traffic? Have these strategies drastically changed over the last five decades? Please 
outline the key features of these changes.  
 How was each one of those strategies implemented? What has been the impact of 
those strategies on the ongoing operational processes (e.g., changes in security 
measures and increase in cost of services)?  
 In your opinion what have been the impacts of regional dynamics on your port’s 
strategic and operational planning? 
 Currently are there any initiatives undertaken by your organization toward 
maintaining the competitive strength of your port (e.g., introduction of new IT 
systems, infrastructural / superstructural adjustments)? 
 Are there any strategies in place for sustaining or increasing the competitive 
position of your port for the next 5-10 years? 
 Can you please give some direction in finding other sources of information on 
historical development of your port?  
Thank you for your time and participation.  
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Name of Organization:      Date of Interview:  
Position of Person Interviewed:     Interviewer:  
Time interview Commenced:     Time Interview Completed:  
Competitiveness of Global Seaports 
Global Seaports have been achieving competitiveness over the last five decades by taking 
advantage of opportunities and making their locational disadvantages irrelevant. The process 
of capability building for Port of …. in competing with other ports across the globe to attract 
cargo traffic is being viewed to gain an overall understanding of its development path.  
 What, in your view, have been the major forces driving port competitiveness at 
present? How do these forces differ from those at the turn of the century as well as 
those in the early 1990s? What were the key global events that had triggered the 
change in factors affecting port competitiveness? 
 Can you please outline the specific events that had affected the competitive strength 
of Port of … over the last five decades? In what way had each of these events 
influenced the volume of container traffic handled by Port of … during this period? 
 How, in your view, did Port of … respond to the changes brought about by each of 
these key events in the last two decades? Please elaborate the actions taken by Port 
of … from both a strategic as well as an operational perspective. 
 In your opinion, were the strategic and operational measures adopted by Port of … 
over the last five decades linked to some of the development policies introduced at 
the City, State or National level? If yes, please provide examples. 
 What impacts (both positive and negative) did the change in operational strategies 
by Port of … over the last five decades have on the supply chain actors that utilized 
this port? Please provide specific examples.  
 What impacts (both positive and negative) did the change in operational strategies 
by Port of … over the last five decades have on the economy of the city (or region 
supported by or supporting this port)? Please provide specific examples.  
 In your opinion, what have been the impacts of regional dynamics on the strategic 
and operational planning of Port of ….?  
 In your view, what operational adjustments could Port of … adopt to increase its 
current level of competitiveness (e.g., introduction of new IT systems, 
infrastructural/superstructural adjustments)? Please provide specific examples.  
 Can you please give some direction in finding other sources of information on 
historical development of Port of ….?  
Thank you for your time and participation. 
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Tangible Resource Building2 in PoD, PoK, and PoR 
  Dubai (PoD) Kaohsiung (PoK) Rotterdam (PoR) 
Tangible Resource 
Building  
 Port Rashid established (1978)  
 Dubai DryDocks built (1979) and operational 
(1983)  
 Jebel Ali port established (1979) and operation 
commenced (1983)  
 Jebel Ali Free Zone (Jafza) constructed around the 
Jebel Ali port area, and operational (1985) 
 Dubai Trade (Port community portal) launched 
(2003), Customer-oriented services introduced: e-
Token, e-Payment and Asra’a  
 Dubai Ports International (DPI) acquired the CSX 
Terminals (2004) 
 DP World acquisition of P&O, expanding their 
portfolio of terminals (2006) 
 Expansion of Jebel Ali Port  
- Terminal 2: Phase I (2001-2006),  
                            Phase II (2008- 2013) 
- Terminal 3 (2011- 2014) 
- Terminal 4 (commenced 2016)  
 Construction of a multimodal logistics platform in 
Jebel Ali area - Dubai World Central  
(DWC – under development since 2012) 
 Acquisition of Jafza (2015)  
 Construction of an Intermodal Rail Terminal in 
Jebel Ali Port confirmed (Projected with Etihad 
Rail) 
 Construction of Container Terminal  
- Terminal 1 (1969-1970) 
- Terminal 2 (1970-1975)  
- Terminal 3 (1980-1981) 
- Terminal 4 (1985-1991)  
- Terminal 5 (1995-2000) 
 Construction of the 2nd harbor entrance  
(1967-1975), opening access for larger vessels into 
the port’s inner harbor to facilitate utilization of 
Qijin district improving operational capabilities  
 Construction of the Cross Harbor Tunnel  
(1981-1984), linking Container Terminal 4 and 
Qijin district to the rest of the port, increasing 
annual capacity of the port by more than 2 million 
TEU 
 Navigation centers (VTS, VTC) were introduced  
 Construction of Container Terminal 6 
(Intercontinental Container Terminal) 
- Phase I (2007-2011) 
- Phase II (2011-2014) 
 Dredging along waterline in Terminal 4 (2014) 
deepening wharfs to provide access of larger 
vessels  
 Construction of Container Terminal 7  
(MoU signed with DP World to develop a new 
terminal accommodating 2.25 TEU 
 Spatial Expansion  
 Maasvlakte 1  
- Phase I (1968 -1971)  
- Phase II (Mid 1990’s – 2008)  
 Maasvlakte 2 (2008 – 2033)  
 Investment in Portbase, ICT infrastructure (2002)  
 Introducing Pipeline system (2003) 
- RC2 & Multicore  
 Investment in “Keyrail” (2007) company that manages the double 
track dedicated freight rail towards Germany, and Europe  
 Investment in “Verkeersonderneming” (2008), a traffic enterprise 
promoting hinterland accessibility  
 Introduction of transshipment terminals: 
- Alpherium (2010)  
- Container Transferium (2015)  
 Introduction of Plug & Play (2013), an initiative creating a bio-based 
cluster in the port 
 Introduction of Steam Grid (2013), promoting bio-energy, bio-
chemicals, and bio-fuel by distributing steam  
 Undertaking a number of International ventures (Oman, Brazil, 
China, Indonesia) for development and management of ports  
 Agreement for exploitation, development, and management of 
Dordrecht seaport  
 Setting up information platform (NextLogic) based on syncro-
modality concept  
 Launching a fieldlab in port as a site of innovation  
                                                 
2 References were provided in Chapter 4. 
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 Intangible Resource Building3 in PoD, PoK, and PoR 
 Dubai (PoD) Kaohsiung (PoK) Rotterdam (PoR) 
Intangible 
Resource Building  
 Unification of port authorities (Jebel Ali and Port 
Rashid) and formation of Dubai Port Authority (DPA)  
 Dubai Ports International (DPI) founded as the first 
Container Terminal Operator in UAE (1999) 
 DPA, Jafza and Customs merged and formed Ports, 
Customs, Free Zone Corporation (PCFC) (2001)  
 Participation of Jebel Ali port in Container security 
initiative (CSI) (2002)  
 
 Dubai Ports International (DPI) merged with DPA 
(Dubai Port Authority) and formed DP World (2005).  
Merger of DPI with DPA (Dubai Port Authority) and 
formation of DP World (2005). DP World developed to 
one of the largest terminal operators in the world, with 
a portfolio of more than 78 marine and inland terminals 
across 6 continents, handled more than 64 million TEU 
in 2016.  
 Establishing long term relationship with shipping lines 
by offering dedicated container terminals (1970s) 
 Introduction of Export Processing Zone in the port area 
(1980s) targeting “Double V”(trade value + trade 
volume)  
 Establishing an Offshore Shipping Center (1997) 
 Lifting the limitation of dedicated container terminals 
and upgrading the shipping lines to “Terminal 
Operators”, offering opportunities for higher volume of 
transshipment cargoes (late 1990s) 
 Privatization of Container terminal operation  
 
 Introduction of Free Trade Zone in the Port area, 
Terminals 2,3,4 and 5 approved as Free Trade Zones 
(2004) 
 Obtaining Eco-port certification to verify port 
environmental friendly infrastructure and operations 
(2014) 
 Implementation of International ship and port security 
(ISPS) systems to improve port and vessel security 
against terrorist threats 
 
 Obtaining ISO 9002, and 14001 quality certifications  
 Introduction of Distriparks in the port area  
 Eemhaven (1989) 
 Botlek (1990)  
 Maasvlakte (1998)  
 Formation of a port cluster association (Deltalinqs) to 
enhance relationship between port and the industries 
located within the port land (2001)  
 
 Formation of Rotterdam City Ports Development 
Corporation (RCDC) to transform the city harbors and 
promote sustainable combinations of city functions, 
port functions, and living functions (2004)  
 Collaboration with Universities (Smart Port, Generation 
R, RCIP) for training, research and consultancy 
services linked to port activities  
 
 Plant One (2010): Opening a test facility in the port for 
sustainable process innovations  
 Forming a start-up accelerator program (PORTXL) to 
promote sustainable growth of port economy through 
port related for start ups  
 
 Opening the first 3D lab in port called RAMLAB 
(2016) 
                                                 
3 References were provided in Chapter 4. 
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